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This dissertation addresses the question of how Britain was able to achieve its imperial 
goals in Palestine in spite of the limitation imposed by the League of Nations’ mandate 
system. To do so, it investigates the construction of Haifa harbour as a case study. The 
crucial issue was that Britain as the mandatory power and as a founding member of the 
League of Nations was compelled to adhere to the open door clause and give foreign 
nationals access to economic opportunities in the mandated territories. Conformity with 
the mandate system provided the legitimacy necessary for the British government to 
control Palestine in the context of the new international law that emerged as a result of 
World War I, prohibiting annexation of acquired territories. Debates in Whitehall occurred 
about how to obtain economic and strategic benefits whilst keeping rivals away and 
without breaching the mandate system. Broadly speaking, the Colonial Office’s position was 
to follow the traditional colonial approach while the Foreign Office insisted on adapting to 
the new global regulations. On several issues policy functioned: on the method of carrying 
out the harbour works; on the issuing of a loan for Palestine; and on efforts to convince the 
Iraq Petroleum Company to adopt a route for the oil pipeline from Iraq to terminate in 
Haifa. This was also made possible due to the British government’s employment of an 
interventionist policy. With the completion of the construction at Haifa harbour, the British 
government was able to achieve a balance between its own interests and the requirements 
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At the San Remo conference of 1920, the League of Nations assigned the mandate of 
Palestine to Britain. This was no burden to the British who recognised the economic and 
strategic importance of Palestine. The first British High Commissioner there, Herbert 
Samuel, wrote in his July 1921 report that ‘the prospects of Palestine are not limited, on the 
economic side. […] Its geographical position rendered it in ancient times, and may render it 
again, a centre of no small importance to the commercial traffic of the larger territories that 
surround it. […]The seaborne commerce, such as it is, is loaded and discharged in the open 
roadsteads of Jaffa and Haifa: there are no harbours.’1 Later, in 1928, Arthur Balfour, Lord 
President of the Council, said in a Cabinet memorandum that ‘Palestine has special 
characteristics depending on its geographical position which greatly increase its Imperial 
importance. It lies at the very place where the Power primarily responsible for the security 
of the Suez Canal would wish to place it.’2 
 
The means by which the British sought to maximise the economic and strategic importance 
of Palestine for British interests was to construct a harbour there. In fact, constructing 
harbours formed one of the British government’s investments in the colonised territories 
and characterized Britain’s approach to Empire before World War One (WWI). As Cain and 
Hopkins explained, Britain’s commercial expansion was ‘accompanied by railway and 
harbour construction’ which required machinery that gave ‘employment to British 
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manufacturers and personnel’.3 In light of this explanation, it is fair to say that in spite of 
the fact that the acquisition of Palestine was not planned, the British government had clear 
objectives for using the newly acquired territory. That is the building of a harbour in 
Palestine would achieve the expected strategic and economic goals from Palestine as if it 
were an imperial project. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate how the British government, through the 
construction of Haifa harbour, maintained its colonial approach towards Palestine, even 
though it was under the League of Nations mandate, in order to advance its economic and 
strategic goals. This hypothesis is in line with the understanding that Britain as mandatory 
power should get something ‘exclusive out of it’ as declared in the first meeting of the 
League of Nations Assembly by A. Balfour, the British representative on the League’s 
Council.4 This thesis shows how Britain skilfully managed to do this by manipulating the 
provisions of the mandate and balance her interests and those of the international 
community with those of local inhabitants. A threefold objective is presented here in order 
to examine Britain’s three-way balancing act. First, I intend to demonstrate that Britain 
sought to secure her imperial interests as a matter of paramount importance in pursuing 
projects (Britain created a climate conducive to economic expansion, to enhance the British 
economy). Secondly, I expect to show that the interests of the international community and 
economic equality - as guaranteed by the League of Nations - were taken into consideration 
by Britain. Nevertheless, Britain was able to neutralize the efforts of foreign interests to 
contribute to the project. Thirdly, I will show that local interests were cared for through the 
application of fair labour conditions when employing local labour. Therefore, Britain 
                                                          
3
 Peter Cain and Anthony Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000 (second edition) (Harlow, England: 
Pearson Education, 2002), p. 313. 
4
 Herbert Gibbons, ‘The Defects of the System of Mandates’, Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, vol. 96, The Place of the United States in a World Organization for the 
Maintenance of Peace (July 1921), pp. 84-90, p.89; Susan Pedersen, The Guardians, The League of 
Nations and the Crisis of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 51. 
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continuously attempted to reconcile its interests with its obligations towards Palestine and 
the international community through its commitment to the League of Nations. This 
problem provides the constant thread running through the whole discussion of Britain’s 
deliberations over the construction of the Haifa harbour. 
 
The core question in this thesis is, what were Britain’s economic and investment policies in 
Palestine during the period in question, 1919-1935, and how were they formed? The case 
study on the construction of Haifa harbour offers a good example of how wider British 
policy towards the mandate was formed. Hence some of the questions that have to be 
posed are: To what extent was Britain’s approach towards the harbour construction 
influenced by its economic and strategic concerns? How did Britain’s international 
commitments affect its decisions about the construction of Haifa harbour? What impact did 
Britain’s foreign policy have on its insistence on the Haifa terminus for the Iraqi oil pipeline? 
And, how was Britain’s imperial approach towards acquired territories adapted to fit the 
mandate system?  
 
In the newly acquired territories after WWI, Britain maintained its colonial approach in 
seeking to secure for itself economic and strategic interests. However, Britain’s approach 
was hindered by the fact that the acquired territories were now subject to the provisions of 
the mandate system as designed by the League of Nations. Consequently, Britain 
maintained the fundamental features of its imperial approach in those acquired territories, 
such as using their natural resources, but had to introduce changes to its method, such as 
that related to the harbour construction. This was so in spite of the fact that mandated 
Palestine was not annexed by Britain but was nonetheless treated as a de facto colony.5 It is 
                                                          
5
 Pitman Potter, ‘Origin of the System of Mandates under the League of Nations’, The American 
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by detecting these features that characterized Britain’s approach to Empire where we can 
learn about its policies toward the construction of the Haifa harbour. To achieve that, this 
thesis revises existing knowledge of British policy before and during the period between the 
two World Wars. The available literature provides material that enables us to see when 
Britain followed an imperial approach in Palestine or something that differed from it when 
faced with circumstances that demanded it. 
 
In examining the influence of economic factors in Britain during British rule in Palestine, 
there is reason to agree with Cain and Hopkins’ argument that ‘the central weakness in 
existing accounts of overseas expansion and imperialism is that they underplay or misjudge 
the relationship between the British economy and Britain’s presence abroad’. 6 They 
suggested that ‘putting the metropolitan economy back at the centre of the analysis’ makes 
it possible to ‘establish a new framework for interpreting Britain’s historic role as a world 
power’.7 This thesis explores the commercial benefits gained by Britain’s expansion in 
Palestine through which new markets for British products were created as seen in the 
building of the harbour. Cain and Hopkins’ analysis of British imperialism forms an essential 
element of this thesis. Their suggestion that there is a link between the economic 
conditions in Britain and its policy abroad forms the backbone of this study. In fact, this 
study provides evidence supporting some of their assumptions, particularly those 
pertaining to Britain’s attempts to maximise the economic benefits to her Empire. 
Therefore, this thesis demonstrates how the building of the harbour contributed, although 
only marginally, to the economic benefit of Britain. 
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John Hobson in Imperialism argued that there was a connection between territorial 
expansion and economic requirements as a response to the social changes expressed in 
what he termed ‘new imperialism’. Hobson’s assumption that economic matters and 
specifically ‘consumption’ were the reason behind Britain’s territorial expansion is 
contested by other historians who point to political and strategic reasons. Hobson’s 
assumption, however, is still valid. It is not the concern of this thesis to pass judgement on 
the causes that led to the prevailing economic conditions in Britain after WWI, but rather it 
deals with evaluating how these conditions affected the shaping of Britain’s economic 
policy towards Palestine. As Hobson states ‘the distinction between the “political” and 
“strategic”, on the one hand, and the “economic”, on the other, whilst useful for analytical 
purposes, may not be accorded such a separation in real life where political and economic 
institutions formally interact.’8 In explaining his point, for example, he states that Egypt was 
occupied in 1882 in order to protect routes of communication with India that Britain 
required for trade and investment, clearly demonstrating the strategic and economic 
reasons for maintaining control of the country.9 In this context it is possible to see Britain’s 
interest in Palestine as providing ‘suitable bases or jumping-off points for regional business 
penetration’.10 It was vital for Britain’s ‘worldwide commercial and maritime interests’ to 
control access to ‘various zones of land and sea’ to reach its ‘long-established colonies’.11 In 
light of this explanation, the development of the harbour could be viewed as serving a 
similar task to Gibraltar and Malta. As established above, factors of politics and economics 
are inseparable, and are reflected in the many deliberations in Whitehall that took place 
over the construction of Haifa harbour.12  
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Cain and Hopkins argued that WWI is ‘conventionally regarded as marking the dividing line 
between the expansion and decline of Empire.’13 It is safe to suggest that the fact that 
Britain seized additional territory after the War makes the dividing line rather blurred than 
vivid, particularly under the mandate system. This is evident in Elizabeth Monroe’s 
explanation that ‘the mandatory undertakings amounted to a cross between liberalism and 
adherence to war aims, but were not the same thing as old-style colonialism’.14 
Furthermore, John Darwin argued that the expansion in the Middle East after WWI showed 
that British imperialism in the twentieth century ‘operated under very different conditions 
from its Victorian counterpart and displayed somewhat different characteristics’.15 The view 
presented in this thesis is in agreement with Darwin, as the case of Palestine’s mandate 
does not present a decline of Britain’s Empire but rather direct imperial rule. Britain’s 
imperialism in Palestine, Darwin argues, became conspicuous after Britain had to undergo 
an abrupt and radical change in 1935-36 courtesy of the Arabs’ revolt.16 Before this, 
however, this thesis demonstrates how Britain sought to conceal its imperial approach in 
Palestine. This is possible to understand by following the process of building Haifa harbour, 
from the time it was initially proposed and contemplated by the British military authorities 
up to the point when it was built, which gives us a genuine insight into Britain’s imperial 
approach in Palestine. 
 
Part of the motivation to build a harbour in Haifa could be interpreted in connection to L. J. 
Butler’s argument about the presence of the British Army in the Middle East. Butler argues 
that, during the 1920s, British defence goals required a presence in the Middle East to 
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 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, p. 654. 
14
 Elizabeth Monroe, Britain’s Moment in The Middle East 1914-1971 (second edition) (London: 
Chatto & Windus, 1981), p. 71. 
15
 John Darwin, ‘An undeclared empire: The British in the Middle East, 1918-1939’, The Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 27/2, (1999), pp. 159-176, p. 174. 
16
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defend the Empire from potential Russian aggression against India.17 This thesis 
demonstrates that the construction of Haifa harbour enhanced Britain’s assurances of 
securing fuel needed for the Navy in the event of war. Hence, Haifa harbour became part of 
Britain’s strategic considerations. Additionally, Monroe provides a thorough account about 
Britain’s developing interest in the Middle East culminating in Britain’s investment in 
Middle Eastern oil.18 This thesis extends Monroe’s argument particularly in regards to 
Middle Eastern oil through its analysis of discussions of Haifa harbour and the Mosul oil 
pipeline terminus that was there.  
 
It was not only political, but also financial decisions that were centralised in London. Eric 
Hobsbawm saw the role of the City of London during the era of ‘New Imperialism’ as the 
‘switchboard for the world’s international business transactions’ in commercial and 
financial services. This depiction certainly applied to the period after WWI since capital 
export, according to Hobsbawm, began in the late nineteenth century and ‘lasted until the 
Great Slump of 1929-33’.19 This was reflected in Britain’s guarantee of a loan for the 
government of Palestine. A loan was therefore raised on the British market, of which some 
of the proceeds were directed to the harbour project at Haifa. In addition, the raising of a 
loan on the British market can be understood in light of Fieldhouse’s argument that during 
the imperial age, the employment of surplus capital outside Britain gave ‘a high interest 
return’. Fieldhouse continues that in order to attain this objective, ‘some political control’ 
over a territory was necessary. Indeed, subject to the provisions of the mandate, Palestine 
was already under Britain’s ‘comprehensive economic and political controls’.20 Having said 
that, it is worth noting that raising a loan for Palestine did not follow the norm used in the 
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 L. Butler, Britain and Empire, Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World (London; New York: I.B. Tauris 
Publishers, 2002), p. 4. 
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20
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colonies (i.e. facilitated by the Crown Agents); instead, it was raised as a British government 
loan through the Bank of England. 
 
All key decisions were taken in London and by virtue of the mandate system Britain took 
responsibility for Palestine’s foreign affairs and dealt with the international community on 
behalf of territory. With the construction of Haifa harbour, Britain was compelled to change 
its imperial method, but not its goals, in order to comply with this emerging international 
order. In constructing the harbour, Britain succeeded in excluding her rivals from 
developing influence in Palestine. Darwin is right in saying that Britain played the ‘part of a 
colonial power par excellence’.21 
 
Discussions of the Palestine Loan, and the method of constructing the harbour, need to be 
examined in light of the prevailing economic conditions in Britain during the period in 
question. Solomous Solomou argues that after WWI the British economy was characterised 
by slow growth and was viewed as being beset by ‘poor investment opportunities’.22 
Similarly, this thesis demonstrates that British firms and contractors were anxious to be 
involved in the construction of the Haifa harbour because of the shortage of work at home. 
Plans to obtain equipment for the harbour from the British market served the purpose of 
alleviating domestic economic problems. Furthermore, B. Alford argues that although 
British postwar politics were defined by the ‘politics of victory’, its power declined relatively 
during the 1920s owing to international competition in trade and finance, which created 
new economic uncertainties and difficulties. Alford describes the complexity of the 
relationship between postwar political changes and the economic conditions.23 With 
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regards to Palestine, as we shall see, the British government had to take into consideration 
the mandate system and the provisions of the Palestine mandate when weighing 
investment in the Haifa harbour project. 
 
Furthermore, and particularly during the first two decades following First World War, the 
British economy witnessed significant changes which were reflected in Britain’s approach to 
Palestine.24 For example, key events in the British economy such as the downturn of 1919-
1920, had an impact on the military authorities in Palestine who proposed investing in the 
development of Haifa harbour, in order to contribute to the relief of the British economy. 
Another example related to Britain’s economic condition was presented by her 
guaranteeing a loan to the Palestine government, which would allow purchases to be 
performed in Britain.  
 
The fact that the British controlled Palestinian territory did not mean that they applied the 
exact same colonial practices as elsewhere. At the same time, the fact the mandate was 
acquired as a result of the War meant there were no fundamental changes to Britain’s 
imperial approach. In Palestine, ‘a 'colonial'-style administration was created’.25 The view of 
Quincy Wright, an authority on the mandate system, was that it ‘marked an important step 
in the anti-imperial trend of the twentieth century’.26 This view is problematic, however, as 
it was clearly contradicted by the fact that Palestine was absorbed under British rule as a 
new territory. 
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In general, the formation of British policy was very much influenced by the limits imposed 
by the League of Nations’ mandate system.27 Authorities such as William Rappard, Edward 
Jenkins, and William Roger Louis have discussed various aspects related to the mandate. 
William Roger Louis demonstrates that the mandate system adopted by the League of 
Nations was accepted by Britain as a compromise between the traditional annexation of 
acquired territories and the more liberal approach recommended by the Americans.28 This 
theme was echoed by Monroe as mentioned earlier. William Rappard, the Swiss political 
economist and Director of the Mandates Section of the League, while examining imperial 
control and ownership of acquired mandated territories, explains that sovereignty was not 
vested in the mandatory but rather ‘held in suspense’ by the international community.29 
Britain was authorized to administer Palestine on behalf of the League of Nations but did 
not have full sovereignty over the territory. Rappard further argues that although the 
mandatory powers were committed to the League of Nations, they sometimes violated the 
provisions of the League’s Covenant and the League’s recommendations.30 In light of 
Rappard’s argument, this thesis discusses the method of the harbour construction where 
the provisions of the mandate system were under consideration by the British government 
and were not necessarily fully adhered to. Britain’s commitment to the Covenant gave it 
the legitimacy it needed to control Palestine whilst simultaneously requiring it to respect 
the interests of other League members. This delicate issue, of Britain’s attempt to abide by 
the League’s rules, whilst maintain its own interests is discussed in this thesis. This meant 
that the open door policy secured by article 22 of the League’s Covenant, as Jenkins argued, 
had to be observed. Jenkins explains that this was attainable through a mechanism adopted 
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by the League’s Permanent Mandates Commission to follow the matters related to 
mandated territories.31 This delicate issue of abiding by the League’s rules and maintaining 
its own interests is discussed in this thesis. 
 
In fact, a lot of literature is available about the British Empire in general, on the reasons for 
territorial expansion and on the relationship between political and economic factors within 
these.32 To a lesser extent, literature exists that discusses the mandate system and much 
less investigating the economic conditions in Palestine.33 Literatures about the construction 
of the harbour are few in number and treat the issue mostly in passing.34 The examination 
of some of these publications was useful in analysing the actions and decisions made 
regarding the process of carrying out the works at the harbour. Hence, by discussing 
Britain’s imperial approach to Palestine as reflected in the construction of Haifa harbour 
this thesis fills some of the gaps left by other scholars. This has significance particularly in 
light of what John Darwin says about the lack of appropriate scholarly work on imperialism 
in the Middle East in comparison to other places. He emphasised that the area was not 
scrutinized enough although in the Middle East there was ‘played out the last, if not the 
highest, stage of British imperialism.’35  
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On the arrangements established between the British government and the governments of 
the dependencies, two former officials of the Colonial Office, Charles Jeffries and Cosmo 
Parkinson, provide good accounts of the relationship between the Colonial Office and the 
Crown Colonies from which the treatment of Palestine can be understood.36 By highlighting 
some details on how the decisions regarding the harbour building were formed, this thesis 
explains the nature of the relationship between the Colonial Office and the government of 
Palestine. The political decisions involved were made in London, a fact emphasised by many 
including May Seikaly. Although Seikaly was mainly concerned with discussing the social 
structure of the city of Haifa she rightly argued that investment projects in Palestine were 
determined by the British government and thus centralized in London. For example, she 
explains that loans for the development of the city of Haifa were granted through the 
Anglo-Egyptian Bank at the request of the Colonial Office.37 This is viewed in contrast to the 
Palestine loan of 1926 which was also extended upon the directions of the British 
government but was raised by the Bank of England since its proceeds were for imperial 
purposes.  
 
Barbara Smith discusses British economic policy in Palestine in its entirety, including, for 
example, trade and currency issues in relation to Britain.38 Smith provides significant 
analysis on the formation of policy within the British government during the mandate 
period. She discusses the delicacy of Britain’s position regarding the method used in 
constructing the harbour in light of the potential criticism by members of the League of 
Nations. This study confirms in some instances Smith’s analysis and in others corrects or 
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completes it in those areas concerning the formation of British investment policy for the 
harbour.  
 
A portrait of British rule in Palestine during the mandate period can be seen in Naomi 
Shepherd’s Ploughing Sand, though she focuses on the political and social history of 
Palestine with emphasis on health and education.39 She argues that although the primary 
obligation of Britain as mandatory power was to prepare the country for independence, it is 
striking that there was no reference to training Palestine for the exercise of political 
responsibility.40 Hence, decisions about the harbour construction were mainly taken by the 
Colonial Office, sometimes with, and many times without, consultation with the 
government of Palestine. Although Shepherd says that there was a ‘reluctance to spell out 
British interests’ in Palestine, she rightly argues that Britain ‘saw the control of Palestine as 
a strategic necessity in the imperial context’ and that the strategic interests behind British 
rule in Palestine remained constant throughout the Mandate’s existence.41 Palestine gave 
Britain a foothold for preserving tis strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. It was 
a buffer between the Suez Canal and enemies to the north, besides offering an overland 
route to Iraq and its oil reserves.42  
 
Britain’s imperial interest and supremacy in the region was viewed as secure when the 
terminus of the oil pipeline from Iraq was completed in Haifa. The conflict over the route of 
the pipeline, as examined by Colin Davies and Edward Fitzgerald, highlighted the crucial 
relationship Britain had with its rivals France and with the United States, the latter on 
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whom Britain was dependent for oil supplies.43 In order to secure its access to the Middle 
Eastern oil, G. Gareth Jones rightly argues that the British government used an 
interventionist policy after WWI.44 This thesis discusses that policy, with reference to the 
decision about the route of the pipeline that was supposed to be taken by Iraq Petroleum 
Company, solely on a commercial basis.  
 
My claim about Britain’s continued imperialism in Palestine finds reinforcement in Butler’s 
work which argues that ‘the importance of the imperial system was unquestioned’ among 
politicians and policy-makers during the interwar period.45 It was also true that before WWI 
the government was not ‘anxious to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire’.46 
Certainly, the condition of Palestine as a mandate territory, and the government’s inability 
to annex it, was ‘no proof of reluctance to control’ on Britain’s part.47 Whether the period 
before WWI could be described as formal or informal Empire, or one of anti-Imperialism, in 
fact the British government’s activity and approach towards acquired territories was the 
same after the War. What therefore defined British imperialism in Palestine? 
 
‘New imperialism’, Hobson argued, was characterized by the existence of competing 
empires, the dominance of financial over mercantile interests and the absorption of new 
territories populated by people for whom self-government was not intended.48 Certainly, 
specific features of that period persisted. There were now competing Powers instead of 
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Empires. The 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement allowed the partition of the Ottoman Empire and 
the absorption of its territories.49 Hence, the partition of the Middle East into spheres of 
interest and influence was in fact ‘annexation masquerading under a different name’ to 
reconcile international rivalries.50 The partition determined Britain’s political, strategic and 
economic objectives in the Mediterranean.51 Other characteristics of the old colonial 
system that pertained during the sixteenth and seventeenth century included that of 
monopoly and exclusion. Colonies were viewed solely as source of benefit and enrichment 
for the mother country, since they were required to purchase their supplies from it.52 In 
fact this was the case in Palestine where materials were acquired in Britain in spite of the 
fact that the mandate, in theory, had a different purpose and the open door policy that 
recognized the interests of other nationals was meant to be respected. However, in order 
to establish its power, Britain ‘preferred to work through informal methods of influence 
when possible, and through formal methods of rule only when necessary’.53 Hence, it is 
understood that Britain’s general approach to Palestine was imperialist. However, the 
British government had to adjust its colonial methods when needed due to the limitations 
imposed by the new world order represented by the League of Nations’ mandate system.54  
 
The British government most often treated Palestine as a colony for the simple reason that 
it did not know of any other way to treat an external territory that is controlled. Limited 
under article 22 of the League of Nations’ Covenant, the British government, throughout its 
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regime in Palestine, had to find ways to develop appropriate tools and techniques that 
would differ from colonial practice. Constant conflict between the Treasury, the Foreign 
Office, the Colonial Office and the government of Palestine was characteristic of the 
direction of Britain’s economic development policy in Palestine.55 The case study of the 
construction of the harbour at Haifa reveals many of the disagreements that occurred 
within Whitehall over the methods through which the harbour would be built. 
 
The British government, during the construction of Haifa harbour, went through a muddled 
and unsuccessful process before it decided on the appropriate means that fitted with 
Britain’s interests, whilst avoiding international criticism. The deliberations of the British 
government about the harbour demonstrate how the policy towards investment in the 
mandated territory was formed. They also show how the mechanism for treating the 
territory was developed. This was significant, as those officials who were seeking to 
establish ways of managing the mandated territory were mostly those who were charged 
with the management of the colonies. The colonial mind-set was dominant and they found 
themselves obliged to adjust their methods and mentality in regards to Palestine. Britain’s 
inability to employ traditional colonial practices in Palestine was a consequence of its 
obligations under the League of Nations and not because Britain sought to depart from its 
Imperial approach and from its Empire as a whole.  
 
There were several investment projects carried out in Palestine by the British government. 
This included the airport in Lydda and the extraction of chemicals from the Dead Sea. 
However, the construction project at Haifa harbour offers the best case study for analysing 
the issues at hand, particularly British economic policy in Palestine. By tracing the stages 
from the point the construction was initiated and built, we gain insights into how Britain 
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formed its policies towards Palestine. Moreover, since various internal and international 
aspects were taken into consideration throughout the project, this provides wide insight 
into various aspects relating to Britain’s interventionist policy and its international relations. 
Additionally, the length of time between the project’s conception in 1919, under the 
military administration, and its completion in 1933 represents a long enough period to 
examine the British government’s decision-making. The establishment of the oil dock was 
of significant strategic consequence to the British government, which therefore provides a 
rationale to conclude this thesis in 1935 when the oil terminus was opened. This period 
includes, through building the harbour, the achievement of key economic and strategic 
aims on the part of the British government.  
 
In debates over Haifa harbour’s construction, the British government developed an 
approach towards the newly acquired territories to secure the greatest benefit from them. 
Britain’s thinking had shifted from its established approach because of the world order that 
emerged after the WWI. Throughout this thesis, it is possible to see that the debates in 
government obliged the state and Parliament to change Britain’s attitude and approach in 
mandated Palestine. The mandate system awarded equal economic opportunities only as 
between nationals of League of Nations members. as those for the mandatory.56 Outside 
states claimed privilege on the basis of special treaties such as the United States. However, 
Britain always had fears that, in the event a foreign firm was given economic rights in the 
mandated territory, this would undermine Britain’s authority and allow for foreign control. 
This was because economic privileges in the colonies meant political sovereignty for a 
foreign country and Britain did not want to see this happening in Palestine. 
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Colonial thinking figured in the mandatory power’s exploitation of the natural resources of 
an acquired territory was the principal reason for keeping international firms out of the 
harbour project. However, the basic colonial practices laid down by the Colonial Office did 
not fit with the League’s spirit or, possibly, the requirements of the mandate. Through the 
debate in Whitehall about how to maximize benefit from the mandate while meeting 
international obligations, an appraisal of the world system appeared to value the changing 
conditions. In this regard, the intention of this thesis is to address the difficulties 
encountered during harbour construction, as deliberated by the British government. The 
dispute between the Foreign Office and Colonial Office was not only over the method of 
constructing the harbour, it was also about power and competing arguments made to 
safeguard Britain’s world status and its authority over Palestine.  
 
In order to understand better the forces at play in the construction of Haifa harbour, we 
must be aware of the underlying change in the approach of the British government. The key 
issues this study will therefore examine are: the relationship between Palestine and the 
Imperial capital; the significance of Haifa and Palestine to the British Empire; the shaping of 
British policy under the influence of the economic equality policy of the mandate system; 
and the consequence of this for the harbour construction project.  
 
Britain’s approach to Palestine was two-fold: one was its actual activity in the territory; the 
other was how Britain presented or justified its actions before the international community. 
The significance of this research is to show that in spite of international supervision and the 
limitations imposed by the introduction of the mandate system, Britain was able to act 
within the context of its established practice when acquiring a new country. Having 





In terms of methodology, this study is presented in chronological order marked by the key 
stages and developments in the harbour’s construction. The decisions of the British 
government were mainly determined by the influence of Britain’s foreign relations and 
economic conditions. More specifically, decisions relating to the chosen approach to 
construct the harbour were framed by the regulations of the mandate system and the 
government’s desire to benefit the British economy from such a project. The latter in 
particular saw securing the construction of an oil terminal in Haifa as particularly important 
to satisfy strategic purposes. 
 
The theme that dominates this thesis is that Britain’s approach to building Haifa harbour 
was based on economic and strategic grounds but that these essentially imperial actions 
had to be pursued under limitations presented by the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
This means that Britain’s interest in the harbour development had economic and strategic 
motivations, however, decisions about them were governed by political considerations. 
Discussions in Whitehall were concerned not only with how to achieve the government’s 
goal without infringing the provisions of the mandate system, but also with maintaining its 
public image in view of rival powers and the League. This was made possible by the British 
government actively demonstrating concerns for the interests of the mandated territory 
(mainly by employing local labour) when devising an appropriate approach and method for 
the construction of Haifa harbour. However, the purchase of British equipment, machinery 
and material, and building the strategically important oil dock within the harbour, still 
ensured Britain’s economic and strategic goals were fulfilled. Hence, it is possible to say 
that Britain’s policy in mandated Palestine was as it has been described elsewhere 
‘annexation in all but name’.57  
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Sources and Structure  
The research on which this thesis is based primarily rests upon official British documents 
held at the National Archives. These include minutes and memoranda from Cabinet 
meetings and Cabinet committees, files from the Prime Minister’s office, the Colonial 
Office, the Foreign Office and the Treasury. Primary sources, particularly those of the 
Colonial Office, provide details essential to understanding British government policy 
towards the construction of Haifa harbour. Also Hansard’s parliamentary debates and 
command papers were very useful. Other documents such as the publications of the 
Institution of Civil Engineers, and the Energy Institute, fill some important gaps about how 
events unfolded. The documents of the Bank of England contained invaluable material that 
was complimentary to government documentary sources.  
 
The chapters in this thesis are divided both chronologically as well as thematically. The 
period covered by this thesis extends from the British government’s first interest payment 
in 1919 up to the completion of the harbour’s construction, inclusive of its oil dock in 1935. 
The first chapter covers the period from before WW I to the confirmation of the Palestine 
mandate in 1922. The chapter discusses the origins of Britain’s interest in Palestine and 
particularly the port of Haifa. It also examines the development of the relationship between 
the British government and the government of Palestine with regards to the harbour 
construction. In the second chapter, the study moves from the initial deliberations about 
building Haifa harbour in 1919, to the eventual decision to construct the port in 1926. The 
chapter discusses the development of interest in the Haifa harbour from the period of 
military rule, through the civil administration until the British government’s endorsement of 
the harbour project. In 1926, the building of the port required a loan to be raised in Britain 
for the government of Palestine and is discussed in chapter three. The chapter examines 
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the progress of raising the loan since it was first requested under the Foreign Office. It also 
investigates the deliberations in the British government about guaranteeing a loan to 
Palestine and East Africa, and then raising the loan and its implication. 
 
The chosen method for carrying out the works posed a dilemma, due to the particular 
conditions of Palestine as a mandated territory. Chapter four covers the period from 1927 
to mid-1928 and discusses the significance of the method of carrying out the harbour 
works. Accordingly, Britain was not able to give the works automatically to a British firm. 
The British government found itself forced to evaluate the alternative methods that were 
used in other territories under its control in order to use in Haifa harbour without infringing 
the mandate system. This chapter explains the departmental method as being an 
alternative used in the colonies. That is a department of the government mainly the Public 
Works Department would carry out the works It discusses the advantageous as well as the 
shortcomings of using this method, hence, it also examines the reasons why the British had 
to abandon it. Chapter five covers the period from June 1928 to April 1929 and examines 
the contracting method by which Britain hoped to benefit its own firms. The contracting 
method was to give the whole work for a British contracting company such as that given to 
McAlpine for the building of a harbour in Takoradi. The chapter examines the limitations 
imposed by the rules and regulations set by the League of Nations’ Covenant with regards 
to respecting equal economic opportunities to members of the League. It also details the 
final solution used for the execution of the works through the formation of the ad hoc Haifa 
Harbour Works Department. The chapter reveals how the policy was formed by the British 
government and in the process demonstrates how Britain had to be innovative in dealing 




Chapter six discusses how Britain wanted to transport oil from its fields in Iraq through a 
pipeline to the seaboard of the Mediterranean, in order to fulfil the economic and strategic 
benefit of the harbour,. The contests over the route and the terminus of the pipeline at 
Haifa and the building of the oil dock between 1927 and 1935 demonstrate Britain’s foreign 
policy concerns in regards to Europe and the United States. Finally, chapter seven discusses 
Britain’s interventionist policy in securing the purchases of machinery, equipment and 
material for the harbour works in Britain. The chapter also shows how Britain, on the one 
hand, gave consideration to labour conditions and to foreign firms as a gesture of 
complicity vis-à-vis international regulations. On the other hand, it reveals British attempts 
to underline their supremacy in the region by donning Imperial clothing when it came to 
the opening ceremony of the harbour. 
 
The argument of this thesis focuses on explaining that Britain’s approach to empire was 
maintained in Palestine. The British government had definite economic and strategic goals 
to achieve through the construction of the harbour at Haifa. However, owing to the 
restrictions imposed on all mandatory powers by virtue of the provisions of article 22 of the 
League of Nations’ Covenant, Britain, as the mandatory power for Palestine, was not able 
fully to employ its colonial methods in Palestine, although on certain occasions it was able 
to do so. Consequently, the British government went through serious disagreements and 
negotiations in Whitehall until it was able to reach solutions that met its own interests but, 
at the same time, breached neither the provisions of the mandate systems generally nor 
those provisions of the Palestine mandate specifically. This meant that Britain was able to 
maintain its foreign relations safely although some countries complained about Britain’s 
lack of adherence to the principle of equal economic opportunity called for by the League 
of Nations. Nevertheless, the League of Nations did not criticise Britain since the mandate 
system did not provide details about how the mandate should be managed. This thesis 
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shows that with the completion of the harbour construction the British government was 
able to establish a convenient balance between its own interests and those of the 





The origins of Britain’s interest in Palestine: 




This chapter provides a historiographical-based overview of the importance of Palestine to 
the British government before, during and after WWI. It brings in the setting from which 
the construction of the harbour at Haifa emerged. Britain’s imperial approach had 
dominated its actions and decisions towards the Middle East. With the gradual decline of 
the Ottoman Empire and the growing ambitions of European Powers, particularly Russia 
and France, Britain was anxious to establish firm ground in the Arab provinces. Britain’s 
supremacy in the Mediterranean was of paramount concern in order to maintain prestige 
and safeguard her interests which extended from the Far East to Africa. Recognizing her 
rival France’s connection to Syria, Britain wanted to assert its presence in Palestine as a 
power on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean. This was possible since British troops 
had seized Palestine, Iraq and Syria and with Britain’s attempts to retreat from the Sykes-
Picot Agreement after the War.  
 
The introduction of American President Woodrow Wilson’s new method of ‘territorial 
settlement’ after 1919 compelled Britain to acquiesce to the new global arrangements. 
Britain accepted that rivals’ economic interests had to be met in order to avoid future wars 
and to secure world peace. The mandate system adopted by the League of Nations was 
accepted by Britain as not being entire annexation at the same time was not fully liberal 
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approach.58 The British government’s rule of Palestine was designed to operate in 
accordance with this system.  
 
The argument is that by tracking the development of Britain’s interest in Palestine it is 
possible to assume that Britain did not depart from its traditional colonial approach in the 
manner in which it treated the seized territory. This was true during the military rule when 
Palestine’s destiny was not yet assured, as well as during the establishment of the civil 
administration when Britain was awarded the mandate for Palestine. The beginning of this 
chapter describes the onset of Britain’s interest in Palestine. This interest took shape when 
Britain entered into an agreement with the Allied Powers during the War regarding the 
partition of those Arab provinces and territories of the former Ottoman Empire. The 
introduction of the League of Nations’ mandate system legalized the division of territories 
but, at the same time, prevented traditional annexation. The special character of the 
mandate sought to organise the relationship between the mandatory powers and their 
mandated territories. In the case of Palestine, the British Colonial Office was charged with 
responsibilities of administration while, with its commercial arm the Crown Agents, 
managed investment projects. 
 
Most of this chapter employs on secondary material. Literature discussing the conditions 
that prevailed during the late Ottoman regime which led Britain to consider advancing a 
strategic interest in Haifa is found in Shahar Huneidi’s book A Broken Trust, and Rashid 
Khalidi’s British Policy towards Syria and Palestine. Their extensive description provided the 
primary background necessary to understand the development of Britain’s interest in 
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Palestine.59 Additionally, Frederick Maurice in his article ‘British Policy in the 
Mediterranean’ argues how the changing political status of Britain in Egypt stimulated its 
government to consider controlling some of the Mediterranean’s eastern shores.60 This 
thesis shows that since Britain was not the only power in the Mediterranean, it relied on 
striking agreements to secure her interests. Commitment to these agreements was 
reconsidered after the War owing to the changing political conditions where Britain 
asserted her power in the region. Peter Sluglett argues that the agreements reached by the 
Allied Powers during the War did not offer the concerned powers equitable parts in the 
partitioning of the Middle East.61 Indeed, it was principally Italy that was the country left 
out in the partition period. Nevertheless, after the War, Britain’s tendency was to release 
itself from former obligations as discussed by Paul Helmreich.62 Hence, as Jan Tanenbaum 
has suggested, the French were concerned about British attempts to push them out of the 
territory and deprive them of control over Syria and Lebanon.63 
 
These international concerns were addressed through the establishment of the League of 
Nations and the introduction of the mandate system. Investigations about the League and 
its role in world peace were discussed by various authors including, for example, William 
Rappard, Quincy Wright and Campbell Upthegrove.64 The arguments of Rappard on the 
sovereignty, and ownership of the acquired territories as mandated areas are examined, in 
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this thesis, in relation to how mandated Palestine was treated and are demonstrated 
through the deliberations and negotiations in Whitehall.65 An important issue within this 
study relates to the mandate system and the ‘open door’ policy secured by article 22 of the 
League of Nations’ Covenant discussed by Jenkins.66 In fact, the open door policy was 
essential in determining Britain’s foreign policy with regards to the mandated territories. 
 
 
Britain’s interest in Palestine before, during and after WWI 
Britain’s interest in Palestine is best understood within the regional and international 
context. It has to be seen in connection with Britain’s broader approach to the Middle East. 
Before WWI, a heated contest between rival European powers in the area increased the 
importance of Palestine for Britain. In particular, France’s connection with Egypt and Syria 
and Germany’s influence in the Ottoman Empire motivated Britain to safeguard its interests 
in the area. Palestine’s strategic location and in particular the port of Haifa attracted Britain 
to serve her strategic and economic interests. It became axiomatic that Britain valued 
Palestine as a defensive buffer zone for the Suez Canal, and as a key component of the 
overland route to India.67 Why did Britain need a buffer-zone or a secured route?  
 
The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 promoted Great Britain’s political and strategic 
interests in the region.68 The policy of the British government was directed towards 
obtaining a controlling interest in the Suez Canal Company. In November 1875, Britain 
purchased Khedive Ismail’s 44 per cent of outstanding shares of the company for the sum 
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of £4,000,000.69 It was vital for Britain’s authority and power that the Canal should belong 
to Britain.70 This was the shortest, cheapest and most convenient route to the East and the 
Pacific in peace time, making the canal centrally important to Britain.71 This was reinforced 
by various events. Huneidi argues that the crisis of ‘Aqaba incident’ marked the beginning 
of Britain's strategic interest in Palestine and the adjacent regions in Syria.72 In 
conformation of this idea, Khalidi explains that this incident sparked ‘a full-scale 
reassessment’ of Britain’s strategic approach towards Egypt and provided ‘the opportunity 
and the pretext’ for an active policy in Syria.73  
 
After the settlement of the dispute with the Turks, the British government, represented in 
the main by the General Staff, the Admiralty and the Foreign Office, feared an attack from 
the east on Egypt.74 In 1907 and 1909, following an intensive study, the recommendation of 
the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) was that the best means to defend Egypt was ‘to 
make a large-scale landing at Haifa’ in order to cut the lines of communication of an 
invading army.75 In general, influential British soldiers and diplomats were interested in 
southern Syria at the Bay of Acre to form this ‘shield of the Suez Canal’.76 After the Turkish 
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defeat in the Balkans in 1913, the British government’s concern over possible Turkish 
retaliation, through an attack on Egypt, increased. Confident of its powers, which before 
WWI were in essence ‘geographical location, prestige, and the navy,’ the British 
government had launched a survey of southern Palestine as a preparation for any attack.77 
It should be noted here that the opinion of the CID was sought regularly and the CID 
assisted in making policy.78 The secretary of the CID, from 1912-1938, Colonel Sir Maurice 
P.A. Hankey (who became Lord Hankey of The Chart), was also the Secretary of the Cabinet, 
1919-1938. Hankey, possessed considerable power and was especially anxious to formulate 
plans for immediate action by all departments, services and Dominions in case of war.79  
 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it was not only Britain who had 
economic interests in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, but also France.80 Britain 
was concerned with its rival France because in addition to their assets in Egypt, the French 
wanted to expand their interests albeit by ‘peaceful conquest.’81 The British foresaw that 
‘not only would Marseilles profit,’ from a harbour in Jaffa but it would increase France’s 
political influence.82 In fact, the Ottoman Empire recognized ‘France's pre-eminent position 
in the Levant’ and its various ties with it.83 In addition, French entrepreneurs were granted 
concessions to build railways and harbours in Syria including in Jaffa and Haifa. When WWI 
broke out, and during 1915, the French, including the military officials, urged the 
government to send troops to the Levant in order to secure their control when territorial 
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settlement was determined after the War. Tanenbaum maintains that the French imperial 
approach was justified owing to France’s fear that ‘Britain would move France out of the 
Middle East.’84 At the same time the British government was considering its policy 
regarding the future of the Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire.85 They had declared 
Egypt, which was occupied in 1882, a British protectorate with a promise to reconsider the 
position of the country after the war.86 Britain had concerns that if Palestine was occupied 
by another European power the security of the Suez Canal would be threatened.87 It was in 
the interest of Britain to enter into secret wartime treaties ‘for the partition of the 'Sick 
man of Europe'’.88  
 
The head of the Middle East Department at the War Office Mark Sykes expressed his 
thoughts in April 1915 about controlling territories in the Middle East. He suggested that 
the non-Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire should be annexed by the various Allies or 
that the Empire should be maintained intact and divided into zones of commercial and 
political interests. In either scenario Sykes explained that Britain should acquire, in addition 
to Mesopotamia (as Iraq was then called), the territory from Haifa in the north to Egypt in 
the south.89  
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This division of territory refers back to time when the Hijaz railway had ‘provoked British 
fears of Turco-German designs on areas adjacent to its course.’90 In order to avoid clashes, 
a network of agreements was set up. This culminated in the 1910 railway agreement among 
the powers concerning Turkish railways that sought to establish ‘the sphere of influence of 
each [power]’ without challenging French predominance in Syria.91 In fact, France had 
commercial rights in Turkey and Marseilles relied heavily upon eastern Mediterranean 
trade. Nonetheless, the Mediterranean was part of Britain's most important trade route to 
India and Haifa was the entry point to the Middle East at large.92  
 
Another important territorial treaty was the Sykes-Picot Agreement resulting from secret 
Anglo-French negotiation during-the-war in the spring of 1916, which also required Russian 
and Italian consent. The agreement defined the French and British zones of direct control 
and influence in the Asian areas of the Ottoman Empire.93 The basis for the plan was the 
principle of the ‘equitable division of geographical space’ with the purpose of avoiding 
future quarrels.94 According to the Agreement the divided area expanded from eastern 
Egypt to Western Iran. Britain was assigned southern Iraq with the colour red, France 
northern Iraq, south-eastern Turkey and Syria/Lebanon, coloured blue. In addition, Russia 
was assigned the straits and north-eastern Anatolia, Italy, after protesting against the 
agreement and demanding an ‘equitable part’ in the partition of the Ottoman Empire, was 
assigned parts of south-western Anatolia.95  
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The agreement also stipulated that Palestine was to be put under the control of an ‘as yet 
unspecified international regime’ to be agreed upon later by Britain and France after 
consulting Russia, the Sherif of Mecca, and ‘other allies’.96 The reason for this arrangement 
was that in return for Russia’s agreeing to France’s post-war claim to Syria, Russian’s unique 
historical and religious connections with the Holy Land was taken into account.97 Britain 
however insisted that a small enclave around Haifa was to be controlled by her.98 This was 
because Britain was contemplating to build a railway from Haifa to Baghdad since it wanted 
to have a sphere of interest in Iraq.99 Additional discussions held among Britain, France and 
Italy in April 1917 at St. Jean de Maurienne were translated by the Italian Foreign Office 
into a ‘formal agreement embodying the international administration of Palestine.’100 It was 
drafted as a tentative agreement to settle Italy’s interest in the Middle East. However, the 
internationalization solution was barred by the League of Nations due to the inefficiency of 
direct international administration of a territory.101 
 
With the progress of the War and General Allenby’s advance into Palestine in December 
1917 the picture of the Middle East had changed.102 The capture of Jerusalem made Britain 
the de facto ruler of Palestine and ‘underlined the paramount position of Britain’ in the 
Middle East and the Mediterranean.103 In October 1917, after the defeat of Russia and 
following the entry of the United States into the War, the British Foreign Secretary notified 
                                                          
96
 Slugett, ‘An improvement’, p. 415; Marlowe, Rebellion, p. 341. 
97
 F. Brecher, ‘French Policy toward the Levant 1914-18’, Middle Eastern Studies, 29/4, (October 
1993), pp. 641-663, p. 648; E. M., ‘Palestine: The Background of Present Discontents’, Bulletin of 
International News, 12/25, (20 June 1936), pp. 3-16, p. 6; Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration, 
(London: Vallentine, Mitchell & Co. Ltd., 1961), p. 245. 
98
 Marlowe, Rebellion, p. 39; Kedourie and Sykes, ‘Sir Mark Sykes’, p. 341; Manuel, ‘The Palestine 
Question’, p. 263. 
99
 D. K. Fieldhouse, Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914-1958 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), p. 51; Elie Kedourie, England and the Middle East, The Destruction of the Ottoman 
empire 1914-1921 (London: Mansell Publishing Limited), 1987, p. 35. 
100
 Monroe, Britain’s Moment, p. 42. 
101
 Wright, Mandates, p. 26. 
102
 Ibid., p. 43. 
103
 R. Miller (ed.), Britain, Palestine and Empire: The Mandate Years, ASHGATE, electronic resource, 
2010, p. 7. 
39 
 
France that the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement should be significantly altered.104 The British 
government’s eastern experts did not support the Sykes-Picot Agreement and decided by 
1918 to retreat from its provisions gradually.105 With the defeat of Germany, Britain 
reviewed her imperial interests in the Middle East. Britain was determined not to allow 
France, its commercial and imperial rival, to enhance further its authority and undermine 
Britain’s Imperial supremacy in the region.106 Despite its military significance, Britain 
wanted to avoid previous episodes of conflict so sought renegotiations as part of a general 
peace settlement. France resisted Britain’s attempt to keep her ‘out of the Arab lands,’ and 
insisted on the validity of the Sykes-Picot Agreement.107 In this context, Britain regarded the 
St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement as null and void as the Russian government’s consent, 
due to the Russian revolution, had never been obtained.108 Consequently, Italy’s share of 
the spoils of the Ottoman Empire was also endangered. 
 
In spite of its position towards wartime agreements, when Britain seized the Middle East, 
the question posed was: ‘What was to become of these territories?’109 The British 
government decided in the War’s aftermath that ‘Palestine must not fall into French hands,’ 
and that Britain should exert ultimate control.110 Britain stood in France’s way in the Orient 
and Edward Said rightly argues that there was ‘very little France could do to get between 
Britain’ and the lands under its control (extending from India to the Mediterranean).111 
Furthermore, General Jan Smuts, South African statesman and member of the War Cabinet 
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1917-1919, asserted that in conjunction with Iraq, Palestine would give Britain a land route 
to India and would ‘bring together the British empire of Africa and Asia.’112  
 
 
The League of Nations and the mandate system 
World War I was described by some as ‘’the war to end war’. Stephen King-Hall maintained 
that the Great War was to eliminate the old system of competition between national states 
run by the rule that ‘might was right’.113 The destiny of those territories of the Middle East 
was the subject of negotiations at the League of Nations which was established as a result 
of the Peace Conference of Paris in 1919.114 The League was an international organization 
to ‘promote voluntary cooperation, public discussion, and pacific negotiations among its 
members.’115 A Covenant for the League of Nations drafted by the victors, primarily in their 
interest, came into force in January 1920.116 The mandate system was introduced by virtue 
of article 22 of the League’s Covenant and served a dual purpose. The system arranged the 
relationship amongst the world’s countries and organised the relationship between world 
powers and the wrested territories. Dealing with theses aspects helps to assist an 
understanding, in later chapters, of the discussions that revolved around the construction 
of the Haifa harbour. 
 
The structure and function of the League of Nations’ organs varied. Membership of the 
League was the most fundamental feature of its structure. Initially, 23 countries joined the 
League and that number rose to 56 by 1927. Those states enjoyed equal privileges and had 
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intended to observe international obligations.117 This is significant because, for example, 
Italy observed Britain’s administration of the harbour construction which influenced the 
British government’s decision making in more than one instant. The important organs of 
the League were the Council, the Assembly, the Secretariat, the Court and the International 
Labour Organization. The Secretariat, the administrative body of the League established in 
January 1920, was headed by Sir James Eric Drummond, a British Foreign Office official who 
stayed there until 1933.118 The Secretariat was to prepare and to carry out the decisions of 
the Assembly and the Council and was not authorised to shape any policy of its own.119 The 
Council had an executive committee composed of five permanent members, most of whom 
were the principal Allied Powers as well as four non-permanent members.120 Its meetings 
were held four times a year to study treaties and determine policies.121 The Assembly, 
comprised of representatives of three delegates from each member state, met annually. Its 
purpose was to debate the reports of the Council and to adopt decisions.122 The Assembly 
had the role of the general director of ‘League policy and as a link between the Council and 
the public opinion of the world.’123  
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In fact, the form of the League of Nations was thought by the British government to frame 
the conduct of international relations to make war less likely in the future.124 Susan 
Pedersen sees the League as a transition from formal Empire to ‘a world of formally 
sovereign states’.125 Thus, the League became a remedy against international anarchy.126 
The preamble of the Covenant of the League of Nations explains its purpose and the 
method to achieve it. It stipulated that governments’ agreement to the Covenant was, inter 
alia, ‘in order to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and 
security.’ Free trade and mutual exchange were the basis for international cooperation in 
order to establish peace. This was to be attained through ‘open, just and honourable 
relations between nations’ and by ‘the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for 
all treaty obligations.’127 In essence the Covenant provided for the arrangement of relations 
amongst the international community as well as between them and the inhabitants of the 
seized territories. 
 
The United States, which moved towards isolationism, and the Bolshevik regime in Russia, 
did not join the League. This was despite the fact that President Wilson had been a leading 
figure in the establishment of the League. The United States Senate refused to ratify the 
Paris Peace treaty. Consequently, the United States ceased to attend the League’s Supreme 
Council, resulting in Britain and France being afforded greater freedom and power to 
decide the future of the acquired Arab countries as they wished.128 The absence of the 
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Americans and the Russians, in effect, reduced the League’s scope and cohesion.129 Without 
the United States, William Rappard maintained that the League was feeble and a mere 
association of nations whose corporate solidarity was weak.130 Though the United States 
was not a member of the League, the liberty and integrity of South and Central American 
Republics guaranteed by the United States under the Monroe doctrine were secured by the 
League of Nations.131  
 
Before WWI a vicious system of commercial monopoly had existed and was secured by 
political control. In order to destroy this system and to end secret treaties, the League’s 
Covenant stated that no ‘treaty shall be binding until registered with the League’.132  Article 
20 of the Covenant provided that the members must accept that all previous understanding 
or obligations which were inconsistent with the Covenant must be expunged.133 
Consequently, by virtue of the League’s Covenant, Britain released itself from obligations of 
pacts such as the Sykes-Picot Agreement relating to the partition of the territories acquired 
by war. It was convenient for the British to claim that these were superseded by the 
League’s regulations. In its zeal to control the routes to India, Britain did not wish France 
and Italy to be major powers in the Middle East and urged them to renounce their claims 
under the secret treaties.134 Nevertheless, the French were angry, and a confrontation 
almost occurred.135  
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The guiding principles for the territorial settlement, as a result of WWI, were laid down by 
American President Woodrow Wilson’s famous fourteen points announced in January 1918. 
His insistence upon the rights of native populations and absolute impartial adjustment of all 
colonial claims formed a fundamental contribution to the system.136 Wilson provided for ‘a 
program for national self-determination’ which seemed to invalidate the plans arrived at by 
the colonial powers.137 He effectively blocked the route for the traditional solution of 
outright annexation.138 General Jan Smuts in his A Practical Suggestion published in 
December 1918, offered a concrete plan for a system of internationally supervised colonial 
administration.139 In this way, he introduced a ‘mandatory plan’ which provided an 
instrument of government.140 Indeed, President Wilson not only was the father of the 
League but he also supported the adoption of General Smuts’ suggestions that the League 
of Nations should be the trustee for former German colonies and the seized territories of 
the Ottoman Empire.141 The notion of trusteeship revived the claim to rule ‘in civilization's 
name’.142  
 
The plan, referred to as the ‘mandates system’ in article 22 of the League’s Covenant, was 
adopted by the Supreme Council in January 1919 and came into force in January 1920.143 
This article looked to internationalize colonial policy, with the intention of honouring the 
principle of the ‘open door’.144 It was generally felt that the fundamental causes of modern 
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warfare stemmed from those policies that led to colonial rivalry and exploitation of 
underdeveloped regions.145 It is perhaps right to say that the mandate system was adopted 
as a ‘compromise’ between imperial desires to annex territories and Wilson’s insistence on 
the abandonment of the traditional colonial approach.146  
 
The principles incorporated in article 22 were to organise the relationship between these 
rivals and the territories acquired as a result of war. William Rappard defines the mandate 
system as ‘the scheme of international supervision of the national administration of certain 
backward areas’.147 Much later, this interwar assumption of backwardness was criticised by 
Said who noted that almost all colonial schemes begin with an ‘assumption of native 
backwardness’ and their general inadequacy to be independent.148 Article 22 defined the 
terms upon which the Allied Powers agreed and according to which they could claim an 
interest in the acquired territories.149 It is imperative for this study to investigate the 
provisions of article 22 in order to understand better how Britain’s relationship with the 
international community, as defined by the mandate, affected its policy towards the 
construction of the harbour at Haifa and the building of the Iraqi oil pipeline terminus at 
Haifa. 
 
Article 22 stipulated that those territories seized as a result of the War which inhabitants 
were ‘not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern 
world’. As a result, these territories should be entrusted to advanced nations as 
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‘[m]andatories on behalf of the League’ to secure their well-being and development.150 By 
the terms of this trust, which was defined and regulated by international law, the people 
should be prepared for their independence and self-government.151 The provisions of the 
article referred specifically to those ‘communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire’ 
and as having reached a particular stage of development. Therefore, their ‘existence as 
independent nations can be, provisionally recognised’ provided that they were given 
‘administrative advice and assistance’ by a mandatory that was approved by the 
territory.152 In fact, the British mandate for Palestine was ‘hardly compatible’ with the 
League’s Covenant since Palestine was not provisionally or finally recognised as 
independent.153 Yet other countries became independent only later as it was deemed 
appropriate to serve the interests of the mandatory.154 
 
The character of the mandate was gauged by a country’s stage of development, therefore, 
there was no uniformity in how the mandate system applied to each country. Variation was 
part of the system as applied to different regions and territories.155 The former Turkish 
possessions including Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq were classified as ‘A’ mandates.156 
This meant that these people reached a more advanced stage than those classified as ‘B’ 
and ‘C’ mandates in Africa and the Pacific.157 In summary, the principles incorporated in 
article 22 were: the administration of the peoples of the mandated territories was a trust 
for their benefit with no annexation of the land; the terms of this trust were in accordance 
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with international law; the open door policy was to be maintained; and the people should 
be prepared ‘for eventual independence and self-government’.158 At the same time, the 
League’s covenant did not mention anything with regards to how long the mandatory 
control would last, how it would end, or what the League of do if the mandatory power 
failed to uphold the principles of the sacred trust.159 
 
By the provisions of article 22 the Council of the League was entitled to the supervision but 
not the control of the mandate system, aided by the advice and assistance of the 
Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC). The majority of the Commission’s nine members 
were nationals of states not holding mandates, however, only four of them were.160 They 
were not representatives of governments but individuals with colonial experience in 
administration and governorship.161 Major William Ormsby Gore, Under-Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, was the British representative on the Permanent Mandates Commission 
(PMC).162 In order to guarantee the observance of the mandates the PMC received ‘through 
duly authorized representatives’ annual reports from the mandatories on the 
administration of the mandated territories.163 This systematic supervision was possible only 
due to the existence of the League of Nations.164 According to this system the 
representatives of the mandatory powers were expected to be prepared to answer 
questions and offer explanations or supplementary information.165 To ensure compliance 
with the League’s regulations, it was stated in article 24 of the Palestine mandate that 
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‘copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year shall be 
communicated with the [annual] report.’166 In the case of the Palestine mandate the High 
Commissioner or high official of the Colonial Office would appear before the Commission at 
Geneva and be interviewed about the report and the administration as a whole.167 After 
examining these reports and adding its observation, the Commission would forward them 
to the Council for publishing.168 More importantly, it was evident that these observations 
formed the basis for the Council’s decisions.169   
 
Edward Jenkins, from the University of Chicago, explains that PMC was purely an advisory 
body with no power to render decisions or recommendations upon the mandatory.170 The 
League was in no position, in the opinion of a British official, to ‘interfere with mandatories’ 
and the function of the Commission was to enquire into any grave complaint made in a 
mandated territory, but ‘not undertake administration’.171 In fact, the submission of annual 
reports was viewed by the mandatories as a limitation on their freedom. This is because the 
Commission’s powers were those of moral persuasion and the ‘threat of public rebuke’ as 
these reports would provoke public uproar and pressure.172 Therefore, both the British and 
the French were anxious to avoid public criticism and ‘tailored not merely their reports but 
also their policies accordingly’.173 Indeed, the British government presented reports about 
the administration of Palestine in a manner to show its commitment to the principles of the 
mandate.  
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The 'A' mandates were distributed and accepted by the mandatory powers. Here, Britain 
was granted the mandate of Iraq and Palestine and France that of Syria and Lebanon.174 
Before the League of Nations ratified these mandates, the British Cabinet, in June 1921, 
held discussions to make sure that retaining the mandate of Iraq and Palestine was of 
significance to Great Britain. The question was also discussed in Whitehall and Parliament. 
In fact, there were voices in Britain that were not fully in support of the mandate. Although 
the Cabinet provisionally approved the terms of the mandate for Palestine in 1921, the 
House of Lords passed a motion against it in 1922.175 Additionally, the General Staff of the 
British Army declared in 1923 that Palestine was not vital to the defence of the Suez 
Canal.176 In fact the defence of the canal depended on forces stationed on the banks of the 
Suez and not in Palestine.177 However, the Colonial Office and the CID held the opposite 
position that maintained Palestine’s importance to Suez. Given this apparent dispute, why 
was it so important for Britain to gain control over Palestine? 
 
One argument put forward was that the British government had an obvious incentive to 
sustain control of Palestine given that it had spent ‘over one hundred million pounds’ in 
Palestine and Mesopotamia since the armistice.178 The decision was that however 
‘undesirable and expensive’ controlling any of the Arab areas might be, it would be still 
more undesirable and expensive if ‘they passed [to] the control of any other European 
Power.’179 Moreover, the Cabinet thought that it was difficult to withdraw from Palestine 
and Mesopotamia and ‘hand those countries over to anarchy’.180 Rappard claims that ‘it 
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was held politically impossible’ to leave the acquired territories under their former rulers, 
so the Colonial powers opted ‘to annex them, or to grant them independence’.181 He argues 
that the mandate was a form of administration that justified itself in the ‘eyes of the world’ 
because of the intrinsic advantages it offered to those concerned. Who were those 
concerned in the mandate? Rappard explains that the three parties concerned were the 
inhabitants of the mandated territory, the mandatory powers, and the League of 
Nations.182 In fact, these three interests constitute the three strands of this thesis as 
directed toward an investigation into the construction of the Haifa harbour. 
 
The strategic importance of Palestine to the Suez Canal, particularly after the conversion of 
Egypt to protectorate status in 1921, was one key justification for retaining the mandate of 
Palestine.183 The opinion of the Middle East Department of the Colonial Office was that the 
key to Great Britain’s sea and air communications was shifting from Egypt to Palestine by 
which the latter gained political and strategic importance.184 The July 1923 opinion of the 
CID was that the ‘retention of Palestine was desirable at present’.185 This was because if 
Palestine’s ports were to fall into ‘hostile hands’, a naval menace would present itself vis-à-
vis the Suez Canal.186 Palestine was also important to allow the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
to transport oil to and from the Mediterranean.187 In brief, Britain’s imperial interests in 
Palestine were first and foremost to keep it out of the hands of any hostile power; second, 
to serve strategic purposes related to the defence of the Suez Canal; and third, to achieve 
economic and communication goals.188 Moreover, it was thought that in the event of war 
                                                          
181




 Maurice, ‘British Policy’, p. 108-9. 
184








 Abdul-Wahab Kayyali, ‘Zionism and Imperialism: The Historical Origins’, Journal of Palestine 
Studies, 6/3, (Spring 1977), pp. 98-112, p 112. 
51 
 
India would provide Britain with crucial military recruiting ground, therefore it was vital 
that the Suez Canal would be open for ships to India, alongside overland and air routes via 
Palestine and Iraq.189  
 
Article 23 of the League’s Covenant provided that the stated provisions must define the 
relationship between the mandatory power with the local community on one hand and that 
with the international community on the other. It is vital at this stage to mention some of 
the items of this article that will be discussed in this thesis in relation to the construction of 
the Haifa harbour. For example, item (a) stipulated, inter alia, that the members of the 
League should ‘endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour’ 
both within and outside their countries. For this purpose the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) was established. Item (e) of the article stipulated that the members of 
the league should ‘secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and 
equitable treatment for the commerce of all members of the League.’ This was in reference 
to the ‘open door’ policy which, as Pitman Potter, the author of the Covenant said, was to 
be maintained in the colonial territories under the mandatory power.190 Equitable 
treatment did not mean free trade or lower revenue tariffs, but rather equality and 
uniformity of treatment in terms of duties, dues and regulations, shares in raw materials 
and equal opportunities for investments or concessions.191 Article 23 also provided ‘general 
obligations for the well-being of native inhabitants’ of the mandated territories though no 
machinery was set up for implementation.192 
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The Council of the League held a session in July 1922 in London primarily to ‘consider the 
mandate for Palestine’ and decided to approve it.193 The Council considered it desirable 
that the British and French mandates should come into operation simultaneously. Thus the 
Palestine mandate was held in ‘abeyance’ until Franco-Italian differences, in regard to 
questions raised by Italy about the French mandate in Syria, had been resolved.194 Thus it 
took until September 1923 for the Palestine, Syria and Lebanon mandates to come into 
operation.195 It is worth noting that the United States made no territorial claims after the 
War and therefore avoided the burden of administrative responsibility.196 
 
In the guise of mandatory powers, Britain and France took control of the Arab lands 
formerly under Turkish rule.197 It is possible to say that France had achieved her objectives 
in the Levant although it was agreed Britain’s belated insistence on unilateral control of 
Palestine.198 Due to Britain’s position, friction over territorial settlement between Britain 
and France was unavoidable in the view of some British officials.199 The mandatories were 
selected by the principal Allied Powers for purely political reasons and not because of their 
‘peculiar colonial experience’.200 The wishes of the Palestinian community in the selection 
of the mandatory were not sought as dictated by article 22 of the League’s Covenant. 
Similarly, Alexandre Millerand, the French Prime Minister did not believe, with regards to 
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Syria, that the Arabs ‘should participate in the political decisions affecting their lives.’201 The 
mandate system had legalized Europe’s direct control over the acquired territories of the 
Middle East. 
 
While the League had now agreed the creation of the mandates, the compromise at their 
core brought criticism for being a ‘cloak for further imperialistic expansion’.202 In effect, the 
mandatory system through the agency of the League of Nations, gave Britain and France 
rights to the acquired territories. This indirect allocation of territories for administration 
and development was not to offset Germany’s payment of compensation for the loss and 
damage caused during WWI according to the Treaty of Versailles of June 1919 with the 
Allied Powers. It was also a means of justification to the Italians and others, who did not 
obtain appropriate proportional territorial gains as a result of the War.203 For this reason 
the mandate was adopted ‘without prolonged discussion’.204 It was agreed in Cabinet that it 
was important to ‘get the mandates passed without delay’.205  
 
Monroe rightly argues that although the mandate system was not the same as traditional 
colonialism, the British were still the primary power in the mandated territory. Monroe also 
explains that the local peoples were subordinated ‘to British interests outside the Middle 
East’ under the ‘the magic of the word ‘mandate’’.206 In her view the term ‘mandate’ was 
elastic enough to allow for the British to claim that the Imperial defence would remain 
‘safely in British hands’.207 In this sense, it is possible to describe the mandate as ‘an 
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improvement on colonialism’.208 Nevertheless, the result was that Palestine ‘remained a 
Crown Colony’.209  
 
Neutral nations such as Sweden characterized the League as an attempt to ‘create a 
permanent condition of tutelage’ under the mandates system.210 Moreover, the British and 
the French negotiated the boundaries of the territories with no consideration for 
‘ethnographic frontiers’ or the recognition of the provisional independence of the nations 
concerned.211 Additionally, the articles of the Covenant fell short of stipulating the method 
of mandate allocation. Neither did it specify the instrument for obtaining the wishes of the 
respective communities, nor the basis of accepting or rejecting the mandatories.212  
 
The League of Nations achieved a very important aspect of its purpose in maintaining world 
peace with the establishment of the mandate system. Nevertheless, its effectiveness 
depended very much on the willingness of the mandatory powers to consider the interests, 
mainly economic, of the other members of the League.  
 
 
The mandate for Palestine 
Self-determination was meant to be one of the primary elements providing for the 
adoption of the mandate system. President Wilson wanted an international commission to 
consult the inhabitants of the non-Turkish formerly Ottoman Empire so that their wishes 
could be brought into the process. However, the American King-Crane Commission that was 
appointed by the League of Nations to investigate the desire of the inhabitants produced 
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no results. This was due, as Monroe explains, to the fact that ‘consultation was a virtue only 
if the consulting authority has the will and ability to act on what it learns.’213 The Foreign 
Secretary Balfour wrote in 1919 that the contradiction between the ‘letter’ of the Covenant 
and the policy of the Allies was ‘even more flagrant in the case of the independent nation 
of Palestine’ than in others ‘for in Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form 
of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country.’214 The Commission was 
not able to act according to the inhabitants’ wishes and the mandatory power was certainly 
not interested in those desires directed toward an ‘independent nation’ of Palestine.  
 
The end of the mandate upon a certain territory depended on the mandatory judgment 
that the mandated territory was developed enough to be able to stand alone. The 
preamble of the mandate for Palestine provided that the Allied Powers selected and 
entrusted the British mandatory with the administration of Palestine. Although the 
mandatory states enjoyed full powers of legislation and administration, William Rappard 
argues that ‘the [m]andatories were not, however, to become the sovereign masters of 
these territories.’215 Additionally, Arnold McNair, a British legal scholar, says that the 
detached territories under the mandate system were ‘not in the ownership of any state.’216 
Indeed, J. Stoyanovsky, confirmed that the mandate was not ‘merely a ‘change of form’, but 
it was a change of policy’. This is because it formed a ‘breach with the old practice of 
annexation’.217 However, Rappard challenges these arguments, including his own, when he 
states that the Palestine mandate was peculiar and that the administration as designed in 
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line with the mandate system did not ‘apply to that territory’ whose inhabitants could 
certainly not be ‘regarded as [a] backward people’.218 
 
In light of this the British government could be viewed as not being consistent with the 
spirit of the mandate by reinstating its role as ‘sovereign master’ of Palestine and by 
continuing its colonial policy. Roger Owen demonstrates that the British terms of the 
administration and the policies in Palestine had common features with ‘ordinary British 
colonies’.219 In fact, Britain’s mastery was evident from the early days of the Palestine 
mandate treaty where the Balfour Declaration, with the agreement of the Allied Powers, 
was inserted in the preamble of the mandate. The terms of the Declaration stipulated that 
the British government viewed favourably the establishment of a national home for the 
Jews in Palestine. At the same time, however, the British government felt nothing should 
prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, nor 
the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. Indeed, the British 
government preserved its commitment to the creation of a Jewish national home, which 
ran counter to earlier pledges, made by Sir Henry McMahon to Sharif Hussein of Mecca, 
acknowledging the independence of the Arab countries including Palestine.220 The Arab 
population of Palestine were therefore ‘antagonized at the outset’.221  
 
In July 1922 the Council of the League of Nations approved the embodiment of the Balfour 
Declaration ‘with some modifications (not affecting the policy of the Declaration).’222 The 
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modification referred to was the substitution of the words ‘juridical and political rights’ for 
‘civil and religious rights’ of the non-Jewish communities in Palestine.223 Thus, the 
endorsement of the mandate for Palestine in its form by the principal Allied Powers and the 
United States could be viewed as supportive of Britain’s desire to do as it pleased in 
Palestine. In light of this, Roger Owen’s argument, that the inclusion of the terms of the 
Balfour Declaration into the Mandate was ‘one significant difference from the formal 
colonies’, is contested.224 This is because the insertion of the Declaration provides evidence 
that Britain had the intention to do in Palestine what it desired without consideration of the 
wishes of its inhabitants. Sarah Graham-Brown’s claim that the development of a Jewish 
national home in Palestine is a factor which ‘modified the ‘colonial’ aspect’ is also 
insufficient.225 This factor confirmed, rather than modified, the colonial aspect. Balfour 
himself explained that the mandate was sovereignty ‘exercised over the conquered 
territory’.226 In addition, the then Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill, stated that quoting 
the Balfour Declaration in the preamble of the Palestine mandate would make it 
‘impossible to obtain the consent’ of the representatives of the country to those terms.227 
In the end, the Palestinians ‘have seen an alien regime’ foisted upon them by force and 
threatened their existence.228 Chaim Weizmann maintained that the shortcomings of the 
British government were found in its failure to explain to the Arab population ‘the real 
meaning and implications’ of the Balfour Declaration.229  
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There is no doubt that the Palestinian Arabs had ‘looked forward’ to the mandate but, 
feeling antagonized at the outset, rejected it.230 When the first High Commissioner for 
Palestine Herbert Samuel arrived in Palestine in June 1920 to assume his position as 
governor of the country, he was met with demonstrations.231 During the debates in the 
Council of the League of Nations over the ratification of the mandate in July 1922, the 
Palestinians ‘openly announced’ that they ‘did not accept the mandate based upon the 
Balfour Declaration.’232 The opposition to the mandate continued to be expressed in various 
means and forms. Their rejection was communicated to London, by Palestinian delegations 
representing the Arab Muslims and Christians, forming 93 per cent of the population, as 
well as through repeated written representations to the British government. They wrote, in 
1923 when the mandate came into force, that the ‘mandate as it exists has been rejected 
and will continue to be rejected by the people of Palestine.’233 The position was maintained 
by the indigenous-Arabs of Palestine throughout the mandatory period. They demanded 
the annulment of the Balfour Declaration, the prohibition of Jewish immigration and the 
establishment of a national government.234 As Kenneth Williams noted in ‘Palestine: A New 
Policy Wanted’, 1933, the Arabs of Palestine simply ‘will not have the [m]andate.’235 The 
British mandate, violating self-government from the outset, was imposed on Palestine in 
spite of ‘local populations' clear preference for independence’ in all of the Middle East.236  
 
Amid the wider discussions on the mandate, it is worth noting that, as Herbert and 
Sosnovsky argue, there was ‘no hint […] in all the discussions on the harbour in Whitehall’ 
of the promise made by Balfour in relation to the Jewish homeland in Palestine. Though the 
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building of the harbour meant that Britain was committed to the mandate, it did not have 
any bearing on Britain’s responsibilities towards the Jewish National Home.237 This meant 
that the construction of Haifa harbour was purely a British imperial enterprise that had no 
connection to the fact that a promise was given to the Jews to settle in Palestine. 
 
Those articles of the Palestine mandate that did have a bearing on the British government 
were the provisions of article 22 of the League’s Covenant.238 Those articles were referred 
to and discussed by the British government when debates were held about the 
construction of the Haifa harbour. They generally allowed Britain, as the mandatory power, 
to benefit economically from the mandated territory of Palestine.239 Of the 28 articles of 
the Palestine mandate, the following articles were especially important. Article 11 of the 
Palestine mandate provided, in part, that  
The administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the 
interests of the community in connection with the development of the country, 
and, subject to any international obligations accepted by the mandatory, shall have 
full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural 
resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities established or 
to be established therein.240  
 
The provisions of this article gave the British government the right to control and use the 
natural resources of Palestine, provided that it could safeguard the interests of the 
community and meet international obligations. The building of the Haifa harbour certainly 
contributed to the development of the country, although it inspired disputes with other 
countries related to previous obligations. Additional facilities were given to the mandatory 
nation such as that provided by article 17 that ‘The [m]andatory shall be entitled at all 
times to use the roads, railways and ports of Palestine for the movement of armed forces 
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and the carriage of fuel and supplies.’ This article made it possible for the British 
government, as the author of the provisions of the Palestine mandate, to consider utilizing 
Haifa harbour for strategic purposes particularly in connection with securing a terminus for 
the oil pipeline from Iraq to terminate at Haifa. 
 
In connection with Britain’s relationship with the international community, article 18 of the 
Palestine mandate observed the interests of the members of the League of Nations and 
stipulates that there should be. 
..no discrimination in Palestine against the nationals of any state member of the 
League of Nations (including companies incorporated under its laws) as compared 
with those of the mandatory or of any foreign state in matters concerning taxation, 
commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the 
treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no 
discrimination in Palestine against goods originating in or destined for any of the 
said states, and there shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across 
the mandated area. Subject as aforesaid and to the other provisions of this 
mandate, the administration of Palestine may, on the advice of the mandatory, 
impose such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary, and take such 
steps as it may think best to promote the development of the natural resources of 
the country and to safeguard the interests of the population. It may also, on the 
advice of the mandatory, conclude a special customs agreement with any state the 
territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.241 
 
Article 18 was meant to conform explicitly to the League of Nations’ policy of economic 
equality or the ‘open door’ policy, as it was frequently called, which was mentioned only by 
implication in article 22 of the League’s Covenant. Edward Jenkins argues that economic 
equality is the guarantee of equal tariff treatment and equality of opportunity to compete 
and participate in the resources of national wealth or contract for public works on an equal 
footing with the nationals of the country granting the privilege.242 Article 18 was joined by 
article 19 in securing economic equality to all nations of the League. Article 19 stated that 
‘The mandatory shall adhere on behalf of the administration of Palestine to any general 
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international conventions [… ] relating to commercial equality, freedom of transit and 
navigation.’ Additionally, article 26 provided that in the event of a dispute between the 
mandatory and another member of the League, relating to the interpretation or application 
of the mandate, and could not be settled by negotiations, it should be submitted to 
Permanent Court of International Justice. The Permanent Court of International Justice was 
created in 1920 by the provisions of article 14 of the Covenant of the League. Its task was to 
hear and determine any dispute of an international character, and to give legal advice to 
the League. Usually, negotiations were a preferable solution owing to ‘the costly and 
uncertain decision of a court’.243 Finally, in the event of the termination of the mandate, 
article 28 stated that the Council of the League of Nations should make arrangements and 
use its influence to ensure that ‘the Government of Palestine will fully honour the financial 
obligations legitimately incurred by the administration of Palestine during the period of the 
mandate.’ This meant that the government of Palestine was responsible for paying back 
any financial obligations including loans that were extended to it during the mandate as 
well as employees’ salaries.  
 
The provisions of these articles show that Britain’s approach to Palestine as mandated 
territory took into considerations the purpose set out in the League’s Covenant. Britain’s 
commitment to world peace was reflected in attempts to integrate rivals’ interests in some 
articles of the Palestine mandate such as article 18. At the same time, the provisions of the 
mandate proved useful in defending Britain’s position towards the method of carrying out 
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The government of Palestine 
In light of the provisions of article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the 
articles of the Palestine mandate, it is important to this study to understand how the 
government of Palestine worked. Upon the occupation of Palestine in 1918, a military 
administration, answerable to the Foreign Office, was established to rule the country and 
remained in place until 1920 when the fate of the country was provisionally decided at the 
Paris Peace Conference.244 In October 1918 General Allenby established, what was termed 
in military parlance, the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA) South to 
administer Palestine.245 Its jurisdiction was extended over the area of approximately 27,000 
square kilometres from the Mediterranean north of Acre just south of Ras al-Naqura to 
include the town of Safad and Lake Hulah. To its eastern border was the River Jordan, and 
to the south was the international border with Egypt.246 The population of Palestine was 
estimated at 757,000, of which about 54 per cent derived their livelihood from agriculture, 
and few from industry.247 The middle class mostly included business men, contractors, 
directors and managers of companies and banking institutions. Many of the educated had 
received their training outside Palestine in different fields. At the time of military rule, the 
people were suffering from the hardships and privations that the country had endured 
under Turkish military regime.248 
 
Under the general direction of General Allenby, chief military administrators assisted by 
district military officers managed the country according to the laws of war.249 These officials 
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and their staff, many of whom continued to serve under the civil rule, laid the foundations 
of firm British regime.250 Prominent among these officials were Norman Bentwich, the 
Attorney-General and Colonel R. Holmes, the General Manager of Railways.251 They ruled a 
country exhausted by war whose population was depleted and in severe distress, their land 
left untilled and their commerce at a standstill.252 Although they were instructed to 
maintain the status quo, they were entitled to organise the government, to restore 
essential services, and to begin the work of construction. However, they were not allowed 
to introduce changes to legislation where the Ottoman rules and regulations continued to 
operate.253  
 
Although technically the country was still under military occupation, the military 
administration came to an end under the service of General Sir Louis Bols.254 In July 1920, 
he handed the administration of Palestine to Herbert Samuel as the first High 
Commissioner for Palestine, (i.e. the head of the government) who was also the 
Commander in Chief.255 Samuel observed that the government of Palestine as mandatory 
was a ‘form of constitution that the world has had no experience of’, particularly as it was 
not known how long the mandate would last.256 Until the position of Palestine was 
stabilised and better defined, the British government acted upon a letter provided, in 
October 1921, by the President of the League of Nations’s Council inviting Britain to 
‘continue to carry on the administration of the territories committed’ to its charge in the 
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‘spirit of the draft Mandates’.257 Samuel was succeeded by six High Commissioners who 
ruled Palestine between 1920 and 1948, but was the only Jew among them.258 Being a Jew 
and a Zionist, the Arabs’ suspicions were aroused by Samuel’s ‘easy and sympathetic 
understanding with leading Zionists’.259 In fact an article appeared in The Times in April 
1920, in the context of attempts to invalidate the Balfour Declaration, calling for the 
appointment of impartial executives of the mandatory power in Palestine.260 However, the 
question of whether Samuel fulfilled the requirement of impartiality is not addressed in this 
thesis. 
 
The government formed in mandated Palestine was a reproduction, but in a simple form of 
British pattern.261 An advisory council was established in 1922 in place of a legislative 
council which was indefinitely postponed.262 This council was supposed to represent the 
people of the country, but in fact was composed of the heads of departments of the 
colonial service.263 Similarly, high ranks of the civil service consisted mainly of British 
officials, under the pretence that Palestinians lacked the necessary qualifications to 
undertake tasks in the administration.264 Consequently, the Palestinian notables who had 
served in senior office under the Ottoman regime were denied positions.265 In brief, the 
government of Palestine was British-run and principally by the High Commissioner and 
British officials. 
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The constitution to govern the country was issued in the form of an Order in Council that 
provided the practiced legislative form for the colonies under British administration.266 This 
was possible only after the mandate was officially promulgated and martial law was 
rescinded by mid-1921.267 The Order in Council conferred absolute legislative and 
administrative powers on the High Commissioner and ensured that all the operative 
decisions remained in the hands of mandate officials.268 The powers of the Executive 
Council, which in some sense acted as a Cabinet, also followed the colonial model. The High 
Commissioner governed the country in consultation with the Executive, the Advisory 
Councils which were composed entirely from British officers - the Chief Secretary, the 
Attorney-General and a representative from the Treasury - were in fact, ‘rubber stamps’.269  
 
To change the existing Ottoman laws or to introduce new legislations, the government of 
Palestine initiated and proposed a legislative bill and presented it to the Colonial Office. 
Upon the approval of the proposed legislation by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
the legislation was published as a Bill after which it was enacted by an order by the High 
Commissioner under the Royal Prerogative.270 The constitutional form implemented in 
Palestine showed that the territory was a separate unit. It was not an independent 
sovereign state but dependent upon the United Kingdom, albeit with control by the British 
government exercised in a flexible manner.271 This was because there were no rigidly 
defined practical manual set by the League as to the method of practicing or exercising the 
mandate. 
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In the colonies and other mandated territories local indirect rule supplemented the work of 
British officials, but this was not the case in Palestine.272 The ruling governments in the 
colonies were composed of local inhabitants where the government of Palestine was 
composed of British officials. Christians and Muslims worked together in Palestine ‘sharing 
the same aims of independence and unity’ and in 1920 elected the Arab Executive as the 
head of their nationalist movement. This body, which ‘denied the validity of the mandate,’ 
usually ‘handled the Arab case’ against the government.273 It was not until the end of the 
twenties that the government of Palestine fully recognised the Arab Executive as 
‘representative of the Palestine Arab population.’274 On the other hand, the Jewish Agency 
was given an advisory role to the government from the outset of the mandate as provided 
by article four of the Palestine mandate.275 Arabs were not given similar status. Instead, the 
mandatory administration established the Supreme Muslim Council with Haj Amin el 
Husseini, the Grand Mufti its president, with no formal political role.276  
 
In London, the Foreign Office, under Curzon, was responsible for the mandating 
government in Palestine until February 1921 when the Middle East Department was 
established in the Colonial Office.277 Also, responsibility for both external and internal 
security was transferred from the War Office and placed in the hands of the Air Ministry.278 
The British government was reluctant to transfer the responsibility of the mandated Arab-
speaking territories to the Colonial Office for fear that this administrative move might look 
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like annexation.279 Staff for the Middle East Department was drawn from other government 
offices. Winston Churchill, the then Colonial Secretary, appointed John Shuckburgh, who 
was head of the Mesopotamia Department of the India Office, as head of the department 
under the title of Under-Secretary.280 Ronald Vernon, from the Treasury, Hubert Young and 
O.G. R. Williams were appointed as his assistants, in addition to Grattan Bushe, as legal 
adviser.281 The long tenure of the permanent staff provided a consistency in policy towards 
Palestine as determined in Whitehall.282 There were around eight Secretaries of State who 
were in office during the period of the study. From these Leopold Amery served the longest 
(6 November 1924 – 4 June 1929) and had the biggest impact upon the harbour 
construction project at Haifa. Although these Secretaries served under the government of 
the different political parties, they all, in fact, agreed upon ‘the general lines of policy’ 
regarding protecting indigenous peoples of a territory under British control, in return for 
the right to trade and control external relations of those countries.283 It is worth noting that 
similar to the practice in the colonies, the foreign relations of Palestine, and the defence of 
the country and the preservation of peace within its boundaries were kept in the hands of 
the British government as the mandatory power. This meant that the government of 
Palestine had no direct diplomatic relations, could not enter into treaties or make war upon 
any other state.284 Thus, negotiations regarding the oil pipeline from Iraq were mainly 
handled by Whitehall where some Departments differed in the application of the principles 
but remained committed to the principles themselves.285  
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Cosmo Parkinson, Official of the Colonial Office and occupied the position of Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State from 1937 until 1942, pointed out that the burden of ‘hard labour 
and daily worry’ rested on the shoulders of the Middle East Department.286 More important 
was that the Department could not function for ‘a day without regard to international 
reactions in one part of the world or another.’287 As we will see, in the construction of the 
Haifa harbour, the pivotal point was the consideration paid to the relationship Britain had 
with the international community. 
 
Another important factor to weigh in the relationship between the governments of 
Palestine and Britain in regard to the construction of the harbour, was the significance of 
the role of the Crown Agents. The Colonial Office was not capable of carrying out 
development and investment projects, per se, in the colonies or the mandated areas. The 
Crown Agents for the Colonies, who were specialised in the field and operated under the 
direct control of the Colonial Office, were usually charged with this work. The significance 
of examining the role of the Crown Agents in Palestine is that their activity served as an 
indicator of the policies adopted by the British government. Moreover, owing to the 
scarcity of the literature on the Crown Agents’ work during the period between the two 
World Wars, this study could contribute significantly by adding to the existing literature and 
provide an account of their work in Palestine during this period.  
 
Who were the Crown Agents and what was the scope of their work? The Crown Agency 
Office was a back office supporting the business operations for the Colonial Office. 
Established in 1833, the Crown Agents for the Colonies were a quasi-independent body. 
While under the supervision of the Colonial Office, which appointed the Agents and 
monitored their activities, they were administratively and financially independent of the 
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government. Their headquarters were housed in a single office complex in Millbank, 
London.288  
 
The personnel of the Crown Agents were former Colonial Office officials such as Sir William 
Mercer, Sir Reginald Antrobus, Sir Percy Ezechiel and Sir Henry Lambert who was the first 
Crown Agent from 1921 to 1932.289 Like their Colonial Office counterparts, all the Crown 
Agents were educated at public schools and belonged to the upper middle class.290 The 
Crown Agents, thus, performed a complementary job by which they lightened the burden 
for the Colonial Office. In general, the characteristics assigned to the Crown Agents were 
that of ‘commercial and financial agents’ supposedly unconcerned with political matters.291 
The Crown Agents performed the work needed in Britain on behalf of the governments of 
the colonies and protectorates.292 They operated through an apparatus composed of four 
Crown Agents assisted with eight heads of departments and chief clerks and staff.293  
 
The Crown Agents explained in their July 1917 report that the nature of business transacted 
by them included financial, commercial and the management of projects and works. The 
tasks they performed included: the negotiation, issue and management of loans; the 
management of sinking funds of loans; purchasing stores and material for railways and 
public works and shipping them; and negotiating contracts for the execution of public 
works and managing correspondence with consulting engineers. In addition, the Agents 
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were also empowered with the selection and engagement of candidates for appointments 
of certain jobs and positions, mainly technical, and in secondment of their staff to perform 
specific tasks. The Agents covered their expenditure through a system of charges imposed 
on the colonial governments for achieved services.294 The general principle of obtaining 
supplies followed by the Crown Agents was ‘to invite competition direct from British 
manufacturers, limited however to firm of known capability, resources, and 
trustworthiness.’295 This meant that they did not use the method of public tendering in 
obtaining material and stores. They explained that this was the case in order to avoid 
raising prices and to exercise quality-control arrangements. 
 
The Crown Agents’ ultimate goal, however, was to bring benefit to the British economy 
through the employment of British firms and purchase of British material to the colonies as 
well as to the mandated territories. Their main function was ‘to act as general agents for 
the Governments of the Crown Colonies and Protectorate’.296 They also acted as the agents 
for mandated Palestine as confirmed by Herbert Samuel in 1920.297 This is significant 
because there were in fact other countries such as Austria and Germany who, in 
accordance with provisions of the Palestine mandate, offered to supply the government of 
Palestine with required goods and commodities. The administration of Palestine thought 
that these offers would be more economic than those of the British but the Crown Agents 
were still Palestine’s official agents and favoured British material and goods.298  
 
The preference toward the British market and enterprises for the purchase of supplies and 
stores was confirmed officially in April 1921 by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. His 
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instruction to which the administration of Palestine conformed was to follow the usual 
practice laid down in Colonial Regulations. This put business affairs that could not be 
attained locally in the hands of the Crown Agents.299 In light of their functions, the Crown 




Increasing European interests and activities in the Middle East before WWI had led to 
greater British attention to the economic and strategic importance of the region. The Suez 
Canal became a vital aspect for Britain’s commercial and strategic position and defending it 
was to be achieved at all costs. Controlling the shores of Palestine on the east coast of the 
Mediterranean, and not those of Syria which were France’s interest, emerged as the most 
suitable option for the British government. When WWI broke out and British troops seized 
Palestine, Britain became the paramount power in the region and likewise became the de 
facto power in Palestine. It is possible to conclude that as a result of the War Britain was 
able to achieve its economic and strategic goals and was empowered to retreat from 
previous obligations without harm. Britain was able to safeguard its commercial interests 
by securing a safe passage for British ships and vessels through the canal and by 
strengthening its strategic presence in the basin of the Mediterranean in Palestine. 
 
In order to reduce the possibility of future wars, the conveners at the Peace Conference in 
Paris in 1919 agreed on the establishment of the League of Nations, the main purposes of 
which was to prevent wars and secure world peace. One way to do this was by introducing 
the mandate system which was on the initiative of the American President. The mandate 
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system was meant to prevent the annexation of occupied territories and secure the ‘open 
door’ policy to equalise economic opportunities for all League members (rival or not). This 
system had two purposes: hindering the exploitation of wrested territories and their 
inhabitants; and affording rival countries equality of treatment. The mandate system 
offered a mechanism that, if adhered to, could organise the relationship between the 
world’s countries. Moreover, it afforded a basis for transforming the traditional colonial 
approach towards seized territories and their population. Accepting the mandate of 
Palestine and Iraq made it possible for Britain to exceed the limits of its territorial aspiration 
before the War so that it would build not only a railway but also an oil pipeline linking the 
two countries under British rule. Britain controlled these areas in the Middle East in a 
manner that was not counted as spoils of war. The British government’s commitment to the 
provisions of the Covenant was highlighted in the discussions about the construction of 
Haifa harbour, as will be seen in later chapters. 
 
The provisions of the Palestine mandate addressed the administration of the territory and 
secured the interests of foreign countries. This chapter has examined how the provisions of 
the mandate related to the development of the inhabitants of Palestine in order to 
understand the British government’s position towards various aspects of labour condition, 
as are discussed in the thesis. It was crucial for Britain to keep Palestine away from the 
hands of any hostile power, using it to serve strategic purposes relating to the defence of 
the Suez Canal and achieving economic and communication goals were possible as a result 
of being granted the mandate for Palestine.  
 
The fact was that the government of Palestine was formed in the image of colonial 
government and consisted mainly of British officials running the country. Foreign relations, 
treaties and contracts were consequently administered by the government in London. 
73 
 
Therefore the project at Haifa was by default managed by the Crown Agents for the 
Colonies as was the case in the colonies. The exception to this was where a change was 
needed in order to avoid international criticism. It is to these issues and how they played 









After capturing the Palestinian territories as a result of WWI, the British military authorities 
and the civil administration that controlled the country sought, as one of their primary 
objects, to develop the harbour at Haifa. The peace negotiations in Paris and their 
outcome, in addition to League of Nations regulations, framed the great powers’ treatment 
of the seized territories. However, previous colonial practices, such as exploiting natural 
resources of the newly wrested territories, were possible after the War. This chapter 
explores how Britain’s imperial economic purposes provoked interest in developing the 
harbour at Haifa. Both the military authorities and the civil administration in Palestine had 
at the base of their thinking the prevailing economic conditions in Britain when considering 
the construction of Haifa harbour.  
 
The town of Haifa had been built by Sheikh Daher el-Umar of the Zaydani family in 1785 
during a period when commodities from Palestine such as cotton and tobacco were 
exported to Europe through the Bay of Acre.300 Later in the nineteenth century, although 
Jaffa was the main port for orange exports, Haifa emerged as an exporter of citrus fruit, as 
well as of other products, coming from the hinterland of Syria and eastern Jordan.301 
Laurence Oliphant, British diplomat, author and amateur archaeologist, explained that 
Haifa had gradually became ‘one of the great grain-exporting ports of the country’ notably 
                                                          
300
 I. Schattner, ‘Haifa: A Study in the Relation of City and Coast’, Israel Exploration Journal, 4/1 
(1954), pp. 26-46, p. 43; Marwan Buheiry, ‘The Agricultural Exports of Southern Palestine, 1885-
1914’, Journal of Palestine Studies, 10/4 (Summer 1981), pp. 61-81, p.66. 
301
 Buheiry, ‘The Agricultural Exports’, p. 74. 
75 
 
for exporting cereals coming from Hauran province in Syria.302 The railway line constructed 
from Haifa in 1905 was to meet a line in Dar’a in southern Syria which itself was to connect 
Damascus with the Hijaz.303 In addition, a new dockyard was built in Haifa port to house 
ships and to offload freight even during storms and strong winds.304 This strengthened the 
position of Haifa and spurred further economic and population growth.305 Thus, Haifa 
became a vital intersection for international communications that connected it with the 
Palestinian cities and with neighbouring countries.306 This turned Haifa ‘into a bona fide 
port city’ with strategic location granting it advantages over other coastal cities.307  
 
The theme of this chapter is to highlight the way in which economic conditions back in 
Britain impinged upon the administrators of Palestine and enhanced decisions such as the 
harbour construction. In order to understand this, it is important to ask the following 
questions: What motivated military officials to propose the development of the port at 
Haifa? Why did they think it was important to propose the development of the harbour 
whilst the political status of Palestine was not yet determined? Why did the civil 
administration of Palestine continue to pursue their interest in the port? What influence 
did political conditions have on their proposal? What was the position of the British 
government towards Haifa harbour specifically given that all of Palestine was under its 
control?  
 
This chapter argues that despite uncertain political conditions in Palestine after WWI, the 
military and civil administrations in control of Palestine alike pursued the construction of a 
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harbour at Haifa not only to develop the country but most importantly to contribute in 
reviving the British economy.  
  
Solomou has described how, after WWI, the British economy was characterised by slow 
growth and was viewed as having only ‘poor investment opportunities’.308 Thomas, offering 
a similar view, points to a low rate of investment that weakened the British economy.309 
Hence, the construction of Haifa harbour was thought of as an investment project that 
would open opportunities for Britain. On the other hand Alford argues that although British 
post-war politics was defined by the ‘politics of victory’, this declined during the 1920s due 
to international competition in trade and finance that created new economic uncertainties 
and difficulties. Alford describes the relationship between post-war political changes and 
the economic conditions as ‘complex’.310 Indeed, this complexity was also felt in relation to 
investment in Palestine, though Herbert and Sosnovsky’s argument that Haifa was seen as 
key to Britain’s commercial interests and imperial defence in the eastern Mediterranean 
and the Middle East.311  
 
This chapter is structured to investigate the military administration’s interests in developing 
the port of Haifa and how this related to the interests of the British government. Then it 
explores the civil administration’s pursuit of the harbour development and the view of the 
British government towards its construction. Finally, it examines the interest of the British 
government in the harbour and its consequent actions, particularly the authorising of an 
investigation of Haifa port’s suitability for development.  
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Norman Bentwich, the Attorney General of Palestine from 1922-1931, described the 
limitations of the military administration in the early days of the British rule in Palestine. He 
explained that the major task was to restore ordinary life in Palestine through the 
introduction of limited construction and reform.312 In fact, the development of the Haifa 
harbour demanded for something more substantial because as Butler argues, British 
defence policy during the 1920 needed to shield the Empire from potential Russian 
aggression.313 The Royal Navy bore the responsibility for defending the Empire, thus it was 
vital to the defence of the Suez Canal and ‘Britain’s new regional interests’ to have a naval 
base in Palestine.314 In order to secure its supremacy in the region, Marian Kent argues, 
Britain also had to uphold her commercial and political dominance in the region; a further 
benefit of a new harbour at Haifa.315 
 
 
The military administration’s harbour proposals 
It is the intention of this section to explore why the military administration (1918 - July 
1920) was concerned with developing the harbour at Haifa at a time when introducing 
improvements to the recently occupied territory was restricted. The military administration 
immediately demonstrated its interest in developing Haifa, after the city was captured by 
British imperial troops in September 1918.316 This poses a question: what motivated the 
military administration to promote investment projects in Palestine during a time of post-
war economic uncertainty? The argument I will advance is that the military administration 
reflected traditional modes of thinking that informed past imperial practice. Exploitation of 
natural resources was the norm under Imperialism and doing this in Palestine immediately 
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after seizing it would not have been an unusual course of action. Moreover, by pursuing 
construction and development, Britain would assert its control over the territory even 
before its political status was finally determined by the League of Nations. Additionally, the 
military administration was also concerned with economic difficulties that the British 
government had developed through and after WWI. A contribution to Britain’s economic 
revival was possible through a harbour development in the seized territory, principally by 
making harbour works projects and contracts available for British investors and companies. 
Since Haifa was thought of as a strategic location for the British admiralty before the War, it 
sustained its strategic importance afterwards with this added economic factor.  
 
After the War, Britain exhibited a ‘growing reliance on economic interventionism’ by the 
state.317 This was because, during WWI, Britain’s war burden was considerable due to it 
having to pay for its own wartime expenses, as well as that of the dominions and to finance 
the Entente.318 The financing of the war efforts of France, Italy and Russia was justified as a 
way of maintaining alliances of these countries. The government also suffered from the loss 
of its investments abroad, most notably ‘those placed in Russia, which were repudiated by 
the Bolsheviks in 1917’ and those in the United States which were used for paying for war 
supplies.319 Additionally, during WWI, markets traditionally characterized as British markets 
saw American and Japanese entry. Whilst British industry and shipping were focussed on 
supporting the war effort, Britain lost its markets in Latin America to the United States and 
in India and East Asia to Japan. For example, Britain’s share in the Chinese market fell from 
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16.5 to 9.5 per cent between 1913 and 1929, whilst Japan’s share increased from 20 to 36 
per cent in the same period.320  
 
During the War, Britain depended on selling bonds on American markets.321 This was 
possible since, before the War, it was known that Britain derived considerable income 
through invest in overseas assets.322 The British government’s wartime deficits in 1917-18 
were very high and required large-scale borrowing that caused a ‘swollen national debt 
between the Wars.’323 After WWI, the output of production in Britain fell significantly, while 
the volume of trade on the export side contracted sharply.324 Trade was ‘severely disrupted’ 
within the dominions, the Commonwealth countries, as well as outside them.325 Britain 
found itself in a position where it ‘had been forced to sell off many of its assets to finance 
the war effort.’326 With the liquidation of assets, borrowing and the directing of civilian 
resources to military uses during the War, Britain emerged in a weaker position within the 
global economy.327 Therefore, efforts were made by the government to aid economic 
recovery. The military administration in Palestine shared the British government’s concern.  
 
One way of reviving the British economy was by encouraging investment in recently 
occupied territories. The victorious powers ‘retained an appetite for colonial acquisition’ 
and the British government employed the same old-style military rule in conquered 
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territories with its thinking still centred on its own national economy and defence needs.328 
The policy of diminishing imperialism that was adopted by the British Liberal Party before 
the War had changed afterwards.329 The policy of expanding rather than limiting 
imperialism prevailed under Lloyd George’s leadership of the Coalition government. The 
British government wanted to emerge from the World War I with maximum possible 
advantages. It is within this understanding that the British government’s earlier interest in 
Haifa culminated in the seizure of all Palestine. Whether the justification for controlling 
Palestine was to safeguard the Suez Canal, or to provide a land route to the British seizures 
in the East, both were possible through the utility of a harbour at Haifa. Historically, 
merchants channelled traded commodities through port cities and Haifa had also served 
similar purposes.330   
 
Following WWI, martial law was enforced in Palestine by General Allenby whose legal 
authority was based on military power.331 According to the law, British military 
administrators in occupied enemy territory were only able to exercise such powers as were 
necessary for ‘the purpose of the War, the maintenance of order and of safety, and the 
proper administration of the country.’332 In order to meet those expectations, General 
Allenby appointed Brigadier-General Gilbert F. Clayton, who also was chief political adviser 
to the military in the Middle East, as the first Chief Administrator of Occupied Enemy 
Territory (O.E.T.) South (Palestine). Major General Arthur Money was the second 
administrator in the position. With the service of the third administrator Major General 
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Louis Bols, who previously served as Chief of Staff to Allenby, the military administration 
ended to start a civil one.333 Those administrators were supported by district military 
governors. Their main task, in addition to observing the rules of martial law, was to 
establish administrative machinery through which they promoted some construction works, 
‘as far as the limitations of an occupation allowed’.334 They were expected to preserve 
Allenby’s policy and therefore any proposition for fundamental change was likely to be 
challenged by the British government.  
 
At the same time General Allenby, who was made High Commissioner of Egypt and Sudan 
in 1919, was concerned with facing the nationalist movement in Egypt. Under the 
circumstances, securing safe passage for the British shipping through the Suez Canal was an 
essential element of preserving Britain’s strategic and economic interests in the region.335 
Hence, the Mediterranean shore of Palestine was looked at as a shield for the Suez Canal.336  
 
The overall conditions prevailing in Palestine were difficult after the War. For a people who 
were already exhausted by ‘deaths in battle, forced conscriptions, deportations, and acute 
famine; […] and [where] disruption of markets had led to a total collapse of the peasant 
economy’ there was a need for more than the mere maintenance of law and order.337 The 
military authority in Palestine wanted to relieve distress, resume normal life and begin the 
work of construction. Therefore, they introduced schemes such as a water supply project in 
Jerusalem as well as other vital infrastructure initiatives. However, the development of 
commerce in Palestine was slow due to the lack of an adequate harbour.338 During the 
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Ottoman regime, improvements had been introduced to Haifa harbour, including a railway 
so as to divert activities from Beirut, which was under French control.339 Those 
improvements were not sufficient though, since steamers arriving at Haifa usually anchored 
half a mile from the shore and lighters transported passengers and cargo to and from the 
jetty which caused damage and loss of goods in bad weather.340  
 
Early in the twentieth century concessions had been given by the Ottoman Empire to 
European powers in nearly every aspect of economic relations, including in 
communications and transport.341 In this context, contractors of different nationalities had 
presented proposals for harbour developments.342 In 1911-1912, for example, Italian 
companies such as the Almagia Company, the Sindicato Italiano Construzioni, and Appalti 
Marittimi, and the British Pearson and Sons, had all submitted plans for the development of 
ports in Palestine.343 The Ottoman Empire, recognizing the necessity of providing ports on 
the Mediterranean seaboard, granted concessions to a French Syndicate, the Société des 
Ports Ottomans to construct harbours at Jaffa or Haifa.344 Surveys and borings were made 
principally at Haifa, but the outbreak of the war prevented these from proceeding.345  
 
When the military administration took control of Palestine, it showed an immediate 
interest. Upon his appointment as governor for Haifa, Lieutenant Colonel E.A. Stanton 
started to plan changes to the city and its harbour. His January 1919 proposal, and that of 
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Chief Administrator of Palestine – Arthur Money, for the development of the town of Haifa 
and its port was supported by General Allenby.346 The military authorities saw in Palestine a 
potential for investment that would benefit the British economy through direct and indirect 
gains and would develop the seized country. 
 
The proposal for developing the city and harbour of Haifa presented by Governor Stanton 
in January 1919 was based on the administration obtaining land in the city. He suggested 
purchasing or expropriating areas of (primarily) agricultural land, which could be bought at 
low prices and included into a town planning scheme. In view of the intention of turning 
Haifa into a major railway terminus and port, it was imagined that commercial and business 
quarters could be designed and built and then sold for higher prices at public auction, open 
to all national bidders without discrimination. 
 
With the proceeds of the expected transactions, a harbour at Haifa could then be 
constructed together with roads and drainage.347 Stanton estimated that the cost of the 
harbour construction would be in the area of £3,000,000. With this, he suggested that the 
additional money needed could be obtained by raising a loan on port dues. With a 
developed harbour, Stanton predicted that trade would inflate Palestine’s economy, 
particularly through the establishment of businesses like shipping, insurance, banks and 
other enterprise. It is possible to say that Stanton was envisaging Haifa’s commercial and 
cultural transformation to make it (under the British rule) ‘one of the most flourishing cities 
and ports in the Mediterranean.’348  
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Among Stanton’s other chief aims was the intention to secure the British government’s 
consent for the Haifa development proposal, before a peace treaty was signed.349 Several 
reasons lay behind his desire to start development projects before the conclusion of any 
treaty. First, from previous experience in Sudan, Stanton feared that the price of land would 
approximately triple in value when the British mandate was confirmed. Secondly, he 
wanted to seize the opportunity before legal restrictions made it unconstitutional to 
expropriate areas of land. Thirdly, and most importantly, he sought to remove power from 
the hands of enemies and future trade rivals, so as to leave Britain in have absolute ‘control 
of the future of this port and town’.350 This indicates that the aim of the military governor 
was to secure Britain’s control on the country by introducing changes on the ground. This 
was possible through employing economic projects that would develop the city, albeit 
some would be at the expense of local inhabitants whose land might be seized. Although 
Stanton’s proposal reflected a colonial approach, in that it offered considerable freedom 
for the de facto ruler to do as they wanted with the seized territory, he did not limit 
possible benefits to British investors. Stanton was in fact hoped to give other nations the 
chance to invest in Palestine through the opportunity of purchasing the business quarters 
at public auction. Was Stanton’s proposal acceptable to the British government? 
 
General Allenby supported Stanton’s proposal, although he feared that there would be 
‘legal obstacles’.351 Indeed, the Army Council refused Allenby’s recommendation because 
‘under the law of military occupation’ it was difficult to justify such measures of land 
purchase and expropriation.352 In fact, military law precluded the occupant from working 
‘his will unhindered’.353 Nonetheless, the final say was in the hands of the Foreign Office 
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since Palestine was under its responsibility at that time. It is worth noting that immediately 
after the War the Foreign Office was undermanned and faced with an unprecedented 
increase in its work-load. Most importantly it was preoccupied with pressing diplomatic 
decisions.354 Lord Curzon, the Acting Foreign Secretary on behalf of Arthur Balfour who was 
engaged with negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference, rejected Stanton’s proposal. His 
reasoning was in line of that of the Army Council that said it was ‘difficult to find any moral 
justification’ for the ‘disposal of land at Haifa’.355 Furthermore, the Foreign Office was 
concerned that the terms of peace treaty with Turkey, which were not yet finalized, would 
prevent foreign capitalists from exploiting land in Palestine, or granting concessions to 
foreigners.356  
 
The position of the Foreign Office was based on concerns related to international relations. 
In particular it was due to the rhetoric of the United States and Russia who opposed the 
continuation of classical colonization and to the uncertainty as to which colonial power 
would be finally granted the administration of both Palestine and Syria.357 Nonetheless, 
although the declared position was justified by the expected treaty with Turkey, it is 
possible to discern that the British government wanted to keep the great powers at a 
distance. The British government did not want to allow rivals to have a stake in a territory 
while its political status remained undefined. That would create a situation where other 
governments and companies would have the right to invest in a territory and perhaps 
undermine Britain’s authority. This form of protectionism was an attempt by Britain to 
confirm its authority before other governments had the opportunity to challenge it. 
Although conquest was still recognised as ‘conferring the right of ownership’, the Foreign 
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Office chose to follow a restrained approach so as not to jeopardise its negotiations and 
relations with other world powers and countries.358 With this, it was deemed important at 
the Peace Conference that, among other matters, disputes between governments should 
be settled by arbitration and not by war and that treaties should be published.359 The 
British government valued stability above all since the outcomes and risks were difficult to 
predict. Therefore, a project such as Haifa’s development needed to wait until the 
conclusion of negotiations in Paris.  
 
 
Persistence of the military administration 
The intention of the military authorities in Palestine was to award the harbour works to 
British firms. But this was not possible due to the British government’s decision to postpone 
the matter regarding Haifa. The Chief Military Administrator of Palestine, Arthur Money, 
thought that this would undermine the ‘recuperation and normal development of the 
country’ in response to local demands.360 Money clearly set his ideas around concerns for 
the British economy as he supported, in June 1919, proposals presented by ‘several 
eminent [British] engineering firms’ for works in Haifa.361 This was significant because not 
only British companies such as Vickers and Pearson and Son expressed interest in the 
harbour works before WWI at the invitation of the Turkish authorities but also French, 
Italian and American companies.362 Harbour works, in fact, were granted to the French 
Société des Ports Ottomans. Money wrote that such interests in the ports by the Ottomans 
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resulted in ‘official discussion in London’ about port construction.363 The fact that British 
firms had interest in harbour works in Palestine, undermines Cain and Hopkins’ suggestion 
that the Foreign Office was ‘trying to tempt reluctant businessmen into unpromising 
commercial opportunities’ before WWI in the Middle East.364 However, official positions 
after the War were subject to conditions occurring during the Paris peace negotiations 
related to inhibiting colonial practices. Those conditions however did not hinder individual 
firms from expressing interest in investing in the development of harbours in Palestine.  
 
During the military administration, high financial and shipping authorities expressed their 
desire to have undertakings in the ports of Palestine, wrote Money. These included Lord 
Inchcape, Chairman of the Peninsular and Oriental Steamship Co. and British Director to 
Suez Canal Co; Lord Furness, of Furness Withy and Co. the steamers and steel shipbuilders 
and repairers; and Mr. Boulton, of Boulton Bros. and Co. the steam shipping company. Each 
also paid visits to the ports. Money, though aware of the difficulty of taking action in 
Palestine at that stage, was aware of economic conditions in Britain. Money’s 
recommendation was to accept their tendering for harbour works if only in order to reduce 
‘the feeling of tension’ that resulted from the losses incurred by the War.365 The intention 
was to give the projects to British companies in order to ‘relieve the financial strain on the 
Empire and the present labour and trade difficulties in England’.366  
 
Consideration of the port construction took into account British shipping and ‘politico-
military considerations’.367 In fact, during the War it became ‘axiomatic in British 
government thinking’ that territorial expansion was necessary in order to ‘safeguard the 
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security’ of all the Empire.368 In his 1917 memorandum to the Imperial War Cabinet, Leo 
Amery, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet, wrote on the importance 
of securing the Empire by making sure the seas should be ‘kept clear of all hostile naval 
bases’. The memorandum also demanded that the intercommunication between the 
different parts of the Empire should be developed.369 In light of this, the military authorities 
ruling Palestine were alerted by the interest paid by European companies to build ports in 
Palestine. With these sentiments in mind, it is clear that Haifa harbour was potentially of 
strategic importance, particularly if it were connected to neighbouring countries.370 Since 
Haifa was considered the focal point to safeguard the Suez Canal, Allenby ‘pressed the case 
[of Haifa port] further’ with the War Office in July 1919.371 In expectation that the mandate 
for Palestine would be given to Britain, Allenby insisted that the construction of a port in 
Haifa would be important and therefore ‘a preliminary study should be made now.’372  
 
The Foreign Office, however, maintained its position that no changes should be introduced 
‘until the final settlement of the future of Palestine’ was reached. This included Allenby’s 
request for a preliminary study of the ports.373 In fact, a previous May 1919 request by S. 
Pearson and Son to be awarded the construction of the port was rejected by the Foreign 
Office concurring with the above position.374 The British government adopted a policy that 
sought to avoid provoking ill feeling toward Britain. 
 
The Foreign Office was consistent in rejecting projects in Palestine and turned down a 
number of offers. For example, an April 1919 proposal by Norwegian company 
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Electrochemical Factories of Fredriksstad (F.E.F.), I. J. Moltke-Hansen to develop energy in 
Palestine and the neighbouring countries was dismissed. The project concerned the 
construction of a tunnel from the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea with the purpose of 
producing electricity that would supply Palestine and Egypt. The company requested 
permission to make the necessary investigations in Palestine and insisted on being given 
‘preference for the scheme as the first to propose the project.’375 Another prospective 
Norwegian project, this time concerning irrigation in Palestine, was also rejected.376 The 
insistence of the Norwegian government that the British government should consider these 
proposals meant that the Norwegian government was concerned with protecting the rights 
of its nationals in regards to investment in Palestine, in line with the free trade principles, 
demanded by President Wilson. It also meant that the international community recognized 
Britain’s control over the territory. The Foreign Office’s rejection of projects in Palestine 
‘pending territorial settlement’ testified to Britain’s judgement in balancing world peace 
with its individual interests.377  
 
The establishment of the League of Nations in January 1920 inspired a change in British 
policy towards Palestine.378 The British government approved the Palestine military 
administration’s request in March 1920 to send an engineer to survey the seashore at 
Haifa. Engineer Hugh T. Ker of Pearson and Son, a member of the Institute of Civil 
Engineers, was employed by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company for this task. His mission was to 
survey the port of Haifa with the intention for it to become an entry point to the 
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Mediterranean for the company’s oil.379 Ker investigated the coast of Palestine during the 
summer of 1920. His report was communicated to the Foreign Office and consequently to 
the government of Palestine in 1921.380 (See appendix I, Ker, Haifa plan, 1920).Ker 
concluded that British Palestine must have a port and recommended Haifa as the most 
suitable site for development.381 The report merely recorded certain physical and economic 
characteristics of the harbour but did not off a plan for construction.382 Based on that 
report, however, Pearson and Son presented in December 1920 a wholly-planned proposal 
to carry out the works at Haifa.383 Nevertheless, no real consideration of the proposals to 
the development of Haifa harbour was undertaken during the period of the military 
administration in Palestine.  
 
The significance of these proposals is that the military administration clearly demonstrated 
that the construction of Haifa harbour was undertaken to aid the recovery of the British 
economy. This connection between the British economy and the harbour construction 
provides evidence for the major theme of this thesis that the state of the British economy 
was the driver of investment projects in Palestine. The British companies’ interest in 
building harbours in Palestine before and after WWI demonstrates Kent’s argument that 
the ‘flag was underpinned by the trade’.384 The military administration’s support of the 
British companies as figured in the proposals submitted to the British government reflected 
the concern with the enhancement of the British economy. On the other hand, the firm 
position of the British government to consider international conditions demonstrated that 
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Britain was not yet sure about the appropriate nature of behaviour towards Palestine.385 
Therefore, during the military administration in Palestine the British government was 




The interests of the civil administration in building Haifa harbour 
By the time the civil administration was established in Palestine under the first High 
Commissioner Herbert Samuel, in July 1920, it was possible to make changes. Although the 
political status of Palestine was not yet finalised, development projects for the mandated 
territory could be considered and consequently proposals to develop Haifa harbour were 
revived.386 The concern of the British government now was how to reconcile the mandate 
concept with their own requirements for imperial control in the area.387 This was because, 
as Herbert and Sosnovsky rightly argue, by accepting the mandate for Palestine the British 
government was motivated by a desire to ‘protect and promote its own interests’ and at 
the same time, according to the League’s Covenant, to respect the right of rival countries in 
participating in the development of natural resources in the mandated territory.388 
 
With the absence of a harbour that could satisfy the needs of modern trade, Modern 
Transport wrote that the full commercial potential of the eastern shores of the 
Mediterranean was ‘seriously handicapped’.389 Steps were therefore taken by the Colonial 
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Office to address this in February 1921 following the establishment of the Middle East 
Department. Upon commencing his duties as head of the newly established department, 
John Shuckburgh focused on the development of ports in Palestine. He obtained the 
approval of the Colonial Secretary to send an experienced engineer to enquire into the 
projected harbours in Palestine.390 This was in response to a request by Armstrong 
Whitworth and Company Limited which was submitted to the Department of Overseas 
Board of Trade. It was part of the function of the Department of Overseas Trade to assist 
and advise the British commercial and industrial community in the work of reconstruction 
and the promotion of foreign trade.391 Before the War, it assisted British trade and 
commerce in the Ottoman Empire.392 It was also part of the functions of the Crown Agents 
to follow up on engineering matters.393  As the High Commissioner was ‘anxious that an 
expert should be despatched to Palestine’, Shuckburgh authorised the Crown Agents to 
arrange for engineer J.M. Alexander of Armstrong Whitworth and Company to examine the 
ports of Palestine.394 
 
In order to rectify the conditions of the harbours in Palestine, Herbert Samuel initially 
considered four possible sites for a proper harbour on the coast of the Mediterranean: 
Acre, Haifa, Jaffa and Gaza which were all little more than open roadstead.395 In fact, during 
Churchill’s visit to Palestine in 1921, Samuel managed to obtain his provisional approval on 
several projects, including the construction of the port at Haifa.396 This consent indicated 
that the British government started to recognize Haifa as a future centre of 
                                                          
390
 TNA/CAOG10/68, Shuckburgh to Armstrong Whitworth and Company, Civil Engineering and 
Contracting Department, 26.2.1921 & CA ‘Some notes’, 24.5.1921. 
391
 P. Middleton, ‘British Foreign Trade Promotion’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, vol. 94, The International Trade Situation (March 1921), pp. 16-20, p.19. 
392
 Kent, The Great Powers, p. 177. 
393
 TNA/CAOG14/107, ‘the main function, 9.7.1917; Penson, ‘The Origin’, p. 206.  
394
 TNA/CAOG10/68, Shuckburgh to CA, 26.2.1921, & W, CA to U-S CO, 12.3.1921. 
395
 TNA/CAOG10/68, ‘Some notes’, 24.5.1921. 
396
 Tom Segev, One Palestine Complete, Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate (translated by 
Haim Watzman) (London: Abacus, 2001), p.162. 
93 
 
communications.397 Engineer Alexander understood that a ‘scheme for the building of a 
large harbour was in contemplation’, therefore his attention was directed toward the ports 
of Jaffa and Haifa.398 His mission was to advise as to the works necessary to deal 
‘adequately and efficiently with the present trade’. He also considered possible future 
developments so that ‘any work to be built now shall be capable of being incorporated with 
and forming part of a larger scheme.’399 
 
In his April 1921 report, Alexander recommended that there should be a comprehensive 
scheme to improve both harbours at Jaffa and Haifa, but with only one performing the role 
as a main harbour because the size of trade did not justify the development of two sites. 
Though he gave a substantive account on how to develop the port of Jaffa, his opinion was 
that ‘from an engineering point of view the Bay of Acre is a splendid site in which to 
construct a big harbour.’400 The recommendation was that a port at Haifa, which was 
historically recognised as part of the Bay of Acre, was more favourable than the one at 
Jaffa. Alexander who favoured Haifa because the Jaffa port suffered from inadequate 
conditions and its sheltered roadstead was exposed to heavy seas that led to congestion at 
the harbour front. This resulted in a large annual loss of goods, as goods were transferred 
by lighters/boats and moved by manual labour with no equipment available.401 That being 
said, it should be noted that, the port at Jaffa was considered the gateway to Palestine. 
Orange was exported to British markets as, before the War, it was British ships that served 
that harbour.402 Alexander proposed extending the existing breakwater and jetty in Haifa 
through which a sea face would be built with rubble and large blocks and the inside face 
with a masonry wall. This was possible since the stone suitable for marine construction was 
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available around Haifa. Additionally, he suggested dredging between the jetty and the 
shore, to reclaim an area of land for building a small railway jetty.  He also proposed 
repairing the existing Turkish wharf. Such steps, he predicted would allow for necessary 
equipment for the efficient handling of cargo instead of the manual transfer of goods.403  
 
Since real engineering works were to be demanded in the harbour, the government of 
Palestine requested the use of a civil engineer to aid the development of the harbours at 
Haifa, Jaffa and Gaza.404 Accordingly, the services of H.J. Paul were employed as he had 12 
years of experience of harbour and railway work in British Guyana.405   
 
In light of the recommendation of their engineer, W.G. Armstrong Whitworth & Co. Ltd. 
approached the Colonial Office in October 1921 with projects for the development of the 
Jaffa and Haifa harbours. The plans and drawings submitted by Whitworth were forwarded 
to the Admiralty. The latter only commented on the plans for Jaffa, as they believed that 
the proposals for Haifa were not to be ‘proceeded with’. Their recommendation regarding 
Jaffa harbour was related to strategic concerns that the general lay-out of the scheme 
followed ‘commercial practice’ with too little space given to the Admiralty’s ships to turn 
around. Hence, they suggested introducing an amended proposal.406 It seems, however, 
that Whitworth proposals were not pursued further.  
 
‘Palestine was evidently not quite satisfied’ with Alexander’s report. As a result the 
government of Palestine held an interdepartmental conference about the development of 
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the ports in Palestine in early May 1922.407 The Colonial Office, the Admiralty, the Crown 
Agents and the government of Palestine decided that an expert in port construction should 
make an examination and do so from a ‘purely technical point of view’.408 The expert was 
expected to examine the condition of the ports and prepare a detailed scheme for ‘the 
various construction work necessary’ and report on the provision of harbour facilities for 
Palestine.409 The scheme should take into consideration the Admiralty’s strategic concern 
that a suitable port in Palestine should serve as ‘a depot for oiling’.410 Minor work to the 
Jaffa port was put on hold until the expert advised as to which port to develop, and which 
minor works could be undertaken at the other port.  For this purpose, and until Palestine 
could take out a loan for the harbour construction, the Crown Agents were willing to 
advance the needed money.  
 
By the end of August 1922, upon the instructions of the Colonial Office, the Crown Agents 
commissioned Rendel, Palmer and Tritton (RPT) Consulting Engineers as experts on ports 
and docks to examine and report on the ports of Palestine.411 They were engaged on the 
term of four thousand guineas inclusive of all expenses, to be included in the five per cent 
fee of the total cost in the event the company was engaged as consulting engineers for the 
project in the future.412 Yet, RPT had given Colonial Secretary Churchill reason to expect 
them to lower the fee in the event they were charged with the task.413 It was decided that 
the company’s partner, Frederick Palmer, who was a friend of James Carmichael, the 
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engineer of the Crown Agents would be engaged for the works.414 Engineer Palmer was 
chosen owing to his extensive experience in harbour building. As the vice-president of the 
Institution of Civil Engineers, Palmer was a member of the International Consultative 
Commission of the Suez Canal, chief engineer at the Calcutta Port Authority, first chief 
engineer of the Port of London Authority and he had previously made a ‘proposal to 
improve the Yangtse River’ in China.415 With this tremendous experience the government 
hoped he would be able to make proper examination of Palestine shores and define the 
most appropriate location for a harbour. 
 
The previous reports on the ports of Palestine prepared by S. Pearson and Son Limited (i.e. 
Ker’s report), Armstrong Whitworth and Company Limited (i.e. Alexander’s report) and the 
Italian Sindacato Italiano Construzioni Appalti Marittimi (SICAM) and others were 
communicated to Palmer.416 In fact, the Italians presented their broad plan for the Haifa 
port to the Colonial Office through Cav. Zapelloni, a member of the Italian commercial 
delegation in London. Upon the direction of the Colonial Secretary, Churchill, Zapelloni was 
informed in April 1922 that ‘if and when it was decided to proceed with the development of 
the port of Haifa, the SICAM would doubtless be given an opportunity of tendering.’417 
Fredrick’s son, John Palmer, tells us that his father ‘tore into shreds’ the previous non-
British proposals for deep-water ports at both Jaffa and Haifa.418 This was primarily because 
they did not include the crucial economic aspect required for the harbour.419  
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The decision to commission consulting engineers Rendel, Palmer and Tritton to investigate 
the Palestinian shores and report on the suitable port for a harbour, meant that the British 
government, in effect, was itself becoming involved in the harbour construction. A key 
concern for Whitehall was that the investigation and reporting not be done by foreign 
firms—regardless of what was required by the League of Nations.  
 
Frederick Palmer headed to Palestine in the winter of 1922-23 when weather conditions 
were at their worst. His mission was to advise what harbour works should be undertaken at 
Haifa and Jaffa, having regard to the general commercial conditions and prospects affecting 
those two ports.420 Palmer ‘carefully inspected’ the whole coast of Palestine and presented 
in a July 1923 report the results of his findings to the Colonial Office. From the perspective 
of the British government a developed harbour in Palestine was meant to serve commercial 
as well as strategic purposes. 
 
 
The British government’s endorsement of the harbour 
With the conclusion of Lausanne Treaty in July 1923, the borders of the Turkish Republic 
were recognized and Turkey gave up all claims to the remainder of the Ottoman Empire. 
Accordingly, the British Mandate for Palestine was definitely confirmed. In a July 1923 
meeting the he Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), Standing Defence Sub-Committee in 
Parliament discussed ‘the strategic importance of Palestine’. The concern of the Navy was 
that the ports of Palestine were ‘few and bad’ and needed development.421 The CID insisted 
that the ports in hostile hands such as those of Turkey or France would form a naval 
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menace to ‘approaches to the Suez Canal’ and to shipping in the eastern Mediterranean.422 
More importantly the CID, similar to the earlier concern of the Admiralty, thought that if oil 
pipelines were brought from Iraq they should terminate at Palestinian ports. (The oil 
pipeline issue will be discussed thoroughly in later chapters). Therefore, efforts to develop a 
port in Palestine were made to ensure stability after the conclusion of the treaty with 
Turkey and the confirmation of Britain’s mandate for Palestine.423 In addition, through the 
CID’s examination of the strategic importance of ports in the Mediterranean, the port of 
Haifa was considered as a suitable alternative to Alexandria as a fuelling base given that 
Egypt was offered independence.424 The Admiralty was concerned with the Suez Canal as a 
stopping-off point on the imperial route to India.425 The connection with India was 
important for the foundation of British power in Asia and for the provision of military 
resources.426 In 1926 the Chief of Staff of the Royal Navy defined the security of the sea 
lanes ‘as the cardinal principle of Imperial defence’.427 Hence, Haifa would serve as guarding 
post for the Suez Canal.  
 
In his report of July 1923, Palmer recommended that Haifa was the most appropriate place 
for a modern harbour due to it offering suitable protection from the sea. The Bay of Acre 
and the port of Gaza were discarded because they did not provide sufficient shelter for 
modern shipping.428 The Jaffa port was not selected as its ‘natural formation’ made it 
difficult to construct a deep-water harbour.429 At Haifa, by contrast, the coast-line runs 
roughly south-east, protected from the west by the rocky promontory Ras-el-Kerum and 
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only faces open to seas from the north-east.430 The conclusion of Palmer’s report was that a 
harbour was necessary at Haifa, while improvements could be made also to the port of 
Jaffa.  He estimated the cost to be around £1,000,000.431 Nevertheless, the final decision in 
regards to port building in Palestine was left completely in the hands of the British 
government.432 
 
H.B. Lees, Director of Palestine Public Works, pointed out that Palmer’s estimation of costs 
was ‘largely based on the information furnished by Ker’ of Pearson and Son, information 
that provided for the physical and economic characteristics of the harbour.433 The 
estimated amount was expected to cover the construction works and the building of a 
customs house, transit sheds, railway lines and equipment.434 Palmer’s recommendation, in 
fact, had many similarities with the report of Armstrong and Whitworth’s engineer, J. 
Alexander, in terms of location, extension of existing breakwaters, dredging and 
reclamation of land and repairing the existing old Turkish wharf.435 The basis of Palmer’s 
plan was to construct: a main breakwater running east, ‘over one-and-quarter miles long, 
starting at the point Ras-el-Kerum at the foot of Mount Carmel’; and a Lee breakwater 
running north from the railway-jetty of about half-a-mile long.436 The main breakwater was 
designed with the possibility of extension whenever required, and to a depth sufficient for 
‘the largest vessels’.437 (See appendix II, Rendle, Palmer & Tritton, Plan of Haifa harbour, 
1923) 
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In 1924, Palmer’s report was examined by the relevant departments in London and by the 
government of Palestine. During 1924, Britain had changed its government three times 
bringing with it three different Colonial Secretaries. Despite this, the British government did 
not change its broad policy regarding the construction of a harbour at Haifa.438 The opinion 
of the Board of Trade was that harbour facilities in Palestine would be to the ‘ultimate 
benefit of British trade’ and that every facility should be given to ‘British firms to tender for 
the necessary work.’439 The Board of Trade clearly stated that the building of the harbour 
would be to the benefit of British trade and firms, hence they should be given priority in 
order to improve the economy in the United Kingdom. The Board was also concerned with 
oil transportation with regard to prospective oilfields in Iraq. The Board explained that 
there had been two proposals put forward for pipelines from the oilfields in Iraq. One line 
would run from Baghdad to Haifa with a total length of 600 miles and the second from 
Baghdad to Alexandretta in Syria with a length of 450 miles. With this in mind, they advised 
that the harbour should provide facilities ‘to accommodate tank steamers’ which had a 
draught of about 30 feet.440 The Board’s advice was in line with that of the Admiralty, which 
supported the promotion of harbours in Palestine for strategic and oil-related purposes. 
 
In Palestine, High Commissioner Samuel formed a Harbour Committee to examine Palmer’s 
report. This committee was composed of the general manager of the Railways, R.B. 
Holmes; Director of Customs, J.B. Barrow; Director of Public Works Department, H.B. Lees; 
and the Treasurer, S.S. Davis.441 This Committee effectively endorsed Palmer’s proposal for 
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the construction of a port at Haifa and for improvements to the port at Jaffa.442 The 
Committee explained that although the volume of trade at Jaffa was greater than that at 
Haifa at that time, there were greater potential advantages in developing the harbour at 
Haifa. The Committee explained that a port at Haifa would not only serve Palestine, but 
also the hinterland, whereas Jaffa served only part of Palestine. With Haifa protected by 
Mount Carmel from the weather, and possessing topographical advantages, it was judged 
more appropriate for the construction of a harbour. Additionally, the availability of stone 
for the breakwater near Haifa provided further cost advantages.443 In fact, Haifa also 
enjoyed a network of roads and railways in all directions to connect Palestine with other 
neighbour countries.444 The final recommendation was thus that Palmer’s project for Haifa 
be favourably considered by the government. Given the proximity of Jaffa to Haifa, 
improvements to the Jaffa port, such as straightening the sea wall to afford more working 
space ashore, and removing rocks within the reef to clear the passage for lighters, would be 
sufficient. The committee also recommended that the works for both harbours should be 
carried out simultaneously.445  
 
In spite of the general agreement with Palmer’s report there were some objections. Lees of 
the Public Works made separate observations about the site and design of the port.446 
According to Palmer’s plan, the location of the harbour was adjacent to the existing down-
town area, but Lees suggested situating the harbour further eastward where the harbour 
would be better economically constructed.447 In fact, Seikaly points out that after 1926, a 
Jewish architect, R. Kaufmann, also suggested that the site of the harbour be moved 
eastwards to be open to lands owned by Jewish organizations. The suggestion though was 
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rejected by the British government since the ‘proposed scheme would have been more 
costly.’448  
 
Another sceptical view was presented by the general manager of Palestine Railways, 
Colonel Holmes, suggested, partly on military grounds, that Palestine should rely on the 
railway connected to Port Fuad in Egypt, after moving the line from Kantara, ‘as the 
principal route’ for its communication with European countries.449 He effectively wanted to 
disregard the construction of a main harbour at Haifa. However, the Army Council and the 
Air Council held a different military opinion. They said that if the railway were moved from 
Kantara, located on the eastern side of the Suez Canal south of Port Said, which was the 
depot for all British operations in the Sinai from 1916-1919, it should terminate south at 
Ismailia and not at Port Fuad.450 Holmes’ suggestion was therefore rejected. Nevertheless, 
the High Commissioner sought the opinion of the CID about whether, on strategic grounds, 
developing a port at Haifa, and not a railway in Egypt, would be in the interests of Palestine 
and the Empire.451 It was concluded that spending Palestine’s funds on developing a railway 
line that ran mostly in Egyptian territory, and depriving Palestine from its own port on its 
seaboard, was not acceptable.452  
 
Regardless to the observations of the directors of the Palestine Public Works and Railways 
the government of Palestine persisted with its intention to go ahead with the harbour 
project. This was evident in the High Commissioner’s obtaining again, in May 1925, 
approval in principle from the Colonial Secretary Leo Amery for the harbour construction in 
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Haifa.453 However, Palmer’s July 1923 report was not sufficient enough for the consulting 
engineers to prepare contract drawings and documents. Hence, further investigations 
including surveys, soundings and borings were necessary.454 Arrangements between the 
consulting engineers and the Crown Agents were effected to that end. 
 
Since the Haifa port was officially considered by the British government, British and foreign 
companies expressed interest in undertakings in the harbour. In addition to article 18 of the 
Palestine mandate, the right of foreign firms to tender for works in mandated areas was 
secured by article 23 of the League of Nations’ Covenant regarding ‘equitable treatment’ 
for commerce. This article, in effect, introduced a ‘new international system’ in the spheres 
of finance, trade and transport.455 Within the context of this article, the Italian company of 
Roberto Almagia enquired about the harbour construction. The company, which earlier in 
1911 had proposed similar harbour works to the Ottoman Empire, specialized in the 
construction of harbours, quays and breakwaters, like those in Alexandria and Port Said in 
Egypt.456 Additionally, Thos. [Thomas] W. Ward Ltd.  approached the British government 
hoping to be considered as suppliers of ‘the necessary plant and materials which may be 
required’ in connection with the reconstruction of Haifa harbour.457 The Colonial Office 
though had not yet adopted a clear policy regarding the harbour construction. Accordingly, 
the reply was that the decision of construction had not been taken yet and their ‘request 
for an opportunity to compete would be considered’ in the event the work was put out to 
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contract.458 Moreover, it decided that the arrangements for placing contracts for plant and 
equipment would be placed in the hands of the Crown Agents.459  
 
Enquiries by British and foreign firms about the harbour provoked discussion in the British 
government about the method of constructing the harbour. The Harbour Committee 
recommended that in order to retain sole ownership and control of harbours the 
government should undertake the construction.460 This meant that the Palestine Public 
works Department should carry out the works. Nevertheless, the matter of the method was 
discussed further and three alternative methods were proposed for the harbour 
construction. These were: by the public works department of the territory; by a special staff 
acting under the direction of the consulting engineers; or by a firm of contractors under the 
supervision of the consulting engineers.461 The first two methods were known as 
‘department work’, meaning the departmental method, which had sometimes been 
adopted in British colonies.462 Colonial Secretary Amery was in fact, inclined to favour one 
of the proposed departmental methods by which he would be in agreement with the 
opinion of the Harbour Committee.463  
 
In July 1925, Herbert Onslow Plumer was appointed as new High Commissioner for 
Palestine (August 1925 - July 1928). Plumer maintained his predecessor’s policy that 
establishing a well-equipped port at Haifa should be placed first in any programme of works 
to be carried out in Palestine.464 This was reinforced by the knowledge that the French were 
contemplating the development of a railway scheme in Syria that connected Cairo, 
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Constantinople and Europe. The Manchester Guardian wrote that funds were needed so 
that a railway between Haifa and Beirut could be constructed ‘upon which General 
Weygand, who preceded General Sarrial as French High Commissioner in Syria, set such 
store.’465 Plumer feared that in the event a railway line was extended between Haifa and 
Beirut, ‘there would be risk of a certain amount of Palestinian trade being diverted’ to 
Lebanon.466  This was because Beirut already had a harbour protected by breakwaters since 
1893.467 The establishment of a harbour at Haifa would jeopardise France’s plans. Hence, 
Plumer objected to any postponement and pushed further for the construction of a well-
equipped port at Haifa and recommended that such project should be given priority. He 
thought that it would be extremely unwise for economic, political and strategic reasons to 
spend Palestine funds on making Palestine dependent on a foreign port. He further 
recommended that any railway scheme should be deferred until the port of Haifa had been 
well established.468  
 
The endorsement of the British government of a harbour at Haifa made it possible for 
actual steps to be taken. Authorising the consulting engineers RPT to investigate the coast 
of Palestine was the first step which prompted discussions in London and in Palestine. 
These discussions resulted in the desire to pursue the development of Haifa harbour, to 
make it the modern port of Palestine. Accordingly, British and foreign firms saw in the 
harbour building an opportunity to tender for work. It was, however, not possible to give 
the works to any side/firm owing to the absence of a clear policy on the method by which 
the harbour should be constructed. The method of construction was of significant 
importance owing to the political conditions prevailing after the establishment of the 
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League of Nations. The constraint imposed by the mandate system and its relation to the 




The main task of the military administration in Palestine upon seizing the country in 1918 
was to maintain law and order and foster some progress in the country. In investigating the 
reasons why the military administration wanted to develop the port at Haifa, it seems clear 
that two reasons stood out. One related to the desire to secure British control over the 
country and the other to hope for benefit for the British economy. Since the mandate for 
Palestine was not finally confirmed to Britain, the military administration wanted first of all 
to assert Britain’s control over the country. They thought that by developing the port at 
Haifa, Britain would be the de facto master of the country. However, the political 
atmosphere after the War was not settled and Britain was not able to take decisive 
decisions that would influence the talks at the Paris Peace Conference. Therefore, the 
British government chose to follow a prudent policy with regards to the proposals 
submitted by the military administration regarding the harbour construction at Haifa, 
although they were supported by General Allenby under whose command Palestine was 
initially seized.  
 
The military administration, aware of the challenging economic conditions in Britain, 
recommended employing British companies for executing the project at Haifa. The two 
proposals by the military administration clearly established the connection between the 
harbour construction and the potential benefit for the British economy. Here, the 
connection between economic conditions in Britain and the British territorial expansion 
was a reality. This approach showed that the military administration was thinking along 
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traditional colonial lines regarding acquiring territories, where it was possible to exploit 
their natural resources at the discretion of Britain. At the same time however, it also 
demonstrates the position of the Foreign Office that purposefully did not want to rush to a 
decision regarding Palestine. Balfour, in Paris, was concerned with Britain’s long-term 
position in the Middle East.469 Eventually, the projects were rejected owing to international 
concerns of Palestine status.  
 
The British government was only able to take a firm decision on building the harbour when 
the mandate for Palestine had been granted to Britain. The Colonial Office, which became 
responsible for the mandated territories, was anxious to develop the harbour at Haifa. 
Although there were foreign firms, particularly Italians, that were interested in undertaking 
works at the harbour, the Colonial Office only permitted British companies to carry out 
investigations of the Palestinian coastline. Two preliminary investigations were carried out 
before Rendel, Palmer and Tritton’s engineer, Frederick Palmer, conducted a thorough 
investigation of the shores of Palestine. Palmer’s report on the appropriateness of the Haifa 
port for a harbour was subject to discussion in London and in Palestine before a final 
decision was taken. Recommendations to adopt Palmer’s plan by the government in 
London were based on the notion that benefit would be brought to Britain’s economy by 
employing British firms and material. The Admiralty’s interest, confirmed by the CID, was 
mainly with securing an oil dock and oil terminal in Palestine for the expected pipeline 
coming from the oilfields of Iraq. Palmer’s plan was also endorsed by the government of 
Palestine and consequently arrangements for further investigations of the shores of 
Palestine were on-going in order to enable the engineers to produce drawings and 
specifications for contracts. The desire of foreign firms to compete for the harbour works 
was restated after Palmer’s report was issued. But the British government preferred to 
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maintain its prudent approach before making decisions about the harbour.Therefore, the 
question of the method to be adopted for the construction of the harbour was not decided 
upon and in fact was subject of discussions in London over the next three years. It is to 








The finances of the Palestine government were not on their own adequate to cover the 
expenses of constructing a harbour at Haifa. The uncertain political conditions of the 
country, stemming from its ‘mandate’ status, made it difficult to obtain the required 
finance from private sources, at least not without having unfavourable terms attached to 
any loan. The most appropriate method for securing the money was by obtaining the British 
government’s guarantee for a loan to be raised on the British market. However, permission 
to borrow from the British market was only secured after much reluctance on the part of 
the British government, a reluctance that existed, in turn, because of those difficulties 
connected with Palestine’s political status. This chapter discusses these events and 
demonstrates how the British government was able to secure benefits for the British 
economy, avoid the criticism of the international community, and support the finances of 
the mandated territory. This could be understood as the extension of financial support as a 
result of British political intervention in Palestine. Historically, it had been accepted that 
financial support would be given a certain country, following political annexation. In the 
case of Palestine, however, financing was an outcome of political intervention.470 
 
Although the development of a harbour at Haifa was one of the major projects that 
required a loan, the British government, in its early deliberations, neglected the question of 
capital expenditure necessary for such a project. However, in later stages when the 
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mandate of Palestine was put into operation in September 1923, Haifa harbour project was 
taken into consideration. Therefore, it is vital to investigate the development of the loan for 
Palestine in order to understand its significance to the building of the harbour. Discussions 
and disagreements in Whitehall concerning a loan to Palestine grew from 1920 to 1926. 
This period offers excellent material to examine the formation of Britain’s economic policy 
towards Palestine. From this analysis we can also understand how policy was formed 
regarding the method of the harbour’s construction, a period which itself spans from 1919, 
when a harbour was first contemplated, to 1933 when it was completed. It is suggested 
that although the British government had imperial objectives in Palestine, it did not possess 
appropriate methods to deal with economic and strategic matters in the mandated 
territory. The issue of the loan shows a continued changing of minds in regards to policy-
making. The British government’s aims in Palestine required new methods beyond its 
traditional and standard mode of operation in territories previously under its control. 
 
During the interwar period, it became known that ‘London took on an increasing 
responsibility for the colonies’ economic development’, a similar action was extended to 
mandate Palestine.471 Due to its financial and political conditions, the only alternative was 
to request the support of the British government. Borrowing by public authorities became 
predominant in 1920s.472 Arrangements were launched in order to secure a guarantee from 
the British government so as to pay off the government of Palestine’s outstanding liabilities. 
This would also provide for the financing of new programmes, including harbour 
construction. By 1924, serious consideration was given by the Cabinet to approve the loan 
and the Bill passed by Parliament in 1926. The loan Ordinance was published in Palestine in 
1927, which made it possible for Palestine finally to take the loan. Arguments for the loan 
were carried out mainly between the government of Palestine and the Colonial Office and 
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then between the latter, the Treasury and the Foreign Office. Discussions about the loan 
demonstrate the British government’s approach, within the limits imposed by the mandate 
system, towards Palestine and also the international community.  
 
This chapter explores how those benefits to Britain were obtained by providing finance to 
Palestine. With this in mind, the chapter provides a number of questions: Why did the 
government of Palestine need a loan? On what basis did the government think it could raise 
a loan? Who raised the loan for Palestine and how was it raised? How did the British 
government place the raising of a loan for Palestine in the context of the League of Nations 
and Britain’s relationship with it? Were development projects like the building of Haifa 
harbour essential elements in raising a loan? 
 
This chapter argues that reluctance to take a decision regarding guaranteeing the issuing of 
a loan for Palestine was characteristic of Britain’s approach to the territory. Britain had 
defined objectives in Palestine but had to select the appropriate means to meet them.  
 
The structure of this chapter relies on tracing the development of the loan from the time it 
was considered to the point it was issued. The chapter’s first section looks at the Palestine 
Administration’s efforts to secure funding under the Foreign Office for development works 
during 1919-1920. The second part investigates how the British government’s guarantee for 
the loan was obtained during 1921-1923. The third section discusses Cabinet approval of 
the loan during 1924-1926 period, and finally, the fourth section investigates the loan Act 





Seeking funding under the Foreign Office, 1919 - 1920 
When the Allied forces occupied Palestine, the country was in a ‘neglected condition’, as 
were its harbour facilities.473 Schemes for construction were prepared in order to enable 
the government to fulfil its functions. During military administration, the building of Haifa 
harbour was one of the country’s major development projects to be considered. Two 
alternative funding methods were considered for the construction of the harbour during 
this period. In his proposal for the development of the city, the military governor of Haifa, 
E. Stanton, funding the harbour primarily through the sale of land expropriated or 
purchased (at low prices) from the inhabitants. He suggested that the remaining amount 
needed for construction could be sourced by taking out a loan in Britain, leveraged on the 
expected port dues.474 The solution for obtaining funds was possible, in Stanton’s view, 
based on the merits and finance of the country. At that time the only obstacle was that 
there were no definite procedures to deal with introducing new projects in this recently 
seized territory. 
 
In the second proposal of Arthur Money that was submitted by General Allenby to the 
British government in July 1919, the Chief Military Administrator of Palestine presented a 
different view. In his report, Arthur Money suggested that a British syndicate of contractors 
would ‘provide the whole of the capital under the usual Government guarantees’ to be 
redeemed by the British and Palestine governments as both would benefit from the new 
harbour.475 It is worth noting that by 1919 the British national debt had grown to ten times 
its 1914 level, partly due to the abandonment of the gold standard which caused an 
increase in the Bank of England’s interest rate to seven per cent.476 In light of Britain’s 
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economic conditions, what was important in Money’s suggestion was the point concerning 
the British government’s guarantee for the funds used in the development. Government 
support for private enterprises in such projects was not unusual in terms of British 
behaviour. However, since the political status of Palestine was still under negotiation, it was 
not possible for the British government to approve any projects related to Palestine. In fact, 
both proposals submitted by Allenby were rejected by the Foreign Office and consequently 
no consideration was given to the suggested methods of funding.  
 
The Foreign Office maintained its position even after military rule was changed to a civil 
administration in Palestine in July 1920. Whilst still under Lloyd George’s coalition 
government and Earl Curzon’s Foreign Office, Herbert Samuel, the first High Commissioner 
for Palestine, concerned himself with introducing changes to the territory. There was a 
need to show that the advent of the British civil administration would mean ‘a large and 
rapid economic development of the country’.477 That was important in light of the 
populations’ ‘dislike’ of the new regime.478 Samuel’s aim was to divert the attention of the 
population from politics to economic development.479 The main obstacle facing the new 
civil government in Palestine though was that it had no experience of dealing with a 
mandatory form of constitution or government.480 In fact, the Ottoman fiscal system 
remained in force in mandated Palestine to which only ‘unimportant reforms’ had been 
introduced.481  The expenditure of the civil administration was kept within the scope of the 
local revenue budget without any aid from the British Exchequer.482 This was because the 
Colonial Office ‘rigidly enforced’ in Palestine a colonial policy which required that colonies 
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be self-supporting, with little assistance coming from the colonial power.483 Smith argues 
that ‘according to colonial thinking’ taxes were collected in Palestine so as to assert ‘the 
authority of the colonial government’, thus the administration depended on harvests and 
the import of goods for public revenues.484 Moreover, the Egyptian currency, in use in the 
country, as legal tender and remained so until the Palestinian pound was introduced in 
1927. This exposed Palestine to the movements of Egyptian currency and prices.485 Now 
with the stability of the Palestinian currency it was possible to issue a loan. 
 
The civil administration also faced financial challenges arising from its consumption of 
responsibility for managing the territory’s financial burdens. The assets of the War Office in 
Palestine, particularly the railways that were built during the War for the military efforts, 
were transferred, in 1920, to the Colonial Office. Therefore, the government of Palestine 
inherited the military obligations and fell into debt owed to the British Government. The 
revenue of and expenditure on the railways for example became the responsibility of the 
civil administration.486 Another obligation was, under the provisions of the Treaty of Sevres, 
that Palestine was charged with an ‘annuity in respect of her share of the Ottoman Pre-War 
Debt’.487  The Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA) was an institution created in 
1881 ‘to meet the exigencies of foreign bondholders’.488 The revenues assigned to the 
OPDA were taxes collected mainly on salt, spirits, excise tax, stamp duty and three per cent 
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on customs.489 In September 1920, those specific revenues were no longer assigned to the 
service of the Ottoman debt and by April 1921 they were ‘amalgamated with the general 
revenue of Palestine’.490 According to the peace Treaty of Lausanne (1923), Turkey and the 
states detached from the Ottoman Empire bore a proportion of the public debt of the 
Empire.491 Accordingly, Palestine’s share in the capital of the Ottoman public debt 
amounted to £E3,282,635 in 1924. Owing to accumulated interest, the amount due by 
Palestine to the bond-holders amounted to £E4,577,667 in 1928.492 The annual payment 
was paid ‘as a lump sum’ by the Treasury.493  
 
With such a financial burden, in 1920 the civil administration contemplated the request of a 
loan for Palestine in order to cover inherited and new debts to the British government and 
to finance new projects. This was possible given that the bulk of the British government’s 
investments abroad, as Hobsbawm states, were public loans to infrastructure projects like 
railways and public utilities.494 The intention of the government of Palestine was to raise a 
loan to the amount of £2.5 million, to be delivered in stages. The loan instalments would 
not just be delivered on different dates but in different amounts depending on the 
revenues of the country and on the condition of the market at the time.495 This was 
because the amount to be borrowed would depend upon the ‘margin of permanent 
revenue available for the payment of interest and sinking fund’.496 Similar to other colonial 
loans, Palestine's revenues were to be used as collateral for the loan. It was estimated that 
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the receipts of Palestine in the financial year 1920-1921 totalled of £E937,726 while the 
expenditure was expected to be £E867,559.497 This budget surplus enabled the government 
of Palestine to contemplate borrowing. 
 
In order to convince the Foreign Office and investors of the virtues of the loan, it was 
emphasized that the loan would be spent on remunerative projects. The chief purpose for 
the capital expenditure was the construction of ‘railways, roads, and many other 
purposes’.498 It is worth noting that at this stage monies for constructing a harbour, or 
funding harbour improvements, were not included in the capital expenditure plans and 
budgets since these were not yet formulated.499 Nevertheless, the High Commissioner was 
keen to expedite the process and wanted the ‘first government loan’ to be issued 
immediately once the mandate status was formally confirmed.500 It seemed that the civil 
administration, similar to the military authority in this respect, wanted to establish Britain’s 
control over the country even before the mandate was formally promulgated. 
 
In exploring the alternatives to obtaining a loan, Samuel wanted to address private financial 
institutions.501 He thought that in light of the British government’s promise of a national 
home for the Jews in Palestine, part of the capital ‘would, and no doubt will, be provided by 
Zionist bodies and by private enterprise’.502 However, his main concern was that lenders 
were likely to require guarantees for their investment.503 Owing to the uncertain status of 
Palestine the British government was ‘reluctant to give any guarantee’ as it would involve 
imposing liabilities upon the British Exchequer and therefore require the approval of 
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Parliament.504 Under the circumstances, fundamental amendment to the Palestine 
mandate was needed, in order to provide investors with something solid upon which they 
could depend. The High Commissioner suggested adding an article to the provisions of the 
League of Nations which would guarantee that financial obligations incurred during the 
mandate would be honoured.505 Subsequently, article 28 was indeed added to the 
provisions of the Palestine mandate, stipulating: ‘In the event of the termination of the 
mandate hereby conferred upon the mandatory, the Council of the League of Nations shall 
make such arrangements as may be deemed necessary […] for securing, under the 
guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine will fully honour the financial 
obligations, legitimately incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of 
the mandate’.506 The addition of this article demonstrated the extent to which the British 
government could influence the League of Nations, particularly in its early years of 
operation. The change in the mandate also meant that a loan for Palestine was officially 
requested and not privately communicated to the Foreign Office as Smith and Huneidi 
suggest.507 However, undertaking large financial obligations for a long period was still not 
possible until the position of Palestine was definitely regularised.508 An alternative to taking 
out a loan was contemplated but was not actualised. The Palestine administration 
considered the reclamation of a considerable area of the port of Jaffa and to cover the cost 
of constructing a port in Haifa from the proceeds of selling the reclaimed area.509  
 
By approving the addition of article 28 to the Palestine mandate, the League of Nations 
committed itself to the article in order to safeguard the rights of the bondholder. However, 
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the issue of encouraging financial assistance to develop mandated territories was brought 
before the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) for examination in 1923. In the view of 
the Commission, the mandated territories were ‘exposed to an economic disadvantage’ 
that created doubts concerning the stability of the mandate.510 The Council of the League 
was required to tackle this issue of confidence.511 After more than two years of discussions 
by the PMC, the Council decided in 1925 that ‘the cessation or transfer of a mandate will 
not take place unless the Council had been assured in advance that the financial obligations 
regularly assumed by the former mandatory will be carried out’.512 This meant that the 
League of Nations did not object to Palestine’s raising a loan on the British market. On the 
other hand, it was imperative for the PMC to monitor loans and the investment of private 
capital in the mandated territory. That was because such investment often ‘led to 
annexation’, which was ‘irreconcilable with the mandate principle’.513 Though there was no 
annexation of Palestine, Cain and Hopkins were right to say that financial expansion led to 
‘extensions of control’.514  
 
In the final analysis, raising a loan through the Foreign Office was not possible. Although 
official efforts were made, of which the most important was the amendment of the 
Palestine mandate, the prevailing political conditions still hindered moving ahead with the 
loan.  This shows the extent to which economics and politics were inseparable. In the case 
of the mandated territory economic matters became an important and sensitive issue, 
because unlike with colonies, the relationship between the mandatory and the mandated 
was bound by the limitations of the League of Nations. The Foreign Office was also strict 
about Britain’s compliance with the PMC. Britain’s economic policy towards acquired 
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territories became more rigid in mandated territories due to the emerging international 
obligations. These conditions made the connection between economics and politics 
stronger, and they influenced each other significantly in Palestine.  
 
While Palestine was under the control of the Foreign Office, and despite the efforts to make 
a loan possible, the difficulties related to the political status of Palestine prevented a loan 
being issued. Further consideration of the loan by the Foreign Office was reinforced again 
later, but only when the loan was discussed in light of Britain’s foreign policy and its 
relationship with the international community. For most of the time the loan was mainly 
the concern of the Colonial Office, the Treasury and the government of Palestine. 
 
 
Obtaining the British government’s guarantee, 1921 - 1923 
Under Lloyd George’s Coalition government, responsibility for the mandated territories was 
transferred from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office. When he became Secretary of 
State for the Colonies in February 1921, Winston Churchill established the Middle East 
Department to coordinate policy and control the running of those dependent countries. 
Churchill was dominant in Britain’s post-war policy-making and was largely responsible for 
Britain’s policy towards the mandated territories.515  Consequently, the government of 
Palestine started addressing the Colonial Office instead of the Foreign Office about the 
proposed loan, which now stood at £3.5 million. The High Commissioner urged the Colonial 
Office to approve the loan particularly given that ‘the need of Palestine for expenditure on 
capital works’ was urgent.516  
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The Zionist Organisation expressed interest in the Palestine loan to the British government. 
The High Commissioner advised that ‘every means should be taken to ensure the 
participation’ of the Jewish populations all over the world in the £3.5 million loan.517 
Accordingly, the Colonial  Office sought the opinion of the Crown Agents as to the interest 
paid by the Zionists and informed them that, in light of this interest, the Colonial Secretary 
thought that the loan would be issued ‘otherwise than through the Crown Agents’ ( i.e. 
through private financial institution).518 However, the Crown Agents did not hold a similarly 
optimistic view and were uncertain ‘what response would be made by the Jews’ if they 
were encouraged to participate to the loan.519 During 1921 the Colonial Office did not take 
any action and no legislation was passed for raising a loan for Palestine. 
 
When the League of Nations approved the British mandate for Palestine in July 1922, 
Churchill urged that the loan be issued for Palestine and entrusted to the Crown Agents.520 
That was now possible because, as Fieldhouse argues, wherever there were economic and 
political controls, such as with the colonies, foreign investments would get their highest 
return.521 The purpose of the loan was to pay the Treasury the debt for stores and railway 
material transferred to the government of Palestine from the War office, to repay the 
advanced payments extended by the Crown Agents and to provide for ‘other necessary 
expenditure which cannot be met from current revenue.’522 It is worth noting that 
according to the Covenant of the League that it was justifiable to charge the mandate 
territories for the advances granted by the mandatory for administrative needs during the 
period of military occupation. Moreover, loans granted by the mandatory power which 
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resulted in a development of the territory’s resources should be repayable.523 So what were 
those advances? 
 
An essential part of the functions of the Crown Agents was financial.524 It included 
negotiating, issuing and managing colonial governments’ loans and their sinking funds and 
the payment of interest.525 The Agents made public the floating of loans and the sale of 
stocks in the London market.526 Issuing temporary advances to other governments by the 
Crown Agents was a way of investing in those loans.527 This was possible as a period of time 
often lapsed between the raising of a colonial loan and the date monies could be actually 
spent.528 Advances were provided for the government of Palestine from surpluses made 
available by the Crown Agents, which themselves were drawn from the proceeds of loan 
arrangements with other colonies. In 1924, Palestine’s overdrawn account was 
accumulating at a considerable rate. About two million pounds were already spent by the 
government of Palestine in anticipation of the loan.529 The Agents, concerned that the 
government of Palestine repay its overdrawn account to them, urged the issuing of a 
loan.530 
 
The Colonial Office wanted the Crown Agents to raise the loan in the same manner as in 
other colonies. This was in order to receive better terms than if it were borrowed from the 
private market.531 However, it also meant that the Colonial Office wished to bind Palestine 
more closely to the wider Empire. A ‘General Loan Ordinance’ (No.23) following a colonial 
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model was promulgated in Palestine, according to which the government of Palestine could 
issue ‘a loan either locally or through the Crown Agents or other persons in England.’ 532 
Although Palestine was ruled by a British administration, Smith rightly argues it was not 
entitled to the benefits conferred upon protectorates.533 This was due to Palestine being a 
mandate, which meant it did not fall within the provisions of the Colonial Stock Act 1877-
1900.534 As a result, a loan for Palestine would be raised ‘on rather less favourable terms’ 
than a colonial loan.535  
 
When article 28 was added to the Palestine mandate, the High commissioner contemplated 
raising a loan through private market finance. However, he was entirely opposed to the 
idea once the mandate of Palestine was finally conferred upon Britain.536 He explained that 
capital expenditure should be the government’s responsibility.537 A change in political 
conditions clearly influenced an economic decision. With the control of Palestine now 
beyond question, ‘economic imperialism’ could continue to operate to the advantage of 
Britain.538  
 
The Treasury like the government of Palestine also rejected the idea of sourcing finance 
from the private market. It disagreed though with the Colonial Office regarding the issuing 
of a loan through the Crown Agents.539 It is worth noting that there had been occasions 
when the Crown Agents did not issue loans for Crown Colonies. In the case of British 
Guyana, for example, it was not possible for the Colonial Secretary to take the responsibility 
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of issuing loans, therefore these were issued through private financial institution and the 
Colonial Bank.540 In the case of Palestine, however, the Crown Agents were mindful of the 
risks in issuing the loan, despite Palestine’s sound financial position.541 These concerns were 
based on the nature of the mandate which provided only for temporary governance of the 
territory. They required a ‘really satisfactory undertaking’ to secure the loan after the 
termination of the mandate. Article 28 of the Palestine Mandate in their view was not a 
sufficient security by itself.542 The article, in its form, only committed the Colonial Office to 
make arrangements to preserve the rights of creditors before giving up the Mandate.543 The 
Crown Agents suggested either amending the provisions of the article or that the British 
government should ‘guarantee to pay in the event of default on the part of the post-
[m]andate government.’544  
 
For the same reasons, in order to secure the rights of the bondholder after the termination 
of the mandate, the Colonial Office urged the Treasury to provide a British government 
guarantee of the loan.545 This was because it would be difficult to ‘invite subscriptions to a 
loan’ and give solid assurances based only on the revenues and assets of the government of 
Palestine.546 Consequently, the Colonial Office prepared a draft of the loan prospectus.547 
The draft stipulated that the loan would be charged upon the revenues and assets of the 
Palestine Government and that the Colonial Secretary would ‘regard it as one of his 
principal responsibilities to ensure that the Government makes proper provision for the 
service of this loan.’548 The British government, in other words, would be responsible for 
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this loan, even in the event the mandate was terminated. The Colonial Office’s approach 
provoked an angry response from the Treasury. This protest was based on an interpretation 
of the paragraph that would imply that the British government was ‘ultimately responsible 
for the loan’. Consequently the Treasury would be ‘under a moral obligation to the holders’, 
a position it totally rejected.549 The Treasury requested that it should be clearly stated that 
the British government was ‘under no liability whatever the Palestine Government may do, 
whether during or after the currency of the Mandate’.550 This meant that the Treasury 
insisted that a loan for Palestine should follow the example of colonial loans, since the 
British government was never liable for the payment on these loans.551 As a consequence of 
these complications, a loan for Palestine did not see the light of day under Lloyd George’s 
Coalition government. 
 
With the change of the Government in October 1922, the Duke of Devonshire, who became 
the Colonial Secretary, adopted a different position. The Duke did not want the Crown 
Agents to issue the loan, particularly because the political future of Palestine was not finally 
ascertained.552 This attitude was confirmed by the same Colonial Secretary after the 
government had changed and Stanley Baldwin’s Conservative government came to office in 
May 1923.  The Duke of Devonshire preferred that the Palestine loan would be ‘raised 
through another agency’, a position related to awaiting a finalised peace treaty with Turkey 
(which was concluded in Lausanne in July 1923).553 Not only would ‘the British Government 
[…] not guarantee the loan’ for Palestine, as published by The Times, but additionally the 
Colonial Office did not want to treat Palestine as part of the Empire regarding the loan.554 
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This change in the government’s attitude was due principally to the lack of a definitive 
conclusion regarding Palestine’s political status. With this uncertainty, the Colonial Office 
was uncertain as to the manner in which to raise a loan for Palestine, whether by following 
the colonial loans, meaning through the Crown Agents, or through another method.  
 
Colonial Secretary Churchill decided in August 1922, after the mandate for Palestine had 
been confirmed to Britain, that the Crown Agents should issue the loan for Palestine and 
that ‘a special effort’ should be made to obtain Jewish subscription to the loan.555 
Depending on an earlier offer of support indicated in March 1921 by Rothschild’s financial 
firm to the High Commissioner of Palestine, the Colonial Office together with the Crown 
Agents sought Jewish support for the loan.556 The government of Palestine was concerned, 
however, about introducing Jewish interests into the loan issue.557 The fear was that the 
government’s attitude might be mistakenly comprehended as giving the loan a Jewish 
character, besides better terms would be obtained if it was issued by the Crown Agents.558 
Nevertheless, the Colonial Office proceeded in seeking Jewish support. This was done with 
the aid of Montague Norman, the Governor of the Bank of England. Norman discussed the 
question of a Palestine loan privately with Mr. Lionel de Rothschild. However, Rothschild 
declined to support the loan and clearly stated that his ‘firm does not wish to issue the loan 
and does not wish to be asked to do so.’559 Although, in the late nineteenth century the 
Rothschilds were involved in ‘government loan-contracting for foreign states’, their position 
towards Palestine was not new.560 This was because Britain had previously requested 
assistance to lend money to ‘politically sensitive arenas like the Middle East’, only for the 
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Rothschilds to declare that they ‘did not care to involve themselves’.561 Michael Cohen, in 
discussing the British Imperial finance in Palestine in connection with Zionism, claims that 
Britain used Zionist-generated capital to finance its own imperial projects such as the Haifa 
harbour. He demonstrates that although there were ‘many Anglo-Jewish notables’ who 
opposed Zionism, others were ‘willing to help to raise a Palestine loan’. 562 However, 
Cohen’s argument is shattered  by the fact that Rothschild refused assistance.563 
Additionally, one of Herbert Samuel’s biographers, as quoted by Cohen, was right that ‘the 
awful truth was revealed’ the ‘leaders of Jewish finance,’ were ‘not at all eager’ to perform 
the role assigned for them by Samuel.564 The rejection by Rothschild confirmed that any 
attempt to involve Jewish investors was going to end in disappointment. 
 
Up until July 1923, the Treasury had set ‘their face firmly against any guarantee of a 
Palestine loan’ because it did not want the British government to be held responsible for 
any liability to safeguard the right of a bond-holder. The Treasury was concerned that the 
government of Palestine had already spent about £2 million of which £1.4 million were 
advances by the Crown Agents and £500,000 were from balances due primarily to the 
Ottoman Debt Administration. The Treasury wanted these amounts to be paid back. 
However, in light of Rothschild’s refusal to support the loan, the difficulty faced by the 
Palestine government to issue a loan on reasonable terms, and the imminent coming into 
force of the Palestine mandate (September 1923), the Treasury took a dramatic decision.565 
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The Treasury came to the conclusion that in order for Palestine to raise the necessary 
finance ‘the British government [would have] to guarantee the loan’.566 Why was it 
important to obtain the guarantee of the British government? The primary reason, as David 
Sunderland argues, was that Imperial guarantees were granted because, ‘without them, a 
flotation would fail or stock would have to be offered at a price so high that it would 
damage the consolidated credit of the Crown colonies.’567 In the case of Palestine, the fear 
was that the price of stock would be very high since floating a loan would be based solely 
on the revenues (and not the assets) of the country. This dramatic shift in the Treasury’s 
position was the result of the British government coming to the realisation that it could not 
abdicate its responsibility to Palestine.568 Besides, the Treasury, as Alan Booth argues, was 
the key department regarding the market forces strategy and therefore its initiative 
towards the loan for Palestine was decisive.569 This new approach meant that it was 
possible for the government of Palestine to receive the loan and on reasonable terms.  
 
Neville Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, now argued that since the 
government would guarantee the loan it would be better that the amount was raised to £5 
million so as to ‘clear off the whole of Palestine’s debts and give her money to develop’.570 
The shift in the government’s approach led to new consideration being given to the 
development projects. The inclusion of the harbour building in the schedule of the loan 
became possible in this new approach. Moreover, it became practical to impose the 
condition that, except for labour, the money should be ‘expended in Great Britain’.571 As 
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Cain and Hopkins demonstrate, there was a considerable amount of borrowing in the 1920s 
and this increased demands for British goods.572 Although the inclusion of development 
projects into the loan’s conditions was in line with the mandate defined by the League of 
Nations, the insertion of a condition stating that part of the loan should be spent in Britain 
was controversial. Chamberlain’s aim was to benefit the British economy, a goal in line with 
Scott Newton’s statement that the export of capital to finance constructions projects in 
developing countries ‘stimulated demand… [in]…capital goods’ in Britain.573 In this regard, 
Vladimir Lenin was right to state that it was the ‘usual thing’ for capital exporting countries 
was to spend part of any loans ‘in the country of issue’.574 Part of the reason was that public 
works in the colonies were seen, in the 1920s, as providing remedy for unemployment in 
Britain.575 
 
However, the process again stalled. Due to ‘certain political difficulties’ in Palestine, the 
Secretary of the Exchequer recommended that the loan should be put on hold.576 These 
political difficulties were related to the objection of the Palestinian Arabs to the British 
government’s decision to set up an advisory council and to postpone indefinitely the 
establishment of a legislative council.577 The Palestinian leadership opposed the pro-Zionist 
policy of the British government. They were critical of moves to treat Arab natives of 
Palestine and the in-coming Jews with equal political rights.578 The Daily Mail wrote that the 
British government was ‘trying to impose by force the rule of ten per cent minority of Jews 
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upon an overwhelming majority of Arabs.’579 The main goals of the Palestinians were the 
annulment of the Balfour Declaration and the establishment of independent or quasi-
independent modes of government, similar to those of Transjordan and Iraq.580 Instead the 
Mandate as drafted came into force in 1923.581 Under the circumstances there were fears 
that a Bill guaranteeing a loan for Palestine would face considerable opposition in 
Parliament if the ‘Arab party and its Parliamentary sympathisers were not satisfied.’582  
 
 
Cabinet approval, 1924 - mid 1926 
Since the loan for Palestine was to be guaranteed by the Treasury, the approval of the 
British Cabinet and Parliament was needed. This showed that, in fact, Palestine was treated 
as part of the British Empire as other colonies. Discussion of the loan was deferred until 
February 1924 when the Colonial Secretary J.H. Thomas, under the short-lived (January–
November) Labour government of Ramsay MacDonald, put the question before the 
Cabinet. The Cabinet decided that ‘the question of the issue of the Palestine loan, under 
some form of British guarantee, should be left to be arranged between the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies and the Chancellor of the Exchequer.’583 The British government’s 
intention to guarantee the loan was announced in the House of Lords in July 1924 by Lord 
Arnold in his capacity as the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies.584 This clearly shows 
that London was in charge of the Palestine loan. All arrangements were be made in 
Whitehall with only limited reference to the government of Palestine. 
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It seems that Chamberlain’s recommendation of 1923, that the loan would be used to ‘clear 
off the whole of Palestine’s debts and give her money to develop’, was not heeded.585 This 
was because the High Commissioner wanted to raise an additional ‘special port loan’ of 
‘less than a million pounds’ for the construction of Haifa harbour. The High Commissioner’s 
suggestion of the port loan was delivered simultaneously with the approval of the 
government of Palestine in the report of the consulting engineer for the harbour in April 
1924.586 The intention was that the payment of the port loan would be met principally by 
port dues, duties and partly from ‘revenues to be derived from land that will be 
reclaimed’.587 The Colonial Office did not approve this request due to the fact that the 
finances of Palestine did not justify any increase in the loan above ‘the figure already 
agreed of £2,500,000’.588 This meant that the harbour had to wait. As a result, during this 
short-lived government, and except for Cabinet consideration of the loan, there was very 
little progress. The Colonial Office let the matter ‘rest longer than it should’.589 For the 
Treasury though it was important to support Palestine in order to show ‘the advantages of 
the new regime’.590 This could be taken to mean that the Treasury wanted to show some 
flexibility so that Britain would appear deserving of the mandate before the population of 
Palestine as well as before the international community. This was a step away from the 
conventional approach, although it was not taken, as might be expected, by the Colonial 
Office. This meant that the Treasury was willing to adapt to the requirements embedded in 
the mandate system.  
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The coordination between the Colonial Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer on 
the question of the Palestine loan culminated, in August 1925, under Stanley Baldwin’s 
government, when Winston Churchill approved the loan guarantee.591 Smith rightly argues 
that the limitations of the local budget forced Palestine to ‘confirm its dependence on 
Britain by seeking an Imperial guarantee.’592 The nascent governmental mandate system 
required different sorts of treatment from the British government. It was not yet able to 
provide an alternative to issue a loan for Palestine in a way other than the usual way by the 
Crown Agents in the form of colonial loan. This was perhaps the result of the continuous 
changes at the top of the British government after WWI. There had been five changes in 
governments from 1920 to 1924. Though none of them rejected the principle of giving a 
loan to Palestine they were reluctant, and did not really know how to treat this new 
territory under their control. Although permanent officials of the government did not 
change as often as the ministers, the final decision always had to be made by the Secretary 
of State. This clearly slowed down consideration of the loan.  In fact after the War, Britain’s 
policy-making towards the Middle East in general was filled with complications due to the 
number of its designers and their often contradictory principles.593 Thus, it is possible to 
understand the lack of coherence in government policy towards investment needs in 
Palestine. 
 
In 1925, The Manchester Guardian wrote that the progress of the loan was very slow and 
seemed ‘as remote as ever’.594 During the year, there were consultations about the loan Bill 
between the Colonial Office and Treasury. The loan amount depended on calculations 
relating to debt owed to the British government and to the cost of the capital works.595 
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Discussions mainly centred on raising the loan total to £4.5 million. This enabled the 
government of Palestine to pay £1 million to the Exchequer immediately, based on the debt 
for transferred assets. With this, £2.5 million would be used to meet the cost of specific 
approved railways and other capital works and another £1 million would be used for 
harbour works at Haifa.596  The amount specified for the harbour was in accordance with 
the consulting engineer’s estimate for the cost of its construction.597 It was an approximate 
figure pending proper investigation and surveys and was inserted in the provisional loan 
schedule by Herbert Samuel upon obtaining a provisional approval from Amery for the 
harbour construction during his visit to Palestine in 1925.598 The presentation of the 
Palestine Loan Bill to Parliament was expected in the financial year starting in 1926.599 
Accordingly, the revenues and expenditure of Palestine, under the second High 
Commissioner Lord Plumer from August 1925, had to be regulated in order to be able to 
meet its loan obligations.600 The terms of the loan would also be influenced by a reinstated 
gold standard.601  
 
Since no policy was yet developed regarding treatment of the mandated territories, a basic 
question was raised over who should issue and manage the loan.  The Colonial Office 
wanted to issue the loan in the same manner as colonial loans, by using the Crown Agents 
and their broker J. & A. Scrimgeour.602 The reason for this was that the responsibility of the 
Crown Agents over purchases meant that stores and materials would be sourced in Britain 
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and would directly benefit British manufacturers.603 Additionally, the loan was to be 
borrowed by the ‘local government concerned on the security of its own revenues’ for 
which the Colonial Office had direct responsibility.604 Moreover, ‘in the eyes of the market’ 
a Crown Agents’ loan meant that it was under the responsibility of the Colonial Secretary, a 
factor on which the ‘investing public’ could rely. Another reason was that the Crown Agents 
provided advances to Palestine for construction works ‘from the liquid funds of other 
Colonies in their charge.’ Therefore, the Colonial Office insisted that the Palestine and East 
African loans should be issued in the ‘ordinary way through the Crown Agents.’605  
 
In fact, on the Treasury’s recommendation, to save Parliamentary time the proposed loan 
for East Africa (intended for the governments of Kenya, Uganda, Northern Rhodesia, 
Nyasaland, and mandated Tanganyika) was combined in March 1926 with the loan for 
mandated Palestine. Additionally, the fact that the loan for East Africa was mainly intended 
for development projects, unlike for debt repayment in Palestine’s case, also made it more 
acceptable to the British government to prove, because this meant that purchase of 
material would most likely be affected in the British market. 
 
The Treasury was determined to issue the loans in the same way and ‘under the same 
auspices as every other guaranteed loan’ (i.e., through the Bank of England).606 Treasury 
officials wanted to remove the loans from the classification of colonial loans and bracket 
them with ‘British Funds’ that were intended for market purposes, making them British 
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government loans.607 Hence, they wanted the loans to be issued and managed by those 
who managed the government’s debt. They behaved that the issuing of a British 
guaranteed loan outside the Bank would be regarded as ‘so odd that the loan might even 
suffer’.608 Additionally, the Treasury opposed paying the Crown Agents a commission of a 
quarter of a per cent for their services for issuing a guaranteed loan.609  This means that 
Cain and Hopkins are right in stating that after the reinstitution of the gold standard in 
1925, the Treasury, Bank of England and the City of London had reasserted their authority 
over economic policy.610  
 
Discussions of the Palestine loan Bill in Cabinet in February 1926 raised fundamental issues. 
The Cabinet wanted to insert a condition that the contracts for the harbour development 
works should go ‘to British and not to foreign firms’.611 That was because the Cabinet 
wanted to make sure that finances guaranteed by the British government would be spent in 
Britain. Whether this was possible under the provisions of the Palestine mandate was 
contested by the Colonial Secretary. The provisions of article 18 of the Palestine mandate 
clearly stipulated that there would be ‘no discrimination in Palestine against the nationals 
of any State Member of the League of Nations’. This applied particularly to the spheres of 
freedom of movement and economic enterprises.612 Although British firms would be in an 
advantageous position in comparison with their foreign competitors, it would be difficult 
for the British government to justify before the League of Nations any limiting of these 
contracts to British firms. That point had already been raised as some Italian firms had 
previously expressed interest in any work on a new harbour in Palestine.613 Amery, the long 




 TNA/CO733/957/4, Treasury to CO, 29.1.1926. 
609
 Ibid., Treasury to CO, 12.2.1926. 
610
 Cain & Hopkins, British imperialism, p. 445; Thomas, ‘The macro–economics’, p. 339. 
611
 TNA/CAB23/52/3, Conclusion on Palestine, 3.2.1926. 
612
 ‘British Mandate for Palestine’. 
613
 TNA/CAB24/178/72, Note by Amery, 17.2.1926. 
135 
 
serving Colonial Secretary between 1924 and 1929 became concerned with Britain’s image 
before the League of Nations as well as its relationship with other members of the League. 
This was because the intention was to treat Palestine as a colony in terms of making it 
obligatory to employ only British firms in return for guaranteeing a loan. The desire of the 
Cabinet to give contracts to British and not to foreign firms, contradicted the essence of the 
mandate system as conveyed in article 22 of the League’s Covenant and with article 18 of 
Palestine mandate which demanded economic equality to all members of the League.  
Amery was concerned that inserting a condition to the effect of British contracting firms 
would be ‘challenged as a contravention of the mandate’.614 The British government 
therefore had to take into consideration the obligations indicated by the mandate system. 
Amery felt they need to adhere to the League’s open door policy in making decisions 
regarding mandated areas since the commitment to the League was obligatory on the 
British government.  
 
In order to avoid violating the terms of the mandate, legal clearance was sought with the 
League. The legal officers of the Crown were requested to inquire as to whether the 
attachment to the British guarantee for the proposed loans for Palestine and East Africa of 
a formal condition related to exclusivity of British firms would be ‘in any way inconsistent’ 
with the terms of both their mandates.615 It should bore in mind that, in contrast with 
countries under Class ‘B’ of the mandate, such as Tanganyika in East Africa, the economic 
equality of Class ‘A’ (i.e. communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire) was 
guaranteed by the League’s Covenant by implication only.616 The legal officers’ opinion 
regarding Palestine was in relation to the exclusivity of the British firms while that of 
Tanganyika was related to British manufacturing. Even though Britain enjoyed more 
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administrative control in Tanganyika as being classified ‘B’ mandate, the legal opinion was 
necessary to seek since the item of the open door policy was clearly stated in that type of 
mandates.617  
 
The Colonial Secretary, Amery informed the Cabinet that the legal opinion was that ‘in 
neither instance’ of Palestine and East Africa were the terms of the mandate ‘likely to be 
prejudiced by the condition which it is wished to impose.’618 The legal officers said that 
Article 18 of the mandate for Palestine did not prevent the attachment of such conditions 
to the guarantee by the British government of the Palestine loan.619 They gave their opinion 
without knowing that there was a clear intention by the British government to give 
preference to selected British firms.620 The legal officers, however, warned that adding such 
a condition might discriminate against nationals of states when competing for public works 
contracts. This warning was not however communicated to Cabinet.621 This was perhaps 
because Amery was anxious to obtain the approval of Cabinet for the loan. In spite of the 
legal officers’ warning and in order to persuade the Cabinet of the necessity of 
guaranteeing the loan, Amery presented convincing arguments. He argued that these 
territories were mainly self-supporting and their finances were under the control of the 
Colonial Secretary. Besides, Britain as the imperial government in control of these countries 
‘could not afford to stand by and do nothing’ in the event they were in danger of 
defaulting. Additionally, he claimed that the guarantee was negligible compared with the 
obligations of the British government towards those governments, particularly as the loans 
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would not impose any liability onto the Exchequer. What was also important according to 
Amery was that the proposed loans were mainly for remunerative works.622  
 
At the end of March 1926, the Cabinet agreed to guarantee the proposed loans and 
recommended that since the British government was responsible for the stocks they 
‘should not be issued in any other way than the ordinary’ (i.e. through the Bank of 
England).623 In addition, they took note of the legal officers’ opinion that adding a condition 
of exclusivity to British firms and materials would not be inconsistent with the terms of the 
Palestine and East African Mandates.624  
 
The approval of the loan was vital for reviving economic conditions in Palestine, particularly 
that part of the loan directed to constructing Haifa harbour. This was confirmed by a report 
presented to the League of Nations in 1926 which stated ‘the economic condition of the 
country has been less prosperous this year than last.’625 Hence, a Bill to guarantee the loans 
for Palestine and East Africa was prepared for Parliamentary approval. The Treasury 
intended these plans to be modelled on those employed in Sudan and South Africa.626 The 
Bill was a reproduction of such previous acts, meaning no change in the policy was bought 
in regards to the issues related to mandate Palestine. The British policy towards Palestine 
was consistent with its policy in the colonies as long as it was possible to apply it and had to 
change it whenever the circumstances required. 
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With Cabinet approval for guaranteeing the loan, foreign financiers, including from the 
United States, were encouraged to express interest in issuing the loan for Palestine.627 In 
the ace of this foreign interest, the Treasury insisted on the Cabinet’s recommendation that 
loans guaranteed by the British government should be issued through the Bank of England 
in a manner similar to the issues of the British government.628 In this connection, it is worth 
making note of Otto Niemeyer’s later opinion on such matters. Niemeyer, who was with 
the British Treasury and later became a member of the League of Nations’ Financial 
Committee, held a firm opinion that it was ‘exceedingly dangerous’ to allow other countries 
to give guarantees to loans in a British mandated territory. This was because guarantees 
always meant ‘some degree of control’ which itself would create difficulties for the British 
government as mandatory power.629  
 
 
The Loan Act and its issuing, 1926 - 1928 
In July 1926 the Palestine and East Africa loans Bill was first introduced in Parliament for 
approval as was usually the practice when government loans were raised. The Bill was to 
authorise the Treasury to guarantee the payment of the loan and its interest by the 
government of Palestine and to ensure it did not exceed the amount of £4.5 million (and by 
the governments of East Africa £10 million). These loans were expected to be raised solely 
on the revenues of their countries the fact that made it difficult to attract subscribers which 
would make raising a loan possible only on high terms.630 In order to encourage the 
development of these territories under British control, these countries had to be able to 
‘raise their money on better terms than they otherwise would with little or no risk’ to the 
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British government.631 After the return to the gold standard in 1925, interest rates rose to 
five per cent due to ‘pressures on the reserves’; the high rate was sustained until 1929.632 
These loans would contribute to the advancement of the territories in question, as well as 
the British economy, and would be in line with the League of Nations’ regulations in 
relation to the mandated territories. 
 
There were obvious benefits for the British economy by approving these loans, particularly 
that the loan for East Africa would be spent on the development of railways, roads, bridges 
and harbours. Similarly, although a substantial part of the money to be raised for Palestine 
would be for debt repayments going to the British government, the remainder would go 
toward the development of railways and harbours. In fact, the schedule of the £4.5 million 
Palestine loan included £1,115,000 to be allocated for harbour construction of Haifa and 
port improvement of Jaffa. Britain followed a generally conservative fiscal policy in 
Palestine, a policy that was extended to the development of the harbour since the amount 
specified was almost enough to cover the works.633 The largest item of development was 
allocated to the new harbour at Haifa, projected as one of the great harbours of the Middle 
East.634 It was expected that about half of the expenditure on capital works would be spent 
by placing a ‘substantial volume of orders’ for material in Britain.635 Moreover, Amery 
confirmed to Parliament that all non-local expenditure items would be sourced in Britain. 
This was possible because orders for public works were usually issued through the Crown 
Agents who were under ‘standing orders not to give any order outside this country, or 
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outside the British Empire, without special reference to the Secretary of State.’636 This was 
of ‘immense assistance’ to Britain when trying to work its way out of economic difficulties 
that resulted from WWI.637 With this, it would provide additional employment in the ‘iron 
and steel and engineering industries which have been so greatly depressed’.638 The 
contribution of loans to the British economy’s revival was central to the approval of these 
loans.  
 
The benefit to the British economy was not only felt from those direct purchases made in 
Britain, but also from the returns coming from the loan. In addition there were also more 
indirect benefits. Securing funding for the constructing of the harbour at Haifa allowed for 
acquiring a terminus for an oil pipeline coming from the Mosul oil fields. This was important 
as, in addition to its strategic benefit, it provided cheap petrol for British industry and large 
transport facilities.639 This approach by the British government was in line with its economic 
policy in the period before the War where it shunned laissez-faire economic policies in 
favour of interventionist alternatives.640 Extending the use of capital investment in order to 
revive the British economy could be viewed in this context.   
 
Given its commitment to the League of Nations’ obligations, the British government was 
mindful that it needed to demonstrate its interest in the development of its mandated 
territories. It is for this reason that it would have been difficult to defend a position where 
colonised Kenya could borrow on better terms, under the Colonial Stock Act, than 
Tanganyika and Palestine as mandated territories.641 Therefore, the approval of the loans 
was essential, particularly as it was known that the insecurity of the mandatory powers 
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‘discouraged the investment of private and public funds in mandated areas.’642 It is worth 
noting that when Parliament debated the exclusivity condition favouring the purchasing of 
British material on 9 December 1926, the question was also brought before the League’s 
Permanent Mandates Commission. In its eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth sessions, the PMC 
discussed whether the purchase of certain equipment and material could be restricted to 
the British Empire and ‘still be within the provisions of the draft mandate for Tanganyika’.643 
Until the loan for Palestine was issued in 1928 there would be no concrete decision taken 
by the PMC.644  
 
Amery’s plan to pass the Palestine loan Bill by combining it with the East Africa loan Bill was 
successful. Parliament approved the Palestine and East Africa Loans Act on 14 December 
1926.645 The Loans Act stipulated that the Treasury would guarantee the payment of (and 
the interest on) any loan raised by the government of Palestine and the governments of 
East African countries for the purposes set out in their schedules. It also stated that sinking 
funds should be established for repayments charged on the revenues and assets of the 
respective countries. It was stipulated too that the approval of the Treasury and Colonial 
Secretaries need to be obtained if changes to the agreed expenditure terms were to occur. 
This was important because such changes in fact occurred later in relation to the building of 
the oil dock (which will be discussed in a later chapter). Additionally, the Colonial Secretary 
was to ‘satisfy himself that fair conditions of labour’ were observed in the execution of all 
works carried by these loans.  
 
The Loan Act was approved without the exclusivity condition raised in Cabinet on 31 March 
1926. The reason was that there were fears that the inclusion of such a condition would 
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‘provoke criticism [in] Geneva’.646 There was a danger that some foreign governments 
might claim they had intended to offer, or were preparing to offer, Palestine a loan on at 
least as favourable terms as the British loan and free from any conditions regarding where 
works materials were sourced.647 Foreign governments were not given a chance to compete 
as the British government’s policy was not to allow Palestine ‘to accept a long term loan 
from a foreign government on any conditions.’648 This was because the prerequisite of any 
long term loan was for Britain’s to maintain the mandate of Palestine. However, by the 
nature of the mandate, Britain’s control of Palestine was not permanent.649 Bound to do 
her utmost for Palestine, Britain was obliged to assist Palestine to raise loans on the most 
favourable terms possible. This was because the Council of the League of Nations 
recognised that the mandated territories were at an ‘economic disadvantage’ when it came 
to raising loans owing to the ‘permanence and revocability of mandates’.650 This meant that 
no matter how long the mandate would last it would eventually come to an end.  
 
The ‘Palestine Loan Ordinance, No. 39 of 1927’ was published by the High Commissioner on 
1 November 1927 to enable the government of Palestine to apply for a loan.651 
Consequently, the Bank of England issued a loan of £4,475,000 on 29 November 1927 at an 
interest rate of five per cent, redeemable in 40 years with the right to pay it in full by 1942. 
The prospectus of the loan stipulated that the proceeds of the loan would be partly spent 
on ‘the construction of a harbour at Haifa, on the improvement of the port of Jaffa and on 
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railway capital improvements and public works.’652 These projects attracted investors so 
that the issuing was ‘fully subscribed immediately’.653 The payment of the loan was 
arranged into twice-yearly instalments from the sinking fund, the content of which would 
be sold off for the full payment of the amount due at the end of the loan’s life.654 The 
contribution to the sinking fund from the issuing government would be invested in long-
term securities.655 The trustees for the sinking fund were the Treasury, the Bank of England 
and the Colonial Office.656 However, the decision of investment, which was expected to be 
only in British government securities, was in the hands of the Treasury and the Crown 
Agents, following the Transvaal Loan precedent.657 On the instructions of the Colonial Office 
£100,000 had been paid to the Treasury on account of the balance of a debt for the railway 
material that was transferred to from the War Office to the government of Palestine. The 
sum of £1,050,000 has been repaid in respect of the advances made by the Crown Agents. 
Also the sum of £44,750 has been paid to the Inland Revenue as compound stamp duty. 658 
In total, a sum of over £1.5 million, meaning ‘more than one-third of the total loan’, was 
immediately paid for the debt owed to the British government.659 That is in addition to the 
charges of issuing and other related charges paid to the Bank of England and to the Crown 
Agents.660 Also, the Crown Agents had put on deposit at call the sum of £850,000 of which 
some could also be used to lend temporarily to Colonies at bank rate.661 
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The issuing of the loan in effect enabled the government of Palestine to build the harbour 
at Haifa, despite most of it being used to repay the debt for the British government. It thus 
contributed to the advancement of the country and achieved major economic and strategic 




The provision of financial assistance can often provide a means by which to secure political 
control, and in Palestine Britain was able to tighten its grip by guaranteeing the loan. 662 This 
chapter proves the validity of this conception of the connectivity of New Imperialism with 
the expansion of capital exports in the form of public loans to public utilities as Eric 
Hobsbawm argues.663 This explains why Britain was careful not to allow any foreign 
government to extend the requested financial support to the mandated territories. 
 
It took eight years from the time the loan was first contemplated until the finance was 
available for use. Smith rightly points out that the Colonial Office decided that a loan for 
Palestine was preferable to the repeated advances from the Crown Agents which were 
extended to Palestine since the commencement of the British rule.664 However, the inability 
of Palestine to raise a loan depending only on its revenues elicited the British government 
to employ its interventionist policy by guaranteeing the proposed borrowing. It is by 
examining the various phases that the loan went through that it became possible to 
understand how the international political conditions effected Britain’s economic decisions. 
The peculiar character of the mandate system and particularly item 18 of the Palestine 
mandate contributed to restricting the options for the British government.  This was 
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reflected in the discussions and debates in Whitehall over the opinion of the law officers in 
relation to the consistency of adding the exclusivity of British firms and material clause as a 
condition to guaranteeing the loan with the provisions of the mandate. This meant that 
Britain was not able to act in its usual colonial behaviour because it had to observe its 
commitment to the League of Nations by maintaining a policy of respecting the equal 
economic opportunity clause of the League’s Covenant. Hence, it is feasible to conclude 
that the international environment had its bearing on the British government with regards 
to economic policy in Palestine.  
 
That being said, it became clear that by the issuing of the loan for Palestine by the Bank of 
England Britain was able to secure its tight control over Palestine by having the borrowing 
in the way it wanted. Furthermore, the confirmation of the Palestine mandate held the 
League of Nations, by virtue of article 28, responsible towards the British government and 
the international community in safeguarding the rights of the loan bondholders. This 
behaviour made it possible for Britain to handle the loan for Palestine without facing 
objections from members of the League of Nations.665 Moreover, it also showed that the 
British government could, in fact, influence the League. 
 
The episode of the loan demonstrates how the relationship between the departments of 
Whitehall had developed in regards to Palestine. The British government’s approach toward 
the mandated territory was one defined by constant change rather than settled policy and 
continuity. This was due to the absence of defined procedures to administer mandated 
Palestine which allowed Britain to manoeuver in order to establish an appropriate method 
that suited its interests.  
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The approval of the Loan in December 1926 made it possible technically for the 
government of Palestine to start the construction of Haifa harbour. However, a major 
question remained concerning the method of construction, which was provisionally 
discussed by the British government during issuing the loan. Historically, for building 
harbours in Crown colonies the British government would authorise the Crown Agents to 
employ suitable British consulting engineers and British contracting firms to carry out the 
works. Constructing harbours were major investment projects in those colonies as they 
created employment for British firms and purchasing British equipment and material. With 
such opportunities some economic benefit to Britain was secured. But the implication of 
the mandate system as set by the League of Nations made it difficult to apply the usual 
manner in Palestine. The ‘open door policy’ securing equal economic opportunity for all 
was observed by members of the League. Therefore, the British government had to choose 
the appropriate method for constructing Haifa harbour that would secure benefit to the 
British economy without breaking the regulations of the League.  
 
Discussions in Whitehall revolved around the use of two specific methods: the 
departmental method (i.e. by a department of the government) and the contracting 
method (i.e. by awarding the works for a contracting firm). Since the mandate system 
compelled the mandatory powers to open public works to international competition, the 
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British government was sure that it could not award the works exclusively for a British firm 
as usually was done in the colonies. It feared that if the works for Haifa harbour were 
opened to international competition a foreign firm would take the work. This concept of 
giving the works to a non-British firm was totally rejected by the Colonial Office which 
maintained its colonial approach towards Palestine and hence it did not want to adopt the 
contracting method which was necessarily subject to the League’s regulations. Therefore, 
the Colonial Office investigated the possibility of using the departmental method which was 
used in some colonies under specific circumstances which did not apply on Palestine. 
Nevertheless, the departmental method was safer, from the Colonial Office’s point of view 
because by using this alternative there would be no need to open the works for 
competition and at the same time equipment and material could be purchased from 
Britain. Therefore, this chapter will, in its first part, discuss the significance of both methods 
and in its second it will examine the nature of the departmental method and its 
implications.  
 
There is a key theme running through this chapter: despite the limits imposed by the 
mandate system in regards to the exclusive employment of British firms, the British 
government explored alternative forms for carrying out the harbour works that would still 
benefit the British economy and would avoid giving works to non-British firms.  
 
This chapter examines the reasons why the method and means of executing the works at 
the Haifa harbour was not a given matter and needed investigation. To what extent did the 
provisions of the Palestine mandate influence the discussion in Whitehall about the method 
of the harbour construction? How the departmental method was thought of to serve the 
purpose of the British government? To what extent was the departmental method 




This chapter argues that due to the limits imposed by the provisions of the mandate, Britain 
was not able to employ its usual colonial methods in constructing the Haifa harbour by 
awarding the works contracts automatically to British firms. Since the British government 
still held a colonial mind it was not willing to open the works for competition to British and 
non-British firms as the mandate system dictated. Therefore, the British government had to 
weigh different alternatives and options used previously in the colonies, the fact that 
testified that Britain did not depart much from its conventional thinking and methods and 
that it lacked the appropriate tools to deal with a mandated territory. 
 
This chapter is structured to examine the significance of the method of constructing the 
harbour at Haifa. It also discusses why the Colonial Office became convinced by the 
departmental method in Palestine. After that, the chapter describes those previous 
examples where this method was used and the form of departmental method that would 
be used as a result. The final section discusses the difficulties that such a method would 
face and the subsequent retreat from the employment of the departmental method. 
 
The National Archives provides the bulk of the documentary material used in this chapter. 
Additional primary sources were found in the archives of the Institute of Civil Engineers. 
Material for this chapter was also found in literature about Haifa in general terms with little 
specific discussion about Haifa’s harbour. Herbert and Sosnovsky though are more 
concerned with the architecture and planning of Haifa city, their discussion about Haifa 
harbour was useful in providing factual information rather than analysis and arguments.666 
Seikaly on the other hand was concerned more with the social structure of the city of Haifa 
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and discusses the policies adopted by the British government towards Palestine.667 In 
particular, however, she describes the centralization of decision-making on London on 
development project. Since the method of construction was primarily the concern of the 
Colonial Office, and the appraisal of alternatives came through an examination of past 
practice, hence,it is appropriate to introduce Fieldhouse’s argument on Imperialism. This 
argument, that there was ‘no break in the continuity of Imperial development’ but a 
variation in the methods, is relevant in regards to this case concerning Palestine and the 
construction of the harbour at Haifa.668  
 
 
The significance of the method of construction 
The British government, with the consent of the government of Palestine, decided in 
January 1927 to proceed with the construction of the harbour at Haifa. This was done from 
one side under the Conservative government of Stanley Baldwin (a government that 
included Colonial Secretary Leo Amery and Austen Chamberlain as Foreign Secretary). From 
the other, Lord Plumer was now the High Commissioner for Palestine until mid-1928 and 
was succeeded by Sir John Chancellor. The envisioned harbour was expected to be capable 
of admitting very large ocean liners in all weathers by which it would serve as a window not 
only to the eastern Mediterranean but to the Middle East as a whole.669 It was for 
economic, political and strategic reasons that ‘the construction of a well-equipped port at 
Haifa should be placed first in any programme of works to be carried out’ in Palestine.670 
The decision was taken that the best alternative for Palestine was to develop the port at 
Haifa rather than to depend on a foreign port such as Port Fuad in Egypt.671 This decision 
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was supported by the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID). The question as to what 
method was to be used became of significance, as the method selected would have to 
answer to the political conditions that prevailed after World War I (conditions that resulted 
in Palestine being defined as a mandated territory and not a colony). This meant that the 
harbour works should be open to public tender for all members of the League of Nations to 
bid, a position that the Colonial Office completely rejected. 
 
Treating development projects in Palestine in the same manner used in the colonies was 
not possible any more. The mandate was ‘not analogous to a colony’, which meant that 
Britain was not able to treat the country as it pleased and award the works contracts solely 
to British firms.672 Before the War, Britain insisted on free trade and an open door policy in 
those colonies that were not under her control. Competition in China, for example, had 
meant that Britain’s interests had ‘best been served by an open trade and by the territorial 
integrity of China.’673 After the War it was important for Britain and the other powers to 
maintain such rights organised by the League of Nations. 
 
The provisions of the League’s Covenant gave priority to keeping peace, the essence of the 
1919 Paris Peace Conference, and were reinforced by securing economic rights for 
nationals of the League of Nations members. Articles 22 (which introduced the mandate 
system) and article 23 of the League’s Covenant secured those rights with regards to 
mandated territories.674 The content of these articles was reflected in article 18 of the 
Palestine mandate. This article clearly states that the equal rights to all nationals of the 
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members of the League of Nations were preserved in terms of, inter alia, taxation and 
commerce, importing and exporting goods, and freedom of transit ‘under equitable 
conditions across the mandated area.’ Moreover, on the advice of the mandatory, the 
government of Palestine could impose taxes and customs duties ‘as it may think best to 
promote the development of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the 
interests of the population.’675 This meant, as argued by Edward Jenkins, that mandates 
included, among other things, the guarantee to members of the League ‘the opportunity to 
compete for and participate in the sources of natural wealth, banking and industrial 
activities, state loans, and contracts for public works.’676  
 
In order for the United States (which was not a member of the League of Nations) to secure 
the rights of economic equality for its nationals, it ‘entered into a number of treaties with 
the mandatory states.’677 The United States negotiated a separate treaty with Britain 
regarding Class ‘A’ mandates, that is the former Turkish possessions in Asia including Syria 
and Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq, and in particular conducted the American-British-Palestine 
Mandate Convention on 3 December 1924.678 Article two of the agreement stipulated that 
‘The United States and its nationals shall have and enjoy all the rights and benefits secured 
under the terms of the mandate to members of the League of Nations and their nationals, 
notwithstanding the fact that the United States is not a member of the League of Nations.’ 
In addition, article three stated that American property rights ‘shall be respected and in no 
way impaired’.679 It was important for Britain to have an agreement with the United States 
particularly given the competition between the two countries that emerged in the second 
                                                          
675
 ‘British Mandate for Palestine’. 
676
 Jenkins, ‘Economic Equality’, p. 605. 
677
 McNair, ‘Mandates’, p. 157. 
678
 Jenkins, ‘Economic Equality’, p. 605; TNA/CO733/ 164/7, Memorandum by the Embassy of the 
United State, London to FO, 3.1.1929. 
679 ‘Convention between the United States and Great Britain respecting Rights in Palestine’, The 
American Journal of International Law, 20/2, (April 1926), pp. 65-72, pp. 71-72. 
152 
 
half of 1920s. This became particularly apparent after the gold standard was reintroduced 
and American capital and trade threatened ‘the chance to begin an economic invasion of 
Europe’.680  
 
It seems that the mandate system provoked Britain to reshuffle its conventions of free 
trade Imperialism and become defensive when others attempted to encroach upon British 
dominated territories.681 That is Britain did not want to allow other countries to have 
interests in mandate Palestine. However, this became an essential question in British policy, 
particularly when Colonial Secretary Amery defended the Palestine and East Africa Loan in 
Cabinet in 1926. Arguments brought to insert a condition stipulating that harbour works 
should only be awarded to British firms underlined the importance that the choice of 
approach to building the harbour had. This is because from one side the provisions of the 
mandate bound Britain to policies of equal economic opportunity.  
 
The question was ‘whether the work should be handed out to a contractor or handled 
departmentally by the Palestine Public Works Department’.682 These were the only two 
alternatives considered by the British government based on previous experiences in the 
colonies. From the discussions that took place in Whitehall on these two methods we learn 
how the British policy was made. Taking into consideration the economic difficulties 
prevailing in Britain after the War, the Colonial Office was concerned with giving the works 
to British firms in the traditional manner as in the colonies. The problem was that it was not 
possible to pursue these traditional methods, due to the regulations of the League of 
Nations.  
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The question of the method to execute the harbour was officially considered by the 
Colonial Secretary in a note submitted to Cabinet in February 1926 to defend the proposed 
loan for Palestine.683 The government’s preference, for economic reasons, was to give the 
works based on the traditional manner to British firms. In building the harbour of Takoradi 
on the Gold Coast (started in 1921 and completed in 1928), for example, works were 
awarded by public tender to British firm, McAlpine.684 Amery’s defence was that it would be 
more economical ‘to have the works carried out by a firm of contractors under the 
supervision of the consulting engineers’.685 However, the rights secured for foreign firms to 
compete for the works by item 18 of the Palestine mandate made it difficult to follow this 
traditional policy.  
 
The difficulties embedded in this method were connected to Britain’s relationship with the 
international community, particularly because international firms were keen to undertake 
development works in Palestine. The clear problem with this was that giving the works to 
foreign firms was not acceptable by the British government which approved the loan on the 
understanding that British firms would receive the contracts.686 
 
Acting in this protectionist manner was deemed crucial for Britain which had lost its place in 
some important markets during WWI. It was therefore essential for Britain to secure its 
markets.687 This was reinforced, according to Alford, as ‘postwar international politics [was] 
so soured that the degree of international economic cooperation necessary for world 
stability was simply unattainable.’688 The difficultly with this issue came with the League’s 
regulations that posed an unprecedented challenge to British policy in the colonized 
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territories. Through both formal and informal control, the British Empire was managed by 
force or agreement, but without any commitment to an international body. The prospect of 
foreign firms competing for construction contracts at Haifa was not merely speculative, but 
real. Foreign countries expressed their interest to invest in Palestine such as the Italians.689 
This made it difficult for the Colonial Secretary to adhere to the government’s policy of 
awarding the works exclusively to British firms. The next chapter discusses the contracting 
method and the solution that the British government arrived at about the method of the 
harbour construction. 
 
Through the use of the departmental method, the British government would be able to 
control how the loan to Palestine was spent. The Colonial Office would, through the Crown 
Agents, be able to make sure that all non-local purchases of equipment and material would 
be performed in Britain. This was possible as it was part of the commercial function of the 
Crown Agents to purchase stores and material on behalf of the colonial governments as 
well as to provide shipment, insurance and inspections.690 David Sunderland argued that 
from 1920 up to the 1970s, ‘colonial clients were required to buy all of their stores that 
were not manufactured or produced within their own colonies or in adjacent countries 
from the Agency.’691 These stores included railway and public works material, machinery 
and engineering stores such as were required for harbour works. Barbara Smith describes 
the arrangement as ‘the usual colonial system whereby the local government was obliged 
to purchase British goods was immediately implemented in Palestine.’692 Preference for the 
British market business for the purchase of supplies and stores was in fact already officially 
confirmed in April 1921 by the Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill. His instruction, to 
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which the administration of Palestine conformed, was to follow the usual practice of 
colonies and protectorates as laid down in the Colonial Regulations.693 
 
The Crown Agents during the interwar period, acted in Palestine, in the same way that they 
did in the colonies in regards to stores and material, but not in regard to loans.694 The 
reason for this was that the government’s objective was to secure benefits for the British 
economy, something delivered by the Crown Agents. Although the Crown Agents were not 
a political body they executed the policy designed by the Colonial Office.695  
 
The significance of discussing the methods considered by the British government is to 
understand how the economic policies towards Palestine were formed during the mandate. 
Additionally, analysing the arguments about both methods reveals the extent that Britain 
sought to apply its Imperial approach. It is possible to suggest that the consideration of the 
methods of construction reflected the British government’s approach to operate 
imperialism in Palestine. As Fieldhouse argued, late nineteenth century imperialism was 
‘merely the continuation of a process which had begun centuries earlier’ and that there had 
been ‘no break in the continuity of imperial development; merely a short-term variation in 
the methods used, corresponding with a temporary change in world conditions.’696  
 
The considerations of the methods to be used in the harbour building would be to evaluate 
which was the most appropriate to ensure the continuity of the Imperial approach yet 
adapt to changes in world politics as now defined by the intent and letter of the League of 
Nations. This meant that the object of exploiting natural resources as an Imperial action 
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was agreed upon. The changes that occurred after the War were not temporary and could 
have profound consequences for the classical Imperial method. Yet, in Palestine there was 
no sharp break of Imperialism and any change was one that sought to adapt this existing 
method to the world’s changing conditions rather than replace it. Therefore, the British 
government was striving to establish a balance between its own priorities, economic 
interests of its competitors and those interests of the mandated Palestine.  
 
 
Reasons for using the departmental method 
After the Palestine loan became a reality and the money became available, the Colonial 
Secretary Amery took the decision, in March 1927, that the harbour works should be 
carried out by the ‘departmental method’.697 The decision was primarily taken to fulfil the 
promise to Parliament to spend the proceeds of the loan in Britain. This was important, as 
Amery’s pretext used to convince Parliament to approve the loan relied on this. By 
embarking on this method, Amery could operate a form of protectionism and give the 
works to British rather than foreign firms.698 
 
The decision on the method to build the harbour was entirely in the hands of the Colonial 
Office, with little role for the government of Palestine. It has been argued that during the 
1920s ‘the permanent Colonial Office Officials—together with the High commissioner and 
his administration in Palestine—had become the decisive factors in the determination of 
policy for Palestine’.699 In fact, this argument can be challenged. May Seikaly rightly argues 
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that the building of a harbour at Haifa, similarly to other development projects, was 
carefully considered in London before it was authorised.700 Official pressure, she noted, was 
to ensure the success of Haifa harbour as a major government-sponsored economic 
development project designed to have an impact on the wider Palestine economy and on 
British strategic concerns.701 Hence, Palestine depended on London’s decisions to perform 
projects.702  
 
Centralization of decision-making in London regarding Palestine was a continuation of a 
policy adopted before the War by the British government. Hobson explained that the 
administrative control of most of the Crown colonies was under a category ‘in which the 
Crown has the entire control of legislation, while the administration is carried on by public 
officers under the control of the Home government’. 703 The basis of the administrative 
control was employed in mandated Palestine. Even countries which were recognised 
formally as part of the British Empire were under ‘varying degrees of effective influence 
from London.’704 In Africa, for example, during the interwar period, Butler demonstrates 
that British colonial rule was more indirect and ‘based on the notion of administering 
colonial populations through indigenous agencies.’705 The influence of London therefore on 
its dependencies continued in Palestine, although not through indigenous agencies but by 
British officials running the government, which in effect rather followed the formal style of 
Imperialism. On the harbour project the Colonial Office took full charge, particularly 
through the use of the services of the Crown Agents as will be discussed later.  
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Amery’s decision to adopt the departmental method for constructing Haifa harbour was 
due principally to economic reasons designed to bring benefit to the British economy, and 
was confirmed by the officials of the Colonial Office. They said that it was the most 
appropriate method because it was ‘the safe and satisfactory way of securing that the plant 
and materials’ used in the work. The Head of the Middle East Department, A. Harding, 
explained that under the departmental method ‘all imported articles will be purchased by 
the Crown Agents and they will automatically see to their being of British manufacture.’706 
Moreover, it was likely that an oil pipeline and/or trans-desert railway coming from Iraq 
would end in Haifa. A departmental method would allow easy alteration of plans during the 
course of the work to accommodate these terminals.707 This was because the department 
charged with works was not restricted to perform specific tasks and would not bear extra 
charges for the changes since it was part of the government.  In the event that the 
consulting engineers Rendel, Palmer and Tritton were not ‘prepared to do the job properly’ 
on the departmental method, the Colonial Office considered handing over the whole 
project to another firm.708 These justifications set forth by the Colonial Office clarify that 
the domestic economy was a primary element of the policy for the construction of the 
harbour.  
 
London’s concern for centralisation could also be attributed to the fact that Britain was 
responsible for Palestine’s international relations.709 This meant that any decisions taken 
with regards to the harbour that would affect the rights of foreign firms should be dealt 
with by the British government. Since some of the companies that applied to undertake 
works of the harbour during the Ottoman Empire confirmed their interest afterwards, the 
British government were faced with a delicate situation. The Colonial Secretary’s fears, 
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expressed during his defence of the loan for Palestine, were that certain Italian firms would 
request access to works contracts in the event that works were put out to tender.710 Hence, 
Amery thought that a departmental method would not necessitate issuing invitations for 
public tender. This was because the department would have employed its own engineers, 
staff and labourers to perform the works and would not need a contracting firm except, if 
needed, for minor works. In this way there would be no competition between contracting 
firms and the British government would be exempted from justifying its approach.  
 
Another political factor that affected the use of the departmental method was connected 
to Britain’s relationship with the League of Nations: the influence of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) with regards to labour conditions. Established in 1919 as part of 
the machinery of the League of Nations (overwhelmingly by European countries), the ILO 
drafted conventions relating to conditions of employment that were imposed on the 
governments of the League. The ILO also forged footholds in the capitals of members of the 
League through national ILO bureaus.711 The conventions were mainly concerned with the 
limitation of working-time in various kinds of occupations to eight hours a day and a 48 
hour week, protecting women and children, helping the unemployed, placement of 
workers, compulsory labour, and related questions.712 In fact the ILO ‘imposed upon Britain 
definite obligations’ regarding applying minimum standards effecting the employment of 
labour in its colonial dependencies.713 These obligations were embedded in provision 23 (a) 
of the Covenant of the League of Nations. It stipulated that members of the League ‘will 
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endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women 
and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and 
industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary 
international organisations.’714 This implied that older and sterner forms of exploitation of 
natural resources in colonised countries and the use of ‘‘forced’ native labour’ had to be 
abandoned.715 In his capacity as Member of Parliament, Neville Chamberlain explained that 
the British government adhered to the ILO’s ‘proposed enquiry into the question of forced 
labour and indentured labour’.716 Conforming to the League’s regulations indicated that 
Britain was starting to take international concerns into consideration in what was 
traditionally seen as an internal affair. The mandatory power therefore was precluded from 
doing what would previously be lawful in the colonies.717 This could be viewed as a gradual 
change in Britain’s colonial approach towards labour specifically and to its Imperial 
approach in more general terms.  
 
Britain’s national interest was mainly concerned with the working time and conditions in 
the various countries ‘yet by reason of the economic unity of the world, labour conditions 
in one country have a very direct bearing on labour conditions in another.’718 Nevertheless, 
it was not possible to apply a uniform labour policy ‘throughout the divergent territories of 
the Empire’.719 Amery made a similar point in regards to Africa where a standard wage was 
difficult and raised the example of Mombasa where the wage was ‘three or four times as 
high as the figure paid inland’.720  
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The British government was concerned with the League’s interference in Britain’s labour 
market policies. Measures to manage this problem were evident in the Colonial Secretary’s 
attempt to impose a ‘fair labour conditions’ adamant to the Palestine and East Africa Loans 
Act in 9 December 1926. Amery asserted that ‘we ought to trust the authorities on the 
spot’ not to use ‘those projects and developments for the purpose of depressing labour’. 
He prophesied that the works at Haifa harbour would produce a ‘large demand for labour’ 
which would help to raise wages.721 To make sure labour standards and ILO conventions 
were satisfied, the British government included a provision in the Palestine and East Africa 
Loan Act. Section 1 (4) of the Loan Act stated: ‘The Secretary of State shall satisfy himself 
that fair conditions of labour are observed in the execution of all works carried out under 
any loan raised in pursuance of this Act.’722 The hope seems to have been that the inclusion 
of labour standards in the Loan Act for Palestine would satisfy international obligations and 
avoid interference by the ILO. It was expected that this clause would be fulfilled if the works 
at the harbour were carried out by the departmental method since the government would 
be in a position to observe that. Moreover, it would not be practical to impose on a 
contracting firm specific wage rates since it would affect the overall cost of the works which 
would potentially reduce its profits. In light of this, it is possible to assume that the labour 
issue could be viewed as one area where the British government accepted international 
regulation and therefore prompted a modification of the established Imperial approach.  
 
Although the economic and political reasons were at the heart of the adoption of the 
departmental method, Amery outlined more practical justification as the reasoning for it. 
These justifications included the timing of the start of works. The Colonial Office hoped that 
the government could start the works earlier with a department in charge, particularly as 
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the talks about building a harbour had taken a long time. Additionally, settling outstanding 
technical matters, such as water and sewerage outlets, would be better resolved with the 
departmental method. Finally, the possibility that work would be suspended when faced 
with certain challenges, such as financial difficulties, would render it necessary to slow 
down or suspend the work at the harbour.723 Such action would not result in additional 
costs if a government department was carrying out the works. 
 
 
Uses and form of the departmental method 
Amery’s consideration of the departmental method was not entirely new. He first discussed 
it when defending the necessity of a loan for Palestine early in 1926. He was not certain 
that Parliament would approve the loan. Hence, he thought of introducing some mere 
improvements to the existing harbour at Haifa. The Public Works Department would carry 
out the works which would cost less than the one million pound budgeted for the 
construction.724 Although the Palestine loan passed through Parliament, Amery still wanted 
the harbour to be built using the departmental method. It now became possible to 
construct a new and large harbour. In fact, a sizable harbour was necessary to allow both 
for big merchant and tourists vessels to berth there and for Iraqi oil pipeline terminus to be 
built. This was essential as there were talks on-going about the availability of Iraqi oil in 
commercial amounts and the British government wanted to accommodate a pipeline 
terminus in the port of Haifa.725 The British interest in the oil pipeline and the difficulties 
concerning the transportation of oil from Iraq will be discussed later in this thesis. 
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So what did a ‘departmental method’ mean in Amery’s view? This method meant that the 
government would be responsible for the works that would be executed either through the 
Public Works Department or by ‘special staff acting under the direction of the Consulting 
Engineers.’726 However, the Colonial Secretary was not convinced that Palestine Public 
Works Department was capable of executing a huge project given ‘limited experience in 
harbour works construction’.727 Therefore, he preferred to use the form of departmental 
method that had been ‘employed with success in the case of Colombo and Lagos harbour 
works.’728 The departmental method in these and other countries was operated under 
certain conditions. These conditions were in fact outlined by the Crown Agents in a 
memorandum to the Colonial Office in October 1927. They noted that the use of the 
departmental method in some colonies was due to various reasons and were not 
appropriate for proposed use in Palestine. One of these reasons was the availability of 
‘convict labour’. Harbour works had been ‘successfully and economically’ carried out by 
‘convict labour’ under departmental supervision in places such as Ceylon, Colombo, Cape 
Town, East London and at Freemantle in Western Australia. Another reason was attributed 
to ‘climate’ such as in the case of Lagos were conditions of bad weather were experienced. 
Additionally, a number of other reasons of a practical nature required the use of the 
departmental method. These related to a number of issues: if the nature of the scheme or 
time pressures meant that designs could not be completed in detail beforehand; possible 
modification of plans during execution; demands to meet the needs of local inhabitants; 
difficulties occurred in ‘newly opened countries’; or when risks were not possible to 
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‘estimate with precision’.729 The exact recreation of previous experiences was not possible 
as the circumstances in Palestine differed from those in the colonies. 
 
Since none of these reasons was similar to the case of Palestine the Crown Agents’ 
recommendation was that ‘the conditions at Haifa favour [the] contract system.’730 They 
clearly stated that they were not aware ‘of any recent case where large harbour works have 
been carried out successfully and economically by departmental labour.’731 Nevertheless, 
the Colonial Secretary’s choice of departmental method was not influenced by the Agents’ 
opinion.  
 
The form of the departmental method used by Amery was based around ‘a special staff 
with a resident engineer in charge acting under the direction of consulting engineers.’732 
The government of Palestine consented to the decisions of the Colonial Office. The Crown 
Agents, notwithstanding their opposition to the departmental method, acted as authorised 
by the Colonial Office. In June 1927 the Crown Agents, on behalf of the government of 
Palestine, started the process of selecting its special staff.733 In this form of the 
departmental method, the selected staff had the responsibility of the consulting engineers 
for their ‘technical conduct’ and their ‘efficient execution’ of the work.734 At the same time 
they would be ‘for all purposes of discipline and action’ the servants of the government of 
Palestine.735 In other words the ‘special staff’ and the resident engineer were, under the 
departmental method, to become employees of the government of Palestine. By using this 
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method, there would not be a need to issue a public call for tender where both British and 
foreign firms would compete because the work of the firm would, in fact, be carried out by 
the department.736 This method provided a way out for the British government from 
difficulties presented by article 18 of the Palestine mandate demanding equal economic 
opportunities in projects like these.  
 
Additionally, the Crown Agents, as part of their public works and construction-related 
functions, negotiated contracts with the consulting engineers.737 They were able to act, 
with authorization from the Colonial Office, for and on behalf of the government of 
Palestine with the latter’s consent.738 In November 1927 the Agents concluded an 
agreement with Rendel, Palmer and Tritton (RPT) consulting engineers. Fredrick Palmer had 
been charged, in 1922, with the mission of selecting the appropriate location for a harbour 
in Palestine.739 The terms of the new agreement stipulated that payment for services would 
be five per cent on the first half a million spent and 4 per cent of the cost in excess of that 
sum; that fee of 4000 guineas would be paid for the 1923 report and would be merged into 
the total payment for services, and that any future visits by the consulting engineers would 
be paid for separately.740 These terms were similar to those agreed upon with the Port of 
London Authority which were higher than those paid for the same works in the colonies. 
The fare for consulting engineers’ services charged in the colonies, such as that of Takoradi, 
was 3.5 percent of the total spent.741 Contracting British consulting engineers was in line 
with John Darwin’s argument that the British Imperial system was ‘a network of economic 
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relationships founded originally upon the mutual dependence of an industrial economy, 
exporting manufactures, capital, etc.’.742 
 
Even before an agreement was finally concluded with the consulting engineers, and with 
their May 1925 recommendation for further investigations, a surveying team was sent out 
to Palestine in October 1927. Assisted by local surveyors and labour, the task of the team 
was ‘to make the necessary surveys and borings for the preparation of the scheme’.743 They 
surveyed, both on land and sea, the area selected by Sir Fredrick Palmer in 1922 found at 
the rocky promontory Ras-el-Kerum at the foot of Mount Carmel.744 Both the winds and the 
depth were the major considerations that counted for the selection of the area.745 The 
survey and the planning which were completed in September 1928 were carried out under 
the general guidance of Ernest. J. Buckton of RPT, who ‘elaborated Sir Palmer’s original 
design of 1923’ in terms of the length of the breakwaters and the depth of the enclosed 
area.746  
 
The data provided by the surveyors were necessary so that the consulting engineers would 
be able to make plans and drawings and to estimate the cost of the harbour. In fact, 
Palmer’s rough estimation of the cost had been included in his 1923 report and was 
consequently included in the schedule of the Loan Act.  The amount of one million pound 
was thought adequate to construct the harbour, based on the use of rubble for the 
breakwaters ‘as Palestine is largely composed of a limestone formation.’747 The availability 
of nearby stone formed a huge saving in the overall cost, in the estimate of approximately 
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£200,000 than artificial blocks since the part related to the construction of the breakwaters 
represented ‘probably three-fourths of the total expenditure.’748  
 
Nevertheless, more facilities were required that needed additional monies to the estimated 
£250,000. These were related to matters such as an extension of the main breakwater and 
facilities to make the harbour appropriate to accommodate the Iraqi pipeline oil terminal. 
Such matters also included the commitment to paying the basic rate of pay for unskilled 
labour and increasing the charge for the haulage of stone over the Palestine Railway.749 The 
Colonial Office secured the necessary money with the consent of the Treasury through a 
virement of monies within the loan from item number four (relating to public buildings), to 
item number three (relating to harbour construction and port improvements).750 This 
episode shows that the Colonial Office needed to satisfy the Treasury on issues of loan 
expenditure since it was raised by the Bank of England as a government loan and the 
Treasury was in charge of seeing it expended according to schedule.  
 
Since there was a precedent in the use of the departmental method, it was, in the opinion 
of the Colonial Secretary, possible to identify the model most appropriate to build the 
harbour at Haifa. Although the Crown Agents’ view, in principle, did not conform with the 
Colonial Office, they still carried out what they were requested to do. They concluded 
agreements with the consulting engineers with the task to supervise the works at the 
harbour from beginning to end. They made arrangements to employ the necessary staff in 
Britain to perform the work under the administrative control of the government of 
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Palestine. By shifting the items of the loan schedule to meet the potential expenditures for 
the harbour works, the British government could now make the necessary arrangements to 
start the works at the harbour. They had thus implemented the departmental method. 
Whether it was the absolutely appropriate way to manage the construction of the harbour 
is the subject of the next section. 
 
 
Difficulties for using the departmental method 
The opinion of the consulting engineers was in opposition to the departmental method on 
grounds of cost and time. This meant that there would be a need to employ staff and 
purchase equipment in high cost besides it would take time to gather the necessary staff 
and to buy and build equipment in the site.  This position was endorsed by the Crown 
Agents who saw the departmental method as inappropriate for use in Palestine. The High 
Commissioner was influenced by these positions and by requests by British contracting 
firms to undertake the harbour work. He therefore requested the Colonial Office for 
reconsideration of the departmental method. In response to such pressure, the Colonial 
Secretary retreated from the departmental method and adopted the contracting method 
although this had serious challenges.  
 
Upon the request of the Colonial Secretary, the Crown Agents sought the opinion of the 
consulting engineers regarding the departmental method.751 The consulting engineers had 
their reservation and described the departmental method as not being satisfactory and 
having embedded difficulties. 752 A major issue concerned the cost, which was expected to 
be greater than through contracting. They said that there would be no obligation on any 
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one to complete the works for a definite sum, whereas contractors would do the works for 
a lump sum based on a schedule of prices.753 They explained that the required equipment 
and machinery would be very costly compared with the value of work to be done.754 In the 
case of Takoradi, for example, the cost of equipment amounted to £342,302 in addition to 
railway lines that were needed for the construction in the amount of £1.6 million.755  
 
In support of the concern of cost, the Director of Palestine Public Works Department, F. 
Pudsey, reported that such large works would involve ‘considerable expenditure on 
plant’.756 Equipment for Haifa harbour would cost about £250,000 and ‘probably much 
more’.757 Additionally, the selection of the most suitable machinery required expertise. 
Such expertise did exist, but there were few real specialists so an engineer was required to 
identify the needed equipment. Ordering the machinery was expected to come from 
various manufacturers, which would not likely be found in stock and would then need six to 
twelve months to be made.758 In fact, in Pudsey’s opinion these remarks apply to the 
carrying out of non-recurring works like that expected at Haifa harbour. That is the 
departmental method was appropriate to employ in India, for example, where there was 
constant demand of railway construction of many miles that justified the purchase of 
equipment. Therefore, the machinery acquired as well as the staff both superior and 
subordinate would be continuously employed and moved from one work to another as 
required. This would result in carrying out the work cheaper than by contracting.759 






 Ibid. It is worth noting that at Takoradi, owing to the circumstances which arose in 1924, a change 
occurred in the method of carrying out the works, and as it was considered necessary in order to 
avoid the break in the continuity of operations, to arrive at a quick decision in the matter, the form 
of competitive tendering adopted and referred to by McAlpine was not necessarily such as would 
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However, in Palestine there would be no further use for equipment after the works had 
been completed. Such equipment would be sold for whatever price it would fetch, thus 
cause a ‘considerable loss to the government’.760  
 
Another concern expressed by the consulting engineers was centred around the conduct of 
work. They explained that a government would need ‘to gather together a constructional 
staff’ and skilled labour, that letter of which would be impossible to assemble.761 They 
expected that local labour would have no experience in such a ‘class of work’ as 
experienced foremen or gang masters would already be employed as permanent staff by 
contractors. Consequently, the cost of the work was bound to be greatly enhanced, 
because of the inexperience of both the foremen and the workmen.762  
 
Amery’s earlier expression for an early start to the work was contested by the consulting 
engineers. They explained that commencing the works concurrently with the survey was 
not possible because more information was necessary to prepare contract drawings and 
plans.763 It would not be possible to determine the method and cost of construction until 
the survey had definitely disclosed the nature of the harbour floor. Moreover, it would be 
difficult to estimate the extent of the works to be carried out until the number of shipping 
berths had been determined, a decision that was in the hands of the government.764 They 
added that it was for the government to set its priority in terms when the work was started 
or price of work. 765 
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A delay in starting the work, as well as when it would be finishing,  would come to define 
the departmental method given the time consumed in obtaining the equipment and in 
assembling the appropriately experienced staff needed for building of the harbour. 
Moreover, the departmental method would be at a disadvantage due to the lack of skilled 
personnel and staff to organize for and control of the working operations.766  
 
The provision of expert advice by the Crown Agents on works and engineering projects for 
the Colonial Office was vital for the harbour construction. They ‘strongly backed the 
objections’ set out by the consulting engineers for carrying out the Haifa harbour works by 
the departmental method.767 They explained that no large harbours had been built by 
departmental method, although there had been a few that had started ‘many years ago’.768 
At Lagos, they explained, the departmental method was adopted because when the work 
started no proper plans could be made and it was not possible to have a contractor willing 
to take on the work in the ‘conditions of West Africa at the time’.769 In Southern Nigeria, 
the departmental method was in use due to lack of funding since the government could 
make only a small sum of money available every year. The work, which started in 1907, was 
still in progress in 1927. The construction of the harbour at Colombo, again by the 
departmental method, was viable due to the ‘large amount of convict labour’.770 In the 
opinion of the Crown Agents these cases could not be regarded as a precedent for using 
departmental method for the harbour works at Haifa. Additionally, the expense, slow pace 
and low level of efficiency of departmental construction in this type of work provided the 
reason for rejecting the departmental method. Also, the Crown Agents had doubts that the 
equipment and machinery required for the harbour could be ordered, manufactured and 
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delivered at site quickly enough compared with the period it would take if work were put 
out to tender.771  
 
The opinion of the consulting engineers in opposition to the departmental method was 
communicated by Frederick Palmer to the High Commissioner during his visit to Palestine in 
late 1927. Accordingly, in January 1928 the High Commissioner Plumer wrote to the 
Colonial Secretary that Palmer ‘made a very strong impression’ on him.772 Such a 
professional opinion, he said, should not be ‘ignored’ as the matter was of vital importance 
to Palestine and that the most advantageous method should be adopted.773 Plumer, in 
effect, withdrew his support for the departmental method since it was not ‘the most 
advantageous’.774 Plumer said that the reasons for using the departmental method, 
regarding the expedition of the work and control of expenditure, were not valid. This meant 
that the work would not commence nor finish earlier and it would be no cheaper with the 
departmental method. He further explained that although the departmental method would 
be preferable for political reasons (meaning it would not incite the international 
community) the contracting method would provide the best practical results. Plumer 
requested that the Colonial Secretary reopen the question as to the approach to build the 
harbour and to consider it carefully before a final decision was made.775 It is possible to 
understand the relationship between the Colonial Office and the government of Palestine 
as described by Barbara Smith that frequent clashes took place between Palestine and 
London.776  
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Another consideration that influenced the opinion of the High Commissioner was a request 
by the contracting firm McAlpine. In a letter addressed to the High Commissioner in July 
1927, Malcolm McAlpine provided strong reasoning as to why the construction of Haifa 
harbour should be carried out by a British contractor. He explained that during and after 
WWI ‘very little dock and harbour work has been done by British contractors’ and added 
that ‘the well-known big contractors such as Pearsons, Scott & Middleton, Sir Norton 
Griffiths, Topham, Jones & Railton’ did not have the opportunity, for many years, to keep 
their equipment and staff working on harbours.777 It was imperative for British firms to be 
given the work of the harbour in a condition when the domestic economy witnessed a 
collapse of post-war boom which was reflected in drop of prices, decrease in trade, and rise 
in the rate of unemployment.778 
 
In light of this it is possible to assume that the lack of available work opportunities for these 
big companies had definite consequences for the British economy. With the lack of work 
opportunities, there was no machinery or material purchased in Britain. Also, their staff 
added to the unemployment in Britain, which by the mid-1920s constituted a major 
economic problem. Unemployment rates before the War hovered around 3 percent and 
during the boom of 1919-20 they sat at around 2.4 percent. By the mid-1920s 
unemployment ‘ranged between 9 and 15 percent’.779 In response to these conditions, the 
British government took financial measures to control the economy and was demonstrated 
in the Treasury’s ‘supportive strategy’ of offering protection and state intervention.780 
Hence, as part of state intervention, it was vital to create working opportunities for British 
firms in order to revive the British economy, and the works at the Haifa harbour was one 
that afforded such opportunity. 
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In light of labour conditions in Britain and in order to encourage the British government to 
accept their offer, McAlpine explained that being engaged in new project would give 
‘employment immediately to labour’. McAlpine asserted that his company was prepared to 
undertake the construction of Haifa harbour ‘under the same contract conditions and 
schedule of prices as that of Takoradi Harbour’ which were coming to their end.781 
Additionally, the British contracting firm of S. Pearson and Son, who applied in reference to 
the development of the port of Haifa in 1919 and 1921, revived its application in January 
1928.782 Also, in order to convince the British government to award them the works they 
said that their ‘experience is unequalled by any other firm in this or in any other country’ 
with harbour construction.783 The firm submitted to the British government and to the 
government of Palestine ‘complete surveys and a report, together with a design’ based 
upon the data collected from borings and surveys.784 Since the investigation was conducted 
by Pearson and Son without a prior promise to award the works, the firm did not have legal 
claim for the expenses it incurred, but still insisted that the government should pay ‘special 
consideration’ to its application.785 The desire of these British firms to have contracts like 
before the War is explained by Bernard Alford that the politics after the War was to 
incorporate the ‘wish to return to normality’. Yet there were ‘obvious signs that the world 
had changed’ and the British government had to re-consider its previous policies.786 
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The High Commissioner Plumer in fact viewed McAlpine proposal favourably, particularly as 
it offered to start the works early, but nevertheless requested a professional opinion.787 The 
consulting engineers RPT agreed that McAlpine’s proposal would save about nine months if 
the works were commenced concurrently with the survey, but the data collected by a 
survey was essential in order to determine the nature and extent of work needed.788 In 
concurrence with the consulting engineers, the Crown Agents said, from their experience, 
that difficulties and delays usually resulted if work began without proper surveys and 
preparation. They explained that detailed surveys were essential in order to estimate total 
expenditure, the depth of the harbour and the number of berths required. Their judgement 
was that unless there were circumstances that made prompt commencement of the work 
imperative, there was a danger in accepting any offer without calling for tenders.789 This 
would expose the British government to claims from other British contractors such as 
Pearson and Son and from foreign contractors that they were not given a ‘fair chance’.790  
 
The Colonial Office also had concerns that if McAlpine was allowed to carry out the work 
under contract without invitation to tender it would be in breach of article 18 of the 
Palestine Mandate.791 Despite this the Colonial Office, still thinking in Imperial manner, had 
started to contemplate giving the works to McAlpine. Thomas I. Lloyd, from the Colonial 
Office, explained that since the Takoradi harbour works were awarded to McAlpine in 
‘competition with other contractors’ and they carried out the work ‘expeditiously and in a 
satisfactory manner’, it was felt that ‘nothing would be gained while much valuable time 
might be lost’ in inviting tenders. 792 He also said that as the British government guaranteed 
the Palestine loan, it would be reasonable to give the work to a British firm ‘without inviting 
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foreign competition’. 793 Additionally, the Under-Secretary for the Colonies, Samuel Wilson 
asked whether McAlpine could be engaged to do the work as ‘agents’ of the Palestine 
government similar to that of Takoradi harbour.794 In fact, these suggestions and questions 
invited arguments from the Colonial Office. As the Head of the Middle East Department in 
Colonial Office, A. Harding had put it, in order for the Colonial Secretary to make his 
decision, it was essential to investigate what provision should be made regarding: wages 
rates that would fulfil the fair labour conditions of the Palestine loan; the use of British or 
Palestinian materials; and whether foreign firms were to be barred from tendering. The 
examination of these issues will be the subject of the next chapter.  
 
While these arguments were still taking place in the Colonial Office, the Colonial Secretary 
decided in June 1928 to abandon the departmental method and to construct the harbour 
‘by contract’.795 The decision was taken on the grounds that ‘the acquisition and assembly 
of plant required and the engagement of the necessary staff would delay the construction 
of the works’.796 It would also be cheaper by contract since the plant would cost a 
considerable amount of the money allocated for the harbour.797 Although the decision was 
based on cost and time concerns, giving the work to British firms was to bring economic 
benefits for Britain. Indeed, the position adopted by the Colonial Secretary confirms John 
Gallagher’s argument that ‘In the Conservative party, the dominant group were able to 
respond to the pressures of domestic politics and of colonial political developments.’798 
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The difficulties brought by the departmental method as expressed by the Crown Agents and 
the consulting engineers, gave reason for the High Commissioner of Palestine to withdraw 
his endorsement of the departmental method. Since this method involved greater cost and 
more time for the works to begin and to be completed, the Colonial Secretary retreated 
from recommending the departmental method and decided that the harbour should be 




It was important to understand the significance of the method used in carrying out the 
harbour construction at Haifa because the type of method used was bound up in the 
political conditions prevailing after the War. The complications stemmed from Palestine 
being a mandated territory hence the British government were not able automatically to 
employ a British firm to execute the works of the harbour since this would provoke political 
criticism to Britain. The rights of other firms to compete for the works was secured by 
articles 22 and 23 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and by item 18 of the 
provisions of the Palestine mandate Additionally, abiding by ILO regulations made it 
important to preserve ‘fair labour conditions’ in carrying out the works of the harbour 
which was not possible to observe if the works were given to contracting firm. The difficulty 
was when the Colonial Office had to put these consideration vis-à-vis the Colonial 
Secretary’s pledge to Parliament that British firms and material would be employed in the 
harbour works. 
 
In normal circumstances, as in the colonies, the Colonial Office would authorise the Crown 
Agents to make all arrangements necessary for harbour construction. It was not possible for 
the Crown Agents to assume their role to arrange and follow up for the Haifa harbour 
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works without taking into account several considerations related to Palestine being a 
mandated territory. The investigation of the use of the departmental method, and the 
arguments around its use, helps us understand how the British policy towards the harbour 
construction was formed. Experience in the colonies enabled the government to decide 
what it thought would be the most appropriate policy to adopt. Nevertheless, 
considerations relating to prioritising the maximisation of benefit to the British economy 
complicated a process of decision-making already weighed down by international demands.  
 
Economic and political aspects were at the hearts of the government’s considerations. 
Therefore, landing on the departmental method was important as obtaining equipment and 
material would then be done through the Crown Agents who would make sure that all 
purchases would be made in Britain. Protectionism was a primary concern of the 
government.799 Hence, the employment of a departmental method would open markets for 
British manufacturing. Amery’s use of the departmental method was primarily done to 
keep decisions relating to the harbour construction in the hands of the British government. 
Whether concerns connected to the relationship with the international community, as 
represented by the League of Nations, or circumstantial matters relating to the actual 
construction of the harbour, the departmental method made these issues more flexible to 
solve in the Colonial Office’s opinion This was so in spite of the fact that the professional 
opinion of the consulting engineers and the Crown Agents contradicted those of the 
Colonial Office and showed that the departmental method would take longer and would 
cost more than through contracting. Moreover, British contracting firms’ insistence on 
having opportunities in the development of the mandated territory influenced the 
government of Palestine and the British government alike. This prompted a reconsideration 
of the departmental method by the Colonial Office but still with the primary objective of 
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reaping the most benefit to the British economy .In sum, what this chapter has suggested it 
was difficult for the British government to take a decision by which straight forward 









The transition from the departmental method to a consideration of the contracting method 
for the construction of Haifa harbour, presented difficulties that went to the heart of 
questions concerning Britain’s power in the world and the influence the League of Nations 
and international law would have upon Britain. Debates in Whitehall surrounding the 
contracting method were heated, because although the Colonial Office maintained its 
traditional approach, that sought to maximise the benefits for Britain’s economy through 
the employment of British firms, the Foreign Office was more concerned with Britain’s 
position and image vis-à-vis the international community. The primary concern of the 
Colonial Office was to employ a contracting method without being compelled to open the 
competition for the works to non-British firms as dictated by the Palestine mandate. The 
Foreign Office, however, wanted to show that Britain had adapted to changes in the 
international environment after WWI and as a mandatory power it had adhered to the 
regulations of the League of Nations that Britain was essential in creating. Therefore, Britain 
had to balance her priorities between bringing benefit to her domestic economy on the one 
hand and adhering to the international requirements on the other.  
 
The conclusion of the debate was found principally in the interpretation of the provisions of 
the Palestine mandate. The Law Officer’s explanation counteracted the Colonial Office’s 
desire of employing colonial practices. It was important to come out with a reconciliatory 
decision that took into account the promises that the government gave to British firms 
awarding them access to works contracts and those and those pledges given to Parliament. 
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Hence, the British government found itself obliged to abandon the contracting method and 
return back to the departmental method as a final choice for the harbour construction. 
 
The constant changing of opinion concerning the method to be used for the constructing 
the harbour reflected Britain’s lack of vision in striving to find the appropriate way to deal 
with acquired territories under the inhibitions of international law. This meant that Britain 
took quite a considerable time to adapt to prevailing world conditions within which it 
wanted to assert its power. 
 
There are three main strands that are investigated in connection with the contracting 
method. The first is represented in the British government’s concern about breaching the 
economic equality policy of the League of Nations’ Covenant. The second strand relates to 
the British economy and the intransigence of the Colonial Office that wanted exclusivity of 
British firms and British material. Finally, the third strand relates to the position of the 
government of Palestine where the High Commissioner’s priority was to have the harbour 
built so Palestine’s British rulers would get the credit. The common component in these 
three strands was the role played by the Colonial Office, in whose hands the ultimate 
decision rested. The challenge that the Colonial Office was faced with was how to employ 
the contracting method without awarding the works to a foreign firm. This meant that 
Britain had to reshape and readjust its economic policies in a manner to fit its obligations 
and avoid violating international regulations. The purpose of this chapter is to understand 
the factors that influenced the formation of Britain’s policy towards the method that should 
finally be employed for carrying out the works of the harbour.  
 
During the period of new imperialism, Britain did not object to Germany’s occupation in 
1897 of areas in China as long as there was ‘no exclusive privileges for German subjects’. 
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However, Britain made out ‘its own claims to the Yangtze’ when Germany and Russia 
demanded ‘exclusive or preferential terms for economic development.’800 Britain secured 
commercial rights for her nationals whatever the political conditions were. In line with 
Britain’s approach, article 18 of the Palestine mandate gave the right to League of Nations 
members to invest in the mandated territories. Amongst the European investors, the 
Italians expressed early interest to tender for works relating to developing natural 
resources in Palestine. The Foreign Office wanted the British government to adhere to its 
commitments in order to save face with the League of Nations and invite foreign firms to 
compete for the harbour works. In contrast, the Colonial Office was still following a colonial 
mind-set and sought to continue prioritising British economic and defence interests. This 
was particularly important as there was discussion of Iraqi oil being transported to Haifa via 
a pipeline and facilities to this end had to be available. 
 
The theme that this chapter is concerned with is the battle for control over the construction 
of the Haifa harbour. This battle took place in London between a Colonial Office, 
determined on keeping works contracts in British hands, and a Foreign Office determined 
to play by the letter of international law. What this dispute actually embodied was the 
boarder question of Britain’s power as an Empire in a changing world. 
 
This chapter discusses what the deliberations and debate surrounding the contracting 
method meant. What factors affected the decision-making? What hindered the application 
of the contracting method? Why did the government decide not to adopt the contracting 
method and fall back on to the departmental method?  
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What this chapter claims is that the debate within the British government over the 
contracting method, and the outcome of that debate, demonstrates that Britain was not 
able to enforce pre-existing imperial methods on mandated Palestine. The pressures within 
the British government to abide by international law, and the criticisms raised by foreign 
powers of British protectionism, all point to the changes that were taking place in Britain 
and in a developing context of international law directed toward breaking down 
protectionist practices and defeating imperialism after WWI.  
 
This chapter is structured to investigate the significance of the contracting method to the 
British economy. This means that the chapter will examine the British government’s 
protectionist approach and its insistence on employing exclusively British firms for carrying 
out the harbour works. Then the chapter examines the interest presented from the 
international community in competing for the works and the implications of these appeals 
on the British government. The last section demonstrates how the British government 
resolved the dilemma by resorting once again to the departmental method and what did 
that mean.  
 
This chapter reaches for literature on Britain’s approach to imperialism and the formation 
of British government policy. Hobson’s work, examining Britain’s use of political and 
financial resources extending the area of trade and investment in the Empire, is considered. 
By investigating the contracting method it becomes possible to understand the interest 
expressed by British firms in Haifa harbour within the context of Hobson’s explanation.801 
This meant that there were continuities ‘in aim, not in performance’ as Gallagher argues 
with regards to Britain’s involvement in territories outside Europe.802  
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The debate in Whitehall demonstrates how policies were formed. A single department such 
as the Colonial Office was not able to make its decisions without reference to other 
departments. Parkinson rightly argued that the Colonial Office was part of a ‘government 
machine’ and could not function ‘as an entirely self-sufficing and independent organ’.803 
With this in mind it was necessary to consult other departments, particularly the Foreign 
Office and the Treasury, on the method that best suited Palestine in light of the conditions 
prevailing after WWI. Additionally, Gallagher argued that during the 1920s, the rivalries 
inside the parties and between the parties did not cause sudden changes in foreign 
policy.804 But the changes nevertheless occurred as a result of being compelled to adhere to 
League of Nations of regulations. Therefore, changes of methods could not be avoided. 
Smith discusses the delicacy of Britain’s position towards the method to be used in the 
harbour building in light of the potential criticism by members of the League of Nations.805 
In fact, William Rappard explains how the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) dealt 
with complaints. 806 Accordingly, this study shows how the British government was careful 




The significance of the contracting method 
In July 1927, the Colonial Office received from McAlpine, the British contracting firm, an 
offer to undertake the harbour construction. The Colonial Secretary Leo Amery, despite his 
concerns that article 18 of the Palestine mandate demanded open competitive tendering, 
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decided that the offer deserved ‘careful consideration’.807 The Colonial Office authorized 
the Crown Agents to inquire with the consulting engineers as to the ‘method of procedure 
to be adopted’ if it was decided that McAlpine should be given the work.808 In particular 
they were requested to clarify the practicality of the company’s willing to start the works 
one year earlier than expected. Therefore, the questions are: was it possible to start the 
works earlier and was it possible to give the works for a British firm without opening the 
works for competition (i.e. to violate article 18 of the mandate)? To answer these questions 
it is necessary to understand the political and economic atmosphere that prevailed at the 
time.  
 
Imperialism, Hobson argued, enabled the ‘owning and exploiting class’ concerned with 
foreign trade and investment to utilise the ‘political and financial resources of their State’ in 
order to extend the area of their trade and investment in the Empire.809 McAlpine’s offer 
could be seen in the context of utilising Britain’s political and financial resources in 
mandated Palestine. However, the consulting engineers, who were in favour of giving the 
work out through contracting, warned of the dangers of accepting any offer ‘without calling 
for tenders’.810 This was because there would not be sufficient data to enable the 
consulting engineers to judge the ‘real extent of the work to be done or the lowest price 
which it might be possible to obtain’. 811 
 
From the McAlpine offer in July until December 1927, the Colonial Office hung on to the 
departmental method which was endorsed by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State 
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for the Colonies, W. Ormsby-Gore, with the agreement of the High Commissioner.812 A 
serious re-consideration of the departmental method began in January 1928 upon the 
request of the High Commissioner who said that the consulting engineer, Palmer made ‘a 
very strong impression’ on him and that his ‘opinion cannot be ignored’. Palmer said that it 
was a matter of vital importance to Palestine that the most advantageous method should 
be adopted, which, in his opinion, was the contracting method. Therefore, the High 
Commissioner withdrew his agreement to the departmental method and recommended 
that the question of the method be reopened.813 In fact, it had been announced twice to 
the House of Commons by the Colonial Secretary that it was decided twice upon the 
departmental method. In the view of the head of the Middle East Department, A. Harding, 
to draw back from the departmental method, would ‘make the Government look 
ridiculous’.814  
 
The request to reconsider the method of construction caused confusion in the Colonial 
Office, owing mainly to the perils connected with giving the works exclusively to British 
firms. This was important in light of the fact that more British firms expressed their interest 
in the harbour works. The contracting firm Pearson and Son asked whether ‘some 
consideration may be given to them’ and the British–Mediterranean Lighterage [sic] 
Company also offered to undertake the haulage of stones ‘from a quarry for the building of 
the quays at Haifa’.815 Given that the situation was unclear in terms of policy, and that 
British firms were seeking Haifa works contracts, what steps did the British government 
take to remedy this? 
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The contracting method required that contracts be put out to public tender, presenting a 
dilemma for Britain in regards to its intentions to preserve unequal economic rights of 
access for British firms. The consternation of the Colonial Office revolved around whether 
they ‘ought or ought not to run the risk of being criticised’ if they had to put the work out 
to public tender and then turn down a foreign firm.816 On the other hand, if a foreign tender 
was accepted it would be ‘severely criticised’ in Britain.817 British firms wanted to benefit by 
taking on the harbour works and Parliament wanted to see the proceeds of the Palestine 
Loan allocated for building the harbour spent in Britain although such action would be hard 
to defend at Geneva.818  
 
Aware of the hazard created by the contracting method, the Colonial Office felt obliged to 
consult the Foreign Office.819 Consultation amongst the departments of Whitehall was 
common practice.  Cosmo Parkinson, who worked in and for the Colonial Office for about 
forty years, argued that the Colonial Office was part of a ‘government machine’ and could 
not function ‘as an entirely self-sufficing and independent organ’.820 The Colonial Office 
requested that the Foreign Office verify its position with regards to ‘whether, if tenders 
were invited for the construction of the works in question, the Palestine Government would 
be bound to accept a tender from a non-British firm should it prove to be definitely more 
favourable than any tender submitted by a British firm.’ Additionally, it was vital to know 
the position of the Foreign Office on ‘whether a stipulation could be inserted into the 
contract binding the contractor to use stores and articles of British or Palestinian 
manufacture on the work.’821 Gilbert Herbert, although discussing Haifa principally from the 
architectural point of view, rightly argues that the question of giving the construction of 
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Haifa harbour to an appropriate agency ‘proved much more intractable’.822 He did not 
explain however that the issue of exclusivity for British firms and material was at stake in 
view of Britain’s commitment. 
 
The questions posed by the Colonial Office to the Foreign Office were pivotal points of 
debate in Whitehall for about a year. This was because a formal condition stipulated that 
non-local expenditure should be spent in Britain was not included to the Loan Act. The 
reason given was that it would be difficult in practical terms to ensure that such a condition 
would be fulfilled to the letter.823 In fact, the Foreign Office tried to find out the practice of 
other mandatories in a similar situation, such as the French mandate in Syria and the 
Cameroon. The Office concluded that ‘it had not been found possible to trace, in any 
available report on the practice of the governments with regard to the construction of 
public works in mandated areas, any cases bearing exactly upon the point raised.’824 The 
crucial question of binding contractors to use British material, was discussed by the League 
of Nations’ PMC in its eleventh and twelfth sessions (in June, July and October 1927). No 
definite conclusion however was rescheduled.825 This meant that it was left to the 
discretion of the British government. 
 
Why was the issue of the use of British material brought before the PMC? The mandatory 
power was obliged to provide the PMC with an annual report which contained supplements 
of ‘other available documentary material’ including accounts of debates in ‘the Parliaments 
of the administering states’.826 Therefore, when the British Parliament discussed in 
December 1926 the amendment of the Palestine and East Africa Loan Act, the PMC took 
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note of the question raised then with regards to the exclusivity of British firms and material. 
The inquiry by the British government to the PMC was whether it was an ‘infringement of 
the economic equality articles of the mandate for a mandatory power to require, as a 
condition of its guaranteeing a loan raised by a mandated territory, that the proceeds of 
the loan shall be spent in the country or territories administered by the mandatory 
power.’827 The PMC did not have a set policy here, therefore, in order to identify the policy 
adopted in such cases, a questionnaire was circulated to the mandatory powers. The 
question asked was ‘what regulations have been adopted or are generally followed when 
supplies are purchased by the public authorities of the mandated territories?’828 The French 
replied that ‘tenders from nationals of members of the League of Nations would be 
considered if received.’ Nonetheless the French left it to the mandatory power to organise 
essential public works and services ‘on such terms and conditions as [they] think just.’829 
Nevertheless, the result of the questionnaire carried out by PMC was not known, since it 
had not reached a final conclusion on the point.830 This could be understood in light of the 
view British officials held that the League of Nations should only enquire any complaints 
made in a mandated territory and should not attempt to ‘interfere with mandatories’ or 
‘undertake administration’.831 Not having a satisfactory answer from Geneva did not mean 
Britain was safe from criticism by the international community and at the same time it 
meant that the raised questions maintained. As a result, Whitehall was incapable to 
proceed with the construction of the harbour without taking into consideration the 
League’s regulations. 
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The Crown Agents were concerned that if the works were given to McAlpine without public 
tendering, difficulties would arise both internally and abroad. Other contractors at home, 
such as Pearson and Son, ‘would quite certainly complain that they had not been given a 
fair chance.’ Also, troubles from abroad would arise because if the works were open to 
tender ‘an Egyptian firm is most likely to get the job and an Italian firm has probably the 
next best chance.’832 Therefore, the Colonial Office was faced with a serious challenge as it 
did not know how to use the contracting method in a context where it clearly did not want 
to award works to non-British firm.  
 
The British were in a critical situation as the Foreign Office saw Britain as the ‘mandatory 
for Palestine, she is bound to do her best for the interests of that territory; as a 
manufacturing and exporting country, she is entitled to do her best for the trade of her own 
nationals.’833 Gallagher argued that the British policy in the 1920s was ‘losing its old 
autonomy’ and was more and more ‘reacting to situations’ instead of creating them.834 
Indeed, Britain’s decision towards the harbour construction was affected by the League of 
Nations’ regulations. From this, the Foreign Office suggested, in January and in March 1928, 
to seek legal advice with regards to British firms and manufacturing.835 This was because 
any decision to be taken in this instance would be an established principle to be followed in 
other cases.836  
 
In comparison, article seven of the Tanganyika mandate contained a special provision with 
regard to public works, ‘while no similar provision appears in Article 18 of the Palestine 
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Mandate’.837 The provisions of the Palestine mandate were therefore different from those 
of the British mandate of Tanganyika and that of the French mandates. In the opinion of the 
Foreign Office, the ambiguity embedded in the Palestine mandate regarding the public 
works did not by itself provide legal justification to Amery’s proposals for awarding the 
works only to British firms. It is therefore possible to suggest that the drafting of the 
Palestine mandate fell short of satisfying or accounting for Britain’s vital interests. 
 
It is worth noting that the opinion of the legal advisors was sought in March 1926, 
specifically concerned attaching conditions to the Loan Act relating to British firms and 
British materials exclusive access to works contract. The legal opinion then was that article 
18 of the Palestine mandate did not prevent attaching such conditions. Nonetheless, the 
Palestine loan was issued with no attachment of those conditions since it was impractical to 
do so.838 The Colonial Office was therefore reluctant to approach the legal advisors again, as 
requested by the Foreign Office, as the Colonial Office did not include those conditions in 
the Loan Act when they were first asked.839 What was the significance of the legal opinion? 
Was it bounding to the British government? Could it be defended if a suit were brought to 
The Hague?  To what extent were the Law Officers’ opinions flexible in interpreting the 
terms of the mandate? What impact did their opinion have on the policy adopted on the 
harbour’s construction?  
 
In May 1928, the Colonial Office sought the opinion of the Law Officers. The questions 
asked did not however mirror those concerns of the Foreign Office. The original enquiry of 
the Foreign Office was ‘whether the words in article 18 of the Palestine mandate which 
forbid discrimination debar Palestine from granting to British nationals a preference in the 









construction of harbour works, and in the furnishing of supplies therefore.’840 A reply to this 
straightforward question would have added clarity. The Colonial Office, however, posed 
different questions which caused difficulties in reaching a convenient solution. These 
questions were whether the following would infringe article 18 of Palestine mandate: ‘a) 
Placing the contract with a British firm without inviting any tenders; b) Inviting tenders from 
British firms alone; c) Issuing a worldwide invitation to tender and then accepting a British 
offer if it appears suitable although not the lowest suitable tender.’841 The other matter 
concerned to the eligibility of inserting a term in the contract regarding exclusivity of British 
material.842  
 
It was difficult for the Law Officers to give their opinion ‘without some qualification’. They 
emphasised that discrimination within the meaning of Article 18 of the mandate of 
Palestine ‘must be a question of fact depending on the precise circumstances.’843 This 
meant that the Colonial Office should have explained to the Law Officers that the intention 
was only to give works to British not foreign firms, but it did not. Depending on incomplete 
information they were not aware of, the Law Officers gave their advice. The core of their 
opinion was that any decision to be taken by the government should be ‘in the interests of 
the mandated territory’.844  They said that if the government decided that it was in the 
interests of the mandate territories, it could accept an offer by a British firm to enter into a 
contract and there would be ‘no reason for requiring [a] tender’ as it could only invite 
bidders ‘which were in fact British’. The government could also issue ‘a worldwide 
invitation to tender’ and accept a British tender though not necessarily the lowest suitable 
bid. However, it could not accept a tender if a general invitation to tender was issued 
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‘subject to a restriction that only tenders from British firms would be considered’ which was 
exactly what the Colonial Office intended to do. 845 The Law Officers continued that adding 
a term to a contract demanding the exclusive use of British material ‘without regard to the 
efficient execution of the proposed work’ would constitute discrimination within the 
meaning of article 18.846 It was also the intention of the British government to purchase 
only British material.  
 
The legal opinion was clear that any intentions in the direction exclusivity for British firms 
would breach article 18 of the British mandate to Palestine. It is safe to suggest that the 
Colonial Office manoeuvred the Law Officers in order to give a favourable opinion. Smith 
explains the Law Officers’ opinion allowed for exclusivity of British firms.847 Since the 
interests of the mandated territory was at the core of their opinion, who then would define 
what the best interests of Palestine were? William Rappard, the Swiss political economist 
and Director of the Mandates Section of the League of Nations (1920-25) and a member of 
PMC (1925-1939), argued that the interests of the ‘native inhabitants are undoubtedly 
paramount in the mandates system’.848 Although the PMC’s proceedings show that there 
were ‘constant references to the paramountcy [sic] of native interests’, this method of 
colonial supervision, Annette Fox argues, was ‘devised and operated by colonial powers and 
others of like mind and constituted no threat to the continued existence of the colonial 
system itself’.849 It was for Britain’s own discretion as trustee for Palestine to define the 
interests of the country. Such also was the government of Palestine, since it was composed 
primarily of British officials entrusted with the direct administration of the territory and was 
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in fact submissive to London.850 Thus, the interests of the mandated territory were defined 
by the British government as it pleased. 
 
It is worth mentioning that the Foreign Office’s comment on the legal opinion was not 
immediate. It was delayed for four months until September 1928. It was not possible to 
know the reason for this delay, however, it could be that the Foreign Office opted to see 
how the matter would develop. With the absence of the Foreign Office’s reaction to the 
legal opinion, the Colonial Office was encouraged to view the legal opinion in favourable 
terms.  
 
Accordingly, the Colonial Secretary decided, on 9 June 1928, to construct the works at Haifa 
harbour by contract provided that article 18 was not infringed. Amery also explained to the 
High Commissioner that since the money to be used was guaranteed by the British 
government, British rather than foreign materials should be purchased and the means to 
this end would be achieved by entrusting the construction of the works to a ‘reputable 
British firm’. Therefore, only select British firms would be invited to tender and in the 
invitation to tender it should be stipulated that whenever Palestinian or British materials 
met the standards of quality, price, convenience, and met the interests of the mandated 
territory, then such material should be used.851 The justification by Colonial Office of 
changing the policy to the contract method was centred on price, as it was cheaper to 
contract since purchasing equipment for construction by the departmental method would 
cost a considerable amount of the money allocated for the harbour.852 Besides, the 
acquisition and assembly of the required equipment and the engagement of the necessary 
staff would delay the construction of the works.   
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The decision to employ the contracting method for the construction of Haifa harbour was 
published early in July 1928 by the Times. The newspaper wrote that the harbour at ‘Haifa 
should be constructed by contract’ and that ‘the particulars drawn up by the consulting 
engineers to enable tenders to be invited were now available.’853 In fact, the particulars 
were not available for all contractors as was originally published. On 9 August 1928, the 
Crown Agents, with authorisation from the Colonial Office, issued preliminary invitations to 
tender to only eleven of the British firms recommended by the consulting engineers. These 
experienced contracting firms included Charles Brad and Son, The Foundation Co. Ltd., 
Norton Griffiths and CO. Ltd., Sir John Jackson Ltd., Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons, Mr. 
Muirhead, Macdonald, Wilson & Co. Ltd., Edmond Nuttall Sons & Co., Pauling and Co., Ltd., 
Walter Scott & Middleton Ltd., Topham, Jones & Railton Ltd., Sir Ernest Moir of Pearson 
and Son, and Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co. Ltd.854 The firms were promised that the definite 
invitations would be issued early in October 1928 and the submission of tenders was 
expected to be at the end of the same month.855  
 
Although it was the norm for the Crown Agents to issue invitation to tender to select 
companies for works in the colonies, the British government’s approach could be viewed 
within the context of its interventionist policy. Glynn and Booth explain that the interwar 
period could be seen as a ‘transition period for economic policy during which there was a 
movement away from the laissez-faire approach towards more detailed government 
interventions.’856 Certainly, the government’s interventionist policy was evidenced by its 
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efforts to secure opportunities for British firms in a context where equal economic 
opportunity policies were of paramount importance. Interventionist policy was significant, 
particularly given that during the interwar period the British economy was characterised by 
slow growth and was viewed as ‘poor investment opportunities, mass unemployment and 
price deflation.’857  
 
 
International concern  
The declaration of adopting the contracting method prompted interest from overseas firms 
and governments.858 The first expression came from the United States Consulate of 
Jerusalem.859 Another enquiry about the status of the project and indicated its interest in 
bidding for work came from the Construction Materials Company of Chicago.860 European 
governments and companies also enquired about the works at Haifa harbour. For example, 
Ver. Bureau Voor Handelsinlichtingen (Office for Trade Information) made enquiries on 
behalf of Dutch companies and Nederlandsche Maatschappij Voor Havenwerken 
(Netherlands Harbour works) made separate enquiries to the Crown Agents about tenders 
from foreign firms.861 Later, a Dutch minister wrote to the Colonial Office about the 
specifications of the works. The Consul-General of Germany also asked the government in 
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Jerusalem about the construction of a port at Haifa.862 These international interests could 
be viewed in light of Alford’s judgement that the ‘margins on which Britain operated in 
international trade and finance by the mid-1920s were highly vulnerable to the forces of 
international competition.’863  
 
The High Commissioner, not knowing how to answer the American and European 
governments who directed their enquiry to the government of Palestine, requested the 
advice of the Colonial Secretary as to the appropriate reply to be given as decisions relating 
to development projects in Palestine were taken in London.864 Additionally, because it was 
by the terms of the mandate that the British government was responsible for Palestine’s 
foreign relations, replies to diplomatic representatives had to concur within the bounds of 
British government policy. Since choosing the method of constructing the harbour would 
influence Britain’s relations with the international community it was imperative that any 
reply should be after consultation with the British government. 
 
Although the Colonial Office was certain that foreign firms and governments would protest 
the exclusive access for British firms, the Colonial Secretary went ahead with his decision. 
The most reasonable explanation for this was that in spite being aware of the changes in 
the international environment, the mind-set of the Colonial Office was still set around 
colonial practices. This was very quickly shattered however by the enquiries and perhaps 
protests of foreign actors. The British government could not ignore these as it did with the 
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Italians who repeatedly approached the Colonial Office regarding the construction of Haifa 
harbour. 
 
Therefore, in order to avoid further difficulties and in order to give a convincing reply to 
these foreign actors, it was important for the Colonial Office to consult with the Treasury 
(who guaranteed the loan) and the Foreign Office. With the consent of the Treasury, the 
Colonial Office suggested that the reply to these enquiries from overseas should be the 
following: since the loan was guaranteed by the British government it was reasonable that 
money be ‘spent through British firms’.865 Hence, it had been decided to invite tenders for 
the construction of the works from select British firms only.866 Indeed, the suggested reply 
was actually sent in September 1928 to the Dutch as well as other governments before the 
Foreign Office urged reconsideration of the exclusion of foreign firms.867 
 
Whether the policy of reply adopted by the Colonial Office was sufficient or effective could 
be discerned before the Italians made new overtures to the British government on the 
issue. This was significant given the earlier expressions of interest in the harbour works 
were made by the Vice Chairman of Sindicato Italiano Costruzioni Appalti Marittimi 
(S.I.C.A.M.). In 1921, he approached the High Commissioner of Palestine with regard to the 
construction of ports at Haifa and Jaffa. He was promised that if and when it was decided to 
proceed with constructing ports ‘his company would have equal facilities with other 
companies in submitting tenders.’868 In fact, the British government pledged to support 
applications from Italians in accordance with the terms of the Tripartite Agreement 
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concluded secretly by Britain, France and Italy during the formation of Sevres Treaty in 
August 1920.869 A similar promise was given in March 1922 Winston Churchill, then the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies (1921-22), to Cav. Zapelloni who was a member of the 
Italian Commercial Delegation in London.870 Now after the contracting method was 
declared, the Italian Consulate of Jerusalem enquired with the government of Palestine ‘if 
foreign firms’ could tender bids.871 Additionally, and separately, the representative of the 
Italian firm Almagia was anxious to tender and told the Crown Agents that since 1919 they 
have been interested in the harbour works.872 So, what prompted the Colonial Office to 
change its earlier policy on allowing foreign firms to compete for the harbour works? 
 
The first reaction of the Colonial Office as expressed by John Shuckburgh, who was head of 
the Middle East Department since its creation in 1921, Italian claims was that he had ‘no 
recollection of saying anything to Mr. Zapelloni’ and that the Colonial Office had ‘given no 
pledge to any foreign governments’.873 However, it was verified later that there were 
definite assurances given to the Italians. Nevertheless, the Colonial Office insisted that 
when the promises were given the case was that there was no guarantee by the British 
government for a loan to Palestine.874  
 
Why were promises made to the Italians by Britain at such an early stage, even before the 
mandate for Palestine was in operation? It was not only the adherence to equal economic 
opportunity principles in article 18 of the mandate that was important. Frank Manuel 
argues that given the country sided with Britain in WWI, ‘Italy had been promised 
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compensation in general terms in the Treaty of London (April 1915), where the principle of 
fair shares among the Allies in the dismemberment of Turkey had been asserted.’875 
Although Italy was among the victors of First World War, it ‘did not receive her proper 
share of the spoils.’876 It seems that the understanding about the compensation was 
overlooked by Britain and France when they forged the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916 
without Italy's knowledge.877 
 
It was vital for Italy to secure agreement with Britain after First World War. This was 
because Britain held Gibraltar and the Suez and controlled the central straits by possession 
of Malta. Britain therefore could ‘if she wished, cut Italy off completely from 
communication with the outside world.’ Britain had Italy at ‘her mercy without firing a 
single shot’.878 Italy tried to press further to secure compensation for entering the War 
through a new treaty discussed in April 1917, at Saint Jean de Maurienne between Britain 
and France. This treaty however was never agreed because Russia, preoccupied with 
revolution, did not ratify it.879 As a result of having its territorial ambitions ‘thwarted at the 
Peace Conference’ of 1919, Italy became a ‘vigilant guardian’ and watched the behaviour of 
the mandatory powers towards the mandated territories.880 This was with the purpose of 
reporting any violations by the mandatories to the League of Nations. It is possible to 
understand the promises of fair competition given by the British government to the Italians, 
in this context, as a way of compensating Italy for her participation in the War on the side 
of the Entente. This was important since Italy was ignored in the final settlement.881 
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However, the Law Officers viewed these assurances as not being ‘a legal matter at all’.882  
Lord Balfour said that the Foreign Office did not much like the idea of the British 
government pledging itself to support applications by Italians. Nevertheless, the 
commitments given by the British government and the government of Palestine were 
placed primarily on the shoulders of the former. This was by virtue of Britain being a trustee 
of Palestine as well as by the terms of the Tripartite Agreement constructed between 
Britain, France and Italy at the time of the Treaty of Sevres on 10 August 1920.883  
 
The Colonial Office’s reply to the enquiries, that the exclusivity of inviting British firms was 
due to the British government’s guarantee of the loan, provoked protest from the Foreign 
Office. These disagreements between the Colonial and Foreign Offices demonstrate the 
difficulties that came with such a reply. In 1928, the Acting Foreign Secretary Lord 
Cushendun, believed that the reply of the Colonial Office underlining exclusivity for British 
firms by virtue of the loan guarantee, was ‘open to grave objection’. He explained that this 
was plain ‘discrimination on national grounds’ which was prohibited by article 18 of the 
Mandate for Palestine.884 Moreover, the assurances given in the past ‘could not be ignored’ 
so that the faith held in the British government by others would not be ‘impugned’.885 With 
this connection, Gallagher argues that during the 1920s ‘the rivalries inside parties and 
between parties were not sharp enough to cause sudden changes in policies towards world 
issues. In foreign policy their difference lay chiefly in rhetoric.’886  
 
Equal economic opportunity was an important subject in world politics and occupied 
considerable space in the deliberations between the Colonial and the Foreign Offices when 
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discussing the construction of Haifa harbour. This was significant as the Colonial Office was 
bound to employ British firms by virtue of the promise given by the Colonial Secretary to 
Parliament. In the view of the Foreign Office, maintaining the image of Britain before the 
international community outweighed the intentions to aid British firms. This meant the 
Foreign Office had constantly to challenge the legal opinions with regards to investment in 
Palestine.  
 
Lord Cushendun argued that the fact the government of Palestine requested direction from 
the Colonial Office, on how to reply to the enquiries concerning Haifa harbour, confirmed 
that ‘the Palestine authorities treat the matter as one which has been decided 
independently of them and of local considerations-an assumption which indeed appears to 
be correct.’887 This meant that although Britain was ‘bound to do her best for the interests 
of that territory’, the Colonial Secretary was not willing to attach importance to whether 
the best interests of Palestine would be served by the exclusion of all foreign firms.888 The 
fact that Palestine consulted the British government on how to reply could be attributed to 
the fact that foreign relations were in the hands of London, hence Palestine had to be 
careful in how to address the enquiries it received. Nevertheless, in the opinion of the 
Foreign Office the justification provided by the Colonial Office was not valid because no 
condition was formally attached to the guarantee, so Palestine, in theory, was ‘free to 
spend the proceeds of the loan where she likes’.889 As Palestine had been submissive to 
London’s will, attempts to do as ‘she likes’ was unlikely to diverge too far from Britain’s 
wishes and interests.  
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The Foreign Office explained that had a condition concerning British firms been attached to 
the Loan Act, then Britain would be acting in the ‘interests of her own nationals’ trade’ and 
not Palestine’s, but this position could then be defended.890 Cushendun insisted that the 
government of Palestine was bound to accept a tender from a non-British firm ‘should it 
prove to be more favourable than any submitted by a British firm’.891 With this in mind, the 
Foreign Office, in September 1928, rejected the Law Officer’s opinion on British firms’ 
access to works contracts on the grounds that excluding foreign firms would be contested 
before the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague under article 26 of the 
Mandate for Palestine.892 Article 26 stipulated that ‘The mandatory agrees that, if any 
dispute whatever should arise between the mandatory and another Member of the League 
of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the 
mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the 
Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by article 14 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations.’893  
 
How did the threat of litigation at The Hague effect the decision of the British government 
with regards to the method of constructing the harbour? In principle, the purpose of the 
International Court laid in its authority to ‘safeguard against destructive interpretations’ of 
the mandate.894 The case refers back to September 1921, when the Colonial Secretary 
Churchill gave his approval to the government of Palestine to grant a Jewish Russian electric 
engineer, Pinchas Rutenberg, ‘the exclusive right to produce energy by means of water 
power’.895 As a result of a great deal of criticism against this concession, the Rutenberg 
electric concession was discussed by the fifth session of the PMC in November 1924. 
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Frederick Lugard, British member of PMC, in reply to a question whether the concession to 
provide electricity was put to tender, answered that ‘it was not probable that there would 
have been any other bids’.896 In fact the electric concession was not put out to public 
tender.897 The PMC’s conclusion was that since monopolies were permitted in Palestine the 
Commission made no comment on the Rutenberg concession.898 Lugard seemed not to 
have been aware of the fact that European, British and Palestinian concessionaires applied 
for electric power projects to the government of Palestine. Although it was not possible to 
verify which British firms applied, a proposal for energy development in Palestine and the 
neighbouring countries was presented in April 1919 by the director of the Norwegian 
company Electrochemical Factories of Fredriksstad (F.E.F.), I. J. Moltke-Hansen. The 
company requested permission to make necessary investigations in Palestine and insisted 
on being given ‘preference for the scheme as the first to propose the project.’899 Another 
proposal was by the Palestinian concessionaires a group of Bethlehem, Taleyman Handal 
and Hanna Dabdoub. In addition to other projects such as agricultural development of the 
Jordan Valley and motor transport linking up towns not connected by railways, Handal and 
Dabdoub applied before August 1920 for a project for providing electric light and power. 
They were ready to put down £500,000, a sufficient amount to start the project, and ‘if 
required find another £2,000,000’ or more.900 Yet, these applications were rejected by the 
Palestine Administration under the pretext that the mandate was not yet ratified. The 
Conservative Member of Parliament, William Joynson-Hicks, criticised the government of 
Palestine in a letter to the editor of The Times, stating that it appeared that there was ‘a 
valid pre-existing concession, the High Commissioner shall get rid of it and annul it for the 
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benefit of the Rutenberg Company.’901 Although Joynson-Hicks was referring to the Greek 
subject Mavrommatis’ plea for providing electric power, it could be understood from this 
episode that the British government, and consequently the government of Palestine did not 
follow consistent policy towards the various applications for development projects. This 
leads to the question why the Rutenberg electricity monopoly did not end with the PMC 
conclusion. That is why the Greek government brought the Mavrommatis case for 
electricity concession to The Hague. In light of Mavrommatis case, it is possible to 
understand the fears of the British government from being sued at The Hague.  
 
Sara Reguer has argued that Rutenberg’s five years delay in pursuing the energy project 
(from September 1921 to March 1926) was due mainly to ‘government bureaucracy’ and 
financial difficulties.902 In fact, Reguer completely failed to state the Mavrommatis 
concession as a significant element in the delay of the energy project in Palestine. The 
British government was accused of breaching articles of the Palestine mandate by not 
honouring the concessions for the electricity project given by the Ottoman Empire in 1914 
to Mavrommatis.  
 
The Colonial Office explained that Mavrommatis, a Greek subject, induced the Greek 
Government, to sue the British Government at The Hague for an ‘alleged breach of 
contract’.903 Hence, on 13 May 1924, the Greek Government, under articles of the Rule of 
Court as well as by articles 11 and 26 of the Palestine mandate, filed with the Permanent 
Court of International Justice a suit. The case, in brief, was concerned with the alleged 
refusal on the part of the government of Palestine, and consequently also on the part of the 
British government, since the year 1921 to recognise to their full extent the rights acquired 
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by Mavrommatis, under contracts and agreements concluded by him with the Ottoman 
authorities. The Greek government asked for a judgment in respect of public works, 
including the construction and working of an electric tramway system, the supply of 
electrics, power and of drinking water.904  
 
In its first session on 30 August 1924, the Court held that ‘the complaint of the Greek 
Government on behalf of Mavrommatis fell within the scope of article 11’ of the Palestine 
Mandate. This article conferred upon the mandatory government, ‘subject to any 
international obligations accepted by the mandatory’ the responsibility to undertake 
measures with respect to natural resources and public utilities.905 Therefore, the complaint 
could ‘be brought before the Court under article 26’ of the Palestine mandate.906 In fact, 
the Jerusalem concessions given to Mavrommatis had been considered by the Court on 25 
March 1925 when the judgment ‘on the merits established the validity of the concessions 
and the right of the concessionaire to have them put into conformity with the new 
economic conditions prevailing in Palestine.’907 As Shuckburgh explained, the final 
judgement by The Hague Court (by a majority) in the Mavrommatis case was that it 
‘accepted our view that it had no jurisdiction’.908 Accordingly, Mavrommatis lost his case 
against the British government.  
 
Did the changes in international atmosphere have any influence on the British policy in 
making a shift from imperialism when considering the method of constructing the Haifa 
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harbour? In fact, the Mavrommatis case left contradictory lessons for the Foreign and the 
Colonial Offices. On the one hand, the Foreign Office pressed strongly that ‘foreign firms 
should be allowed to tender’ and that Britain had to abide by its international 
obligations.909 It was imperative for the Foreign Office that any action which might be taken 
‘should be such as can be justified before the Court, under article 26 of the Mandate for 
Palestine.’910 Moreover, the mere fact that the works would be paid by the loan guaranteed 
by the British government did not constitute a sufficient ground for disregarding the 
assurances given to foreign firms.911 It was important for the Foreign Office to preserve the 
image of Britain before the international community and avoid litigation at The Hague 
court. 
 
On the other hand, the Colonial Office insisted that the experience of the Mavrommatis 
case had taught them ‘how much trouble a foreign syndicate can give if once allowed to 
acquire interests in a mandated territory.’912 Therefore, Shuckburgh declared that the 
Colonial Office would ‘resist a foreign contract at all costs’ and foreign firms should be 
barred from being invited to tender.913 This was due firstly to doubts that future similar 
cases in the future to that of Mavrommatis, if presented to the International Court, would 
be voted down by a ‘Latin majority’. Secondly, if foreigners were invited to tender the 
principle of ‘sole recourse of British enterprise’ would be surrendered and it would be 
impossible to reject a foreign firm’s tender if the terms were more favourable than a British 
offer.914 This shows that the Colonial Office was still holding on to its colonial approach 
towards Palestine with Britain as the sole controller of the territory. Moreover, 
Shuckburgh’s fears were that if foreigners were allowed to tender and a contract was 
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placed with a foreign firm, then the harbour would never be built at all or would be 
‘indefinitely delayed’.915 That is because, in his view, with the access to The Hague, it would 
be possible that ‘quarrels over details with the Palestine Government’ would occur. Thus, 
the British government would find itself obliged to ‘buy them out at a stiff figure’ in order 
to avoid further trouble and annoyance.916 Therefore the Colonial Office was not able to 
accept any non-British firm for development works in a territory under Britain’s control. 
 
The Colonial Office did not want a foreign firm, and consequently any foreign government, 
to have a stake in Palestine. Once a firm started working then it is possible for the 
government behind it to develop a position of control in Palestine under the guise of a 
works contracts. Therefore, the Colonial Office’s concern was primarily to keep the foreign 
competitors away, a policy that prevailed before First World War and ostensibly was 
sustained after it. Shuckburgh went as far to say that he would ‘prefer to abandon the Haifa 
harbour project altogether rather than to place the contract with a foreign firm.’917 It is 
clear that what mattered most for both departments was Britain and British interests and 
not those of Palestine. For the Foreign Office it was Britain’s image and prestige, and for the 
Colonial Office Britain’s economy. Why did Amery think he could get this ‘British only’ policy 
through?  
 
Wright argued that a distinction had been drawn between gaining direct profits by the 
mandatory government which is prohibited by the Covenant of the League of Nations, and 
bringing advantage to its citizens, through private entrepreneur, for example.918 It is likely 
that Amery depended on such an interpretation of the mandate that he contemplated 
giving the harbour works to a British firm. The problem, however, was that Amery wanted 
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to secure exclusivity to British firms, which was prohibited by the open door policy, and the 
project, in the whole, was a government enterprise. It seems that in Amery’s view giving 
the works to a British firm was not expected to bring direct benefit to the British 
government per se but to allow private business to gain profit. In spite of this explanation, 
the Foreign Office’s concern was to adhere to the open door policy adopted by the League 
of Nations. However, in view of the Mavrommatis case it is possible to claim that the British 
government’s policy of keeping rivals away held merits, although it did not justify it 
circumventing it commitments. It is true that the prevailing conditions including the rise of 
international competition had occurred in the late 1920s ‘as a result of the sustained 
recovery in European countries’ but did not necessarily mean that the British government 
had the right to act in the colonial tradition in Palestine.919 Although Amery’s decision of 
exclusivity of British firms was based on the legal opinion, it was difficult to pursue without 
regarding the concerns brought up by the Foreign Office. Britain’s foreign relations were of 
paramount concern for the British government at that time. The Colonial Office explained 
that the Cabinet most likely would not overrule Cushendun’s opinion ‘on a matter affecting 
our relations with Foreign Powers.’920 This means that keeping good relations with the 
international community was a major aspect governing Britain’s policy after the War as 
reflected in the discussions about the Haifa harbour. 
 
As a result, the Colonial Office was faced with three options in Shuckburgh’s opinion. The 
first one was to accept the Foreign Office’s view of admitting foreign tenders and try to 
manoeuvre, through the application of the labour conditions, accepting a British tender. 
The second option of reverting to the departmental method was opposed by expert 
advisers on practical grounds. The final option was to drop the project altogether. This 
however was not possible owing to the part of the loan that was specified for the harbour 
                                                          
919
 D. Aldcroft, The British Economy (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., 1986), p. 12. 
920
 TNA/CO733/159/17, Shuckburgh CO to Grindle FO, 18.10.1928. 
210 
 
development and, more importantly, that it might ‘wreck the project of a trans-desert 
pipeline and railway, with terminus at Haifa’ which the British government attached great 
strategic importance to.921 In light of Shuckburgh’s view Hobson’s argument that 
‘interference with the government of a lower race must be directed primarily to secure the 
safety and progress of the civilization of the world, and not the special interest of the 
interfering nation’ was seen in different perspective.922 It was neither in ‘the best interest of 
Palestine’ nor in the interest of the ‘civilization of the world’ that mattered, but Britain’s 
economic interests and its Imperial goals. Nevertheless, the Colonial Office decided to defer 
the issuing of definite invitations to tender to British firms.923 It is possible to argue that 
although the power sat in the hands of the Colonial Office in defining policies towards 
Palestine, considerations by other departments in Whitehall had their impact on those 
policies. 
 
In light of the discrepancy in the approach of policy in Whitehall, the Foreign Office 
requested in October 1928, a third reference to the Law Officers regarding the contracting 
method.924 The matter that needed clarification was the same old question which was 
whether limiting the ‘invitations to tender to selected British firms is consistent with article 
18 of the Palestine Mandate.’925 It was this simple question that the Colonial Office should 
have asked the Law Officers in May 1928. The opinion of the Law Officers that came in 
November 1928 stipulated that ‘the limitation of invitations to tender to selected British 
firms is not consistent with article 18 of the Palestine Mandate.’926 The Attorney General, 
Thomas Inskip, confirmed this opinion.927 What changed the opinion of the Law Officers 
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between May and November 1928 was that ‘facts of the case now [were] fully stated.’928 
They clearly pointed to an objective of limitation as being ‘to discriminate in favour of 
British contractors and not to further the interests of the Mandated Territory.’929 This 
means that Britain was not able to favour British firms and that the ‘best interests’ of 
Palestine needed to be met through following the international regulations.  
 
 
The resolution of the dilemma 
The Colonial Office was still stubbornly holding to its view. Shuckburgh stated that ‘if only 
local Palestinian interests were at stake, I would say, as I have said before, that I would 
prefer to drop the whole project and let Palestine do without a harbour at Haifa.’930 This 
was not possible because as Shuckburgh himself explained it might cause a ‘set-back to the 
economic development of Palestine’ and would prevent a new terminus being built linking 
Iraqi pipeline to Haifa.931 Negotiations with Iraq Petroleum Company were undertaken on 
the basis that harbour facilities at Haifa would be provided inclusive of an oil outlet. Under 
the circumstances, and in view of the unfavourable opinion of Law Officers, there was a 
high risk that if a public tender were put out a foreign tender would be accepted. The 
assurances given to foreign governments had to be met which would present difficulties 
and serious obstacles to giving the works to British firms.932 In order to avoid facing such 
risks, the Colonial Secretary retreated from the contracting method and declared on 
December 20th 1928 that there was ‘no alternative but to fall back upon departmental 
construction’.933 That was the least disadvantageous course to be undertaken by the 
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government of Palestine (now under the service of the High Commissioner John Chancellor 
December 1928-November 1931).934 The Colonial Office informed the Crown Agents that 
tendering under a single contract had to be abandoned. The work for the harbour 
construction must be carried out departmentally and contracts should be let out locally for 
the supply of material or the execution of sections of the work as circumstances permit.935 
 
This investigation into the contracting method culminated in providing evidence to support 
the assumption of this thesis that the harbour at Haifa was an Imperial enterprise. 
Shuckburgh’s views about the harbour at Haifa provide clear evidence that the whole 
purpose of building the harbour was for the benefit of Britain and the British economy. 
Choosing the method of carrying out the works of the harbour very much depended on 
which one would bring the most benefit to Britain economically and strategically. What 
seemed to be minor case related to the method of construction, in fact, embedded major 
issues related to international relations that the British government was not able to avoid. 
Britain acting in its own interests, even over the mandate, in the new post-1919 League of 
Nations atmosphere, was not surprising. Nations, big or small or somewhere in between, 
always seek to work in their own interests, even if the conditions are against them. Look at 
how the British sought to do it, within the bounds of the League and the mandate’? 
 
The decision to return to the departmental method from the contracting method now had 
to be explained for those governments and firms that paid an interest in the harbour 
construction at Haifa. Justifications of the adopted policies to use a form of departmental 
method were, in fact, conveyed to the Ambassador of the United States in London as the 
Foreign Office had earlier received, in January 1929, ‘a stiff note’ from the American 
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Embassy.936 The Americans accused the British government of violating the open door 
policy and equality of commercial opportunity. The arrangements to exclude non-British 
firms from making a tender were viewed as ‘discriminatory and in violation of the rights of 
the American Government’ under the American-British-Palestine Mandate Convention.937 
This Convention was, in fact, concluded on December 3rd 1924 in accordance to article 22 of 
the League of Nations’ Covenant as a separate agreement between the British government 
and the government of the United States. Article two of the Convention stipulated that ‘The 
United States and its nationals shall have and enjoy all the rights and benefits secured 
under the terms of the mandate to members of the League of Nations and their 
nationals.’938 
 
The Foreign Office, with the concurrence of the Colonial Office, asserted to the Americans 
that the British government had no intention to violate any of its obligations. Britain was 
committed to the terms of the Palestine mandate, the agreements with foreign 
governments, or any assurances given in the past. Although the government of Palestine 
had the intention to invite select British firms to tender for the harbour works, invitations 
were never issued.939 Indeed, the Crown Agents apologized to the contractors, to whom a 
preliminary invitation to tender was sent, ‘owing to unforeseen circumstances.’940  
 
Additionally, the Foreign Office demonstrated that the British government decided to 
abandon the contracting method owing to that ‘factors had arisen which rendered it 
impracticable to proceed’ further with the contracting method.941 These factors were 
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related firstly to acquiring stone for the proposed breakwater. It would be difficult to 
restrict contractors from using particular stone since some of the suitable quarries held 
important archaeological remains which were prohibited to be used under the Palestine 
Antiquities Ordinance. Secondly, the question of the employment of local labour and the 
application of fair labour conditions also played a role. It would not be practical to include 
special provisions related to wages in any contract which could be made with a firm 
contracting for the whole work.942 Absorption of local employment was important due to a 
‘severe earthquake’ had hit areas in Palestine in 1927 and were followed by ‘severe 
droughts’ that contributed to converting some agrarian workers to labourers.943 The 
Foreign Office also explained that the intention of the government was now that instead of 
constructing the harbour under a single contract the work will be carried out by ‘small 
contracts being let out locally for the supply of material, or for the execution of sections of 
the work, as circumstances permit’.944 
 
From the explanation given to the Americans, it becomes obvious that the British 
government manipulated the international community in order to have things its way. The 
investigation in the British government’s documents shows that the discussions and 
decisions with regards to carrying out the harbour works were centralised in London and 
the final say completely rested in the hands of the Colonial Office and not in the 
government of Palestine. Moreover, the technical factors that rendered the contracting 
method not to be practical (i.e. the stone and the working wage were not the essential 
reasons for abandoning the contracting method) were refuted. The real reason was that 
Britain did not want to give the harbour works for a foreign firm or a foreign government 
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for fear of facing difficulties with them. However, for the government it was paramount not 
to endanger Britain’s relationship with the international community hence practical and 
technical justifications would be convincing and would make it possible to avoid any 
conflicts.  
 
The Colonial Office thought that the reply given to the Americans was sufficient therefore 
did not expect further difficulties to be raised on diplomatic grounds.945 Retreating to the 
departmental method was a way out of the trap and a preferable alternative ‘to the risk of 
being involved with a foreign firm of contractors’.946 Besides, since the departmental 
method did not require tendering, it could not be accused of being ‘inconsistent with the 
obligations’ under articles of the mandate or with the assurances given for foreign firms.947 
 
The Manchester Guardian wrote that the Palestine government decided to undertake the 
construction of the Haifa harbour departmentally, without foreign or other contracts. This 
conclusion was reached as a result of ‘objections filed by several European Governments 
and the Government of the United States’ against the exclusivity of British firms. The 
newspaper stated that  ‘several governments, including, it is understood, the Dutch, 
German, and Italian, intimated that they would be obliged to take action if the British 
persisted in favour their own contractors.’948 Therefore, it is possible to understand the 
British government’s retraction of departmental method was done to avoid giving the 
international community the opportunity to compete in Palestine and consequently to 
avoid the occurrence of any conflicts. The decision was taken in London to fit Britain’s 
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international and national interests. After six months (June – December 1928) of discussing 
the risks of adopting the contracting method, Britain decided to choose a safer path. 
 
The Foreign Office was very careful not to incite any foreign government particularly the 
United States by purchasing the whole equipment and material in Britain. Therefore, the 
Foreign Office’s recommendation was that any employment of British firms and purchases 
of British manufacturers, under the departmental method, should be seen in ‘piecemeal by 
petty contracts’.949 Moreover, the government of Palestine should not ‘enter publicly into 
some contract with an English firm for the construction of the whole harbour in a single 
process.’ Any work should be ‘undertaken in small sections without any widely advertised 
public contract.’950 This meant that the Foreign Office manipulated the international 
community while maintaining Britain’s good image in the face of the League’s regulations. 
According to the Foreign Office’s recommendation, the Colonial Office could still purchase 
British material but in small amounts and from different manufacturers and providers.  The 
Foreign Office also recommended that purchasing should be performed without any 
announcements in order not to prompt actions by the United States and/or European 
countries. Thus, the Imperial principal of economic benefits, by obtaining equipment and 
material from Britain, was maintained though the method changed that is without using 
conventional methods in announcing for tendering for purchases. 
 
Indeed, the Colonial Office adopted the Foreign Office’s recommendation and incorporated 
it in its policies throughout the harbour construction. Very modest announcements related 
to the purchase of British material in Haifa harbour works could be traced in British 
newspapers. Also, the Colonial Office refrained from employing British contracting firms. 
The Colonial Office also, for example, rejected a request by the High Commissioner to 
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employ certain staff and equipment from S. Pearson and Son in order to not provoke 
‘suspicion by foreign Governments’.951  
 
The British government’s behaviour can therefore be understood in light of Pedersen’s 
argument that the mandates system should be seen as an arena for ‘political learning’. This 
political learning could be seen in the British government’s arguments about the method to 
be adopted for the harbour construction in such a manner that would also preserve 
Britain’s good relationship with the international community.952 That is the mandate system 
provided grounds for the British government to perceive the acquired territories as not 
being a possession and to find out appropriate methods to treat those territories in a 
manner different from what was usually used in the colonies. This means that in order to be 
able to decide on a suitable method to use in the harbour the British government went 
through a rehearsal on how to treat the mandated territory by going back and forth on the 
method to be used. This was due to the fact that, unlike the colonies, there were limits for 
using these territories imposed by the jurisdictions and regulations set by the League of 
Nations. Therefore, it is possible to view this reluctance of using a traditional method that 
was used in the colonies for Haifa as a change in the Imperialist mind-set of the British 
government. This was important for Britain, particularly as expressed by the Foreign Office, 
to adapt to the new world order. It is possible to conclude that the challenges about the 
method to be used for the harbour constructions provoked a process of transformation in 
Britain’s colonial approach and consequently thinking. 
 
That is Britain as mandatory by arguing about the method to adopt for the constructing the 
harbour was in fact in the process of learning how to treat a mandated territory in such a 
manner that would also preserve Britain’s good relationship with the international 
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community.953 Arguments in Whitehall departments and correspondence with foreign 
governments could be viewed as unintentional rehearsal towards adapting to the new 
world order. It is possible to say that this contributed to a change in Britain’s political 
thought on how to approach mandated territory in a manner different than the colonies as 
reflected in the change of how to approach the construction of the harbour. Palpable 
contest to Britain’s power after First World War was seen in the rising nationalist resistance 
of India, Ireland, and Egypt. But the debate over Haifa harbour elicited a challenge to the 
effect of transformation in Britain’s colonial approach and consequently thinking. This 
transformation was more obvious in the Foreign Office particularly due to its direct 
exposure and connection with the international community and to a lesser extent in the 
Colonial Office for being indulged in colonial behaviour. 
 
The impact of the debate was the emerging doubt that surrounded Britain’s formal Imperial 
approach and those moves toward considering changes to it. This is somewhat is reflected 
in John Darwin’s argument that ‘British leaders failed to recognize that times had changed, 
that British power was no longer what it was, that Britain’s enemies were more 
irreconcilable and more ruthless, that the old foundations of world power had simply 
rotted away.’954 It is possible to understand the British government’s adjustment to changes 
in light of Hobsbawm’s statement ‘If progress was so powerful, so universal and so 
desirable, how was this reluctance to welcome it or even to participate in it to be 
explained?’955 Was it merely the dead weight of the past that the British government was 
clinching to? In considering practical alternatives toward the harbour’s construction that 
would conform to international changes, the British government in fact went through 
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preparation in order to be able to accept changes in its approach. The discussions of new 
policies to construct the harbour take us through this process. 
 
In order to put the departmental method into operation, the Colonial Office decided in 
March 1929 to appoint, upon the recommendation of the consulting engineers, George C. 
Thompson as Resident Engineer with an initial annual salary of £2000. Thompson was 
selected due to his considerable experience in ‘controlling works in the capacity of 
Contractor’s Agent’. He was capable of controlling expenditure and labour, the factors 
which were ‘so essential to the success of work undertaken without the help of 
Contractors’.956 Additionally, upon the approval of the Colonial Secretary, acting on behalf 
of the government of Palestine, the Crown Agents entered into agreements with assistant 
engineers from RPT and with staff selected also by the consulting engineers from Britain. 
These employees were ‘for all purposes of discipline and action the servants of the 
Palestine Government’ which paid their salaries. At the same time, the staff were 
responsible to the consulting engineers for the technical work and execution.957 That was 
possible since the opposition by the international community was principally on the 
method of execution and not on the employment of British consulting engineers. 
 
Although the Colonial Office attempted to depart from Imperial-like actions not acceptable 
to the international community, it was not possible to produce something completely new 
to use in mandated Palestine. The form of the departmental method that the Colonial 
Secretary returned to was in fact discussed in a meeting in April 1929 in Palestine. The 
meeting was called for by the High Commissioner and attended by F. Palmer of RPT, who 
was visiting Palestine, George C. Thompson the Resident Engineer, the Acting Chief 
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Secretary of the government of Palestine, the Treasurer, and the Director of Palestine 
Public Works. In this meeting, it was decided to establish Haifa Harbour Works Department 
as part of the government of Palestine.958 (See appendix IV, Haifa Harbour Works 
Department organisational design) This was an agency through which the consulting 
engineers could undertake the works.959 It was essentially similar to that proposed earlier in 
1927 by the Crown Agents.960 Reaching this solution as a method for construction was not 
because Britain wanted to challenge or avoid complying with the international regulations, 
but rather because Britain really lacked the appropriate tools to deal with mandated areas. 
Only through experience Britain was able to define which approach to follow, particularly as 
there was no previous sample in recent history where trusteeship, as identified by the 
mandate system, was used. Work was not given to the Public Works Department of 
Palestine because the department lacked previous experience in work of such size.961 It is 
worth noting that the Haifa Harbour Board was also established in December 1929. The 
Board, the Chairman of which was the Northern District Commissioner, was formed to deal 
with any suggestion or criticism of the harbour works as planned.962 
 
The consulting engineers managed the construction of the harbour by using the 
departmental method in a usual manner. They were entirely responsible for the design, 
conduct and satisfactory completion of the work entrusted to them.963 Accordingly, they 
were responsible for the provision of all necessary equipment, and for the efficient and 
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economical execution of the works involved.964 Orders for the purchase of machinery and 
equipment were prepared by the Resident Engineer and sent to the Consulting Engineers in 
London who, having revised them, would send them to the Crown Agents for execution.965 
The Crown Agents who was part of their functions to purchase stores including ‘railway and 
public works material, machinery and engineering stores’, undertook the responsibility for 
the harbour equipment and material.966 That was possible since, as Barbara Smith argued, 
in the case of Palestine the Colonial Office was ‘adamant that the Palestine Administration 
deal exclusively through the Crown Agents.’967 To benefit British trade, the Crown Agents 
would see that ‘all contracts will be placed in Great Britain’.968  
 
By following the non-publicity policy recommended by the Foreign Office, the British 
government was able to benefit its economy by pursuing an approach which was politically 
acceptable and politically practical. British interests were favoured and at the same time 
foreign governments were not able to accuse Britain with violating neither the League’s 
Covenant nor the terms of the Palestine mandate. Gallagher was correct in his assumption 
that there had been continuities ‘in aim, not in performance’.969 The mandate of Palestine, 
Victor Kattan argued, was a compromise between ‘progress towards a decolonization 
process and the manifestation of Imperial rule over peoples not yet able to govern 
themselves.’970  
 
The eventual adoption of ‘departmental construction’, a method used in the colonies,  
provides evidence that the Haifa harbour represented no sudden change in policy, but 
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rather a step in thinking towards a readjustment of approach. The decision of returning to 
the departmental method was taken on the grounds that ‘the acquisition and assembly of 
equipment required and the engagement of the necessary staff would delay the 
construction of the works’ and it would be cheaper by contract since the equipment would 
cost a considerable amount of the money allocated for the harbour.971 Favouring the British 
firms was a major factor in the government’s decision about the method to be adopted for 




The objective of this chapter was to discuss the policies adopted by the British government 
towards the construction of the Haifa harbour. It was essential to investigate the factors 
that influenced the government’s decisions particularly those that rendered political 
implications. While Whitehall discussed the method to be adopted for the works of the 
harbour, essential elements unfolded pertaining to the concerns and priorities of the 
government. The influence of the international community represented in the League of 
Nations’ regulations regarding economic equality revealed a diminishing power of Britain in 
making independent decisions. The British government bended its approach so that it 
would fit the changing global environment. In the final analysis, Britain was able to 
introduce changes in the form of its approach to Palestine in a manner that did not offend 
foreign governments though they were not happy. It was always the interests of Britain 
what matters the most and not the country in its trust as the mandate system demanded. 
Therefore, the best interests of Palestine were not appraised in connection with Palestine’s 
economic conditions but rather in relation to Britain’s interests. 






The debate that took place between the Colonial and the Foreign Offices on the contracting 
method showed that Britain’s commitment to the international community influenced the 
forming of its policies towards the construction of the harbour. The privilege that the 
international community enjoyed, represented in the ability to take offenders to The 
Hague, made the situation all the graver. Assurances given to Italy, for example, to compete 
for works in Palestine constituted a key driver for the British government to divert from its 
usual approach of giving works to a British firm. Fear of being taken to court, and of 
damaging the British government’s ‘reputation’, forced the government to reconsider its 
colonial practices related to the building of the harbour. What accompanied the decision to 
retreat from the contracting method was that the government had to keep a very low 
profile in carrying out the works. In doing so the benefits from building Haifa harbour to the 
British economy were not detected by foreign political and economic agents. We learn 
about these benefits from the internal documents of the government and indirectly from 
the reports of the consulting engineers. 
 
Eventually, British staff, equipment and material were employed for the building of the 
harbour with minimal criticism because the British government was able to adjust its 
methods in a manner that did not provoke the international community to an extent to 
which foreign countries could file complaints against Britain. In fact, the League hesitated 
to criticise the mandatories over discrimination of a third-state interests ‘unless buttressed 
by clear provision of law’.972 The question whether there was genuine change in the British 
government’s approach different than the approach to the colonies, could be answered in 
the negative. In reality there was an alteration in form only and not in substance. The 
departmental method that was adopted in the end, although it was recommended neither 
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by the Crown Agents nor by the consulting engineers, was actually a method that was used 
earlier in some of the colonies under specific circumstances. Nevertheless, it could be 
argued that the discussions in Whitehall might have a long-term effect on the thinking of 
the British government leading to decolonization. In the final analysis it could be said that 
the best interests of Britain were served by promoting the domestic economy through the 
mechanism available to purchase British manufactures and by skilfully not infringing 
international commitments.  
 
This investigation in the contracting method culminated in providing evidence to the 
assumption of this thesis that the harbour at Haifa was an imperial enterprise. 
Shuckburgh’s views about the harbour at Haifa provides clear evidence that the whole 
purpose of building the harbour was for the benefit of Britain and the British economy. 
Choosing the method of carrying out the harbour works very much depended on which 
method would bring the most benefit to Britain economically and strategically and would 
not trigger protest by the international community. What seemed to be minor case related 
to the method of construction, in fact, brought with it major issues relating to international 









At the same time that the British government was debating the method for constructing 
Haifa harbour, the existence of oil in commercially viable quantities in Iraq was confirmed. 
This meant that oil needed to be exported to foreign buyers. In principle, the multi-national 
shareholding Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC), which had concessionary rights over 
oilfields in Iraq, and the Iraqi government wanted to transport the oil from Mosul in Iraq to 
the Mediterranean coast. The problem was that there was a difference of opinion 
particularly between Britain and France, as the major shareholders of the TPC, about the 
route that the pipeline should follow and the terminus location. The British government felt 
it was essential for security reasons that oil should be piped through the British-sponsored 
territory of Transjordan and Palestine, to a British-controlled oil terminus at Haifa Harbour. 
The British Admiralty and the Colonial Office insisted on the principle of an ‘all British’ route 
and outlet for the pipeline. This was because without the assurance of unhindered 
transport, possessing oil wells was useless to Britain, particularly in war time, since Britain 
depended mainly upon foreign sources of supply.973 It was also in the interest of the 
government of Iraq that the pipeline should follow the Haifa route given its dislike of a 
hypothetical French controlled alternative. Conversely the French government believed 
that a terminus at Tripoli and a pipeline running through Syrian territory was vital to their 
interests and expected the company to decide in its favour since it was the closest and the 
cheapest route. 
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The challenge facing Britain was that it was saddled by an agreement with France that 
stated a pipeline must pass through Syria to the seaboard and under the French control. 
The best route from a technical, economic and standpoint was pipeline along the shortest 
and cheapest route to the Mediterranean, thus pointing to a northern route leading to a 
Syrian coast. The route of the pipeline therefore created difficulties and conflicts and it 
significantly impacted on British decision-making. 
 
The route of the pipeline was a challenge because the TPC was not able to act solely as a 
private shareholding company. It was made up of companies controlled by their national 
governments that blended together different commercial and political interests. The 
difficulties with the pipeline route and terminus went to the very heart of the oil policies 
not only of Britain but also France, the United States and the Iraqi government. The 
purpose of this chapter is to explore the difficulties that Britain faced in building the 
pipeline terminus that would enable it to achieve those strategic benefits from the 
harbour’s construction at Haifa. This necessarily requires the investigation of a significant 
but little-examined dispute between Britain and France over the route of the oil pipeline. 
My research shows that the conflict over the terminus contributed greatly to the delay in 
the production of oil in Iraq which caused delays in sanctioning the building of oil facilities 
in Haifa harbour since their construction was pending settling the difficulty of the pipeline 
route. 
 
During First World War, Britain recognised the importance of controlling oil resources to 
secure a reliable supply of fuel for its navy. In fact, an adequate oil supply became a central 
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consideration in ‘the military and diplomatic strategy’.974 Britain was dependent for over 
two-thirds of its oil supplies on foreign providers and wanted to reduce this reliance.975 The 
dispute between Britain and France on the direction of the pipeline route complicated the 
matter for Britain. Eventually an agreement was reached by the TPC shareholders for the 
adoption of the solution of a dual pipeline to go along the borders and then split to Syria 
and to Palestine. This secured at least one of the routes to run southward to Haifa. The oil 
outlet would make more oil available under British control and give the Navy access to fuel.  
 
The theme that dominates this chapter is the strategic importance of the pipeline and 
terminus at Haifa for the defence of the British Empire. While the route of the oil pipeline 
from Iraq had to be decided upon by the TPC on purely commercial terms, Britain found 
itself obliged to intervene to influence the decision and direct it in her favour. This hindered 
the TPC from making a decision on the route of the pipeline that already had a dark shadow 
of Haifa harbour’s construction works hanging over it.  
 
To understand the extent to which the pipeline and the terminus influenced the building of 
the harbour several factors must be investigated. The first of these is how was Britain’s 
interventionist oil production policy in the Middle East connected to the Haifa harbour 
construction? To answer this we must ask why Britain had to employ an interventionist 
policy in regards to oil production in the Middle East. Further questions include why it was 
difficult for Britain despite being a major shareholder in TPC and the mandatory power for 
Iraq, to persuade the company to back the route to Haifa? What role did the shareholders 
of the multinational Turkish Petroleum Company play? How was Britain able to balance the 
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various interests? And, finally how did this conundrum over the route of the pipeline effect 
the harbour construction?  
 
The argument in this chapter is that although from commercial and practical points of view 
the route of an oil pipeline from Kirkuk oilfields to the Mediterranean had to go through 
Syria, the British government, for economic, strategic and political reasons, had to employ 
its interventionist policies in order to secure an ‘all-British’ route of the pipeline and 
terminus. The chapter also argues that the construction of oil facilities at Haifa harbour 
cannot be considered in isolation. Britain’s insistence on the route of the pipeline, 
traversing and ending in the British-controlled territory, was in fact at the heart of its oil 
policies in the Middle East. What seemed to be a technical matter to be decided by the oil 
company turned out to have its roots in political rivalries, particularly between Britain and 
the French. The British government’s determination to get its way had prevailed 
particularly owing to the support of the government of Iraq.   
 
This chapter discusses the importance of an oil terminus at Haifa for the British government 
within the context of Britain’s oil broader interests after World War I. For this reason, the 
British government’s discussions about the route of the pipeline and the approach adopted 
to persuade the company of Britain’s view, are examined. Since Britain ambitions faced 
with obstacles, the chapter demonstrates the limitations imposed by previous agreements 
and by the mandate system. This includes the examination of the policies and method 
adopted by the British government that led the company to align its policies and decisions 
to the satisfaction of all concerned. This consequently allowed Britain to sanctioning the 




The literature available on Britain’s interest in Middle Eastern oil hardly recognises the 
existence of any conflict concerning the route of the pipeline or the importance of its 
terminal at Haifa. Colin Davies in his PhD thesis discusses the British oil policy in the Middle 
East between 1919 and 1932 particularly pertaining to controlling oil sources in the region. 
He mainly examines the British policy from a British point of view depending on British 
references. With regards to the controversy between Britain and France about the route of 
the oil pipeline, Davies argues that both countries ‘fought doggedly’ to ensure that the 
pipeline should run through territory under their own control.976 Edward Fitzgerald also 
highlights the route of the pipeline as a vital issue to the oil policies during that period. He 
argues that the contested route of the pipeline was a source of conflict and examines it 
depending mostly on French sources. He also suggests that the American partner in the TPC 
played a significant role in resolving the conflict.977 This chapter fills the gap in existing 
literature and provides a more cohesive view on challenges attached to the discussions 
about the route of the pipeline.  
 
It was not possible to understand the importance of the route of the pipeline except within 
the context of Britain’s oil policy in the Middle East. Brian McBeth’s discussion of Britain’s 
dependency on foreign sources for oil mainly the Americans requested the examination of 
the importance to have ownership of oil fields in the Middle East for Britain.978 This was 
particularly important in light of the central role oil played in Britain’s defence policy. Alfred 
Bonne argues that in light of Britain’s position in Egypt, the Haifa oil terminus would assure 
oil supply to the British fleet.979  
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This chapter is also concerned with the interventionist policy of the British government 
after WWI. G. Gareth Jones argues that the government intervened in commercial affairs as 
a response to requests from private interests.980 The investigation in this chapter shows 
that this policy continued, at least throughout the period from the start of Britain’s interest 
in Middle Eastern oil until the pipeline issue was solved. This was essential because the 
pipeline was not a purely commercial matter but one entwined with political concerns. The 
French too had similar concerns about oil. It was imperative for the French government, as 
Fitzgerald explains, to be a partner of TPC since it ‘possessed no other sources of oil’.981 
Consequently the British and the French, as Michael Hogan argues, agreed to coordinate 
their oil policies in the Middle East.982 
 
 
The British government’s investment in oil 
In order to understand how the issue of the oil terminal and pipeline route coming from 
Mosul influenced the construction of Haifa harbour, it is necessary to examine Britain’s oil 
interests after World War I. Britain’s strategic, political and economic considerations were 
interlinked the British were key shareholders in the TPC’ which rendered it difficult for the 
company to take its decision on a purely commercial basis. The British government wanted 
the route of the pipeline to pass through territories under its control and terminate in 
Haifa, despite though a northern alternative route through French controlled Syria would 
be shorter and cheaper. Hence, the oil policies of governments propping up the 
shareholders of the TPC influenced the company’s decision.  
 
                                                          
980
 G. G. Jones, ‘The British Government and the Oil Companies 1912-1924: The Search for an Oil 
Policy’, The Historical Journal, 20/3, (September 1977), pp. 647-672. 
981
 Fitzgerald, ‘Business Diplomacy’, p. 218. 
982
 M. Hogan, ‘Informal Entente: Public Policy and Private Management in Anglo-American Petroleum 
Affairs, 1918-1924’, The Business History Review, 48/2, (Summer 1974), pp. 187-205, p. 188. 
231 
 
Britain’s early interest in Middle East oil dates back to 1913 when the British government 
first became preoccupied with getting control of oil resources, particularly for its Navy. The 
First Lord of the British Admiralty, Winston Churchill (1911-1915), declared in Parliament 
that the only way for Britain to safeguard its oil supplies was by becoming ‘the owners, or 
at any rate, the controllers at the source of at least a proportion of the supply of natural oil 
which we require’. This was a clear statement of intent for the British government to 
acquire control of a British oil company.983 Indeed, the British Empire found itself 
dependent on ‘foreign, mainly American, oil sources’.984 In fact, before the War, the 
Admiralty saw its major oil contracts fall to American and Romanian contractors.985 
 
In 1914, Churchill proposed a project whereby Britain would invest £2.2 million for a 51 per 
cent stake in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) that was operating in the oilfields of 
Iran.986 His proposition came in response to British firms’ requests for diplomatic support in 
the face of continental and American competitors ‘often supported by their respective 
governments’.987 British government assistance was also requested, on political and 
strategic concerns, earlier in 1908, when the government intervened to safeguard APOC.  
Britain transferred some regiments of the British Indian Army to protect the oilfields in 
Persia when some disturbances occurred in that region.988  APOC, by requesting the British 
government’s investment in the company, in fact, ‘assaulted laissez-faire policies’.989 
Churchill’s justification was that this measure was ‘as an attempt to maintain competition 
in the oil-fuel market’.990 Nevertheless, the Parliament’s decision to invest in APOC was also 
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motivated by concern about ‘the German navy rather than any desire to go into 
business’.991  
 
The arrangement that afforded the British government a majority shareholding and vote in 
APOC secured the Admiralty a long-term fuel contract.992 The Cabinet files show that APOC 
had exclusive rights to explore the area for oil in the two ‘transferred territories’ situated 
north-east of Baghdad on the Iraqi side of the Iraq-Persian border.993 The company was also 
granted privilege to construct pipelines through the Turkish territory to the sea.994 In fact, 
there was a short pipeline to the local refinery in Khanakin but it was not suitable for oil 
exports.995 Although the primary concerns were strategic, the British government in effect 
became a partner in an oil commercial company, fusing together political and economic 
interests in oil related matters in the Middle East.  
 
Becoming a shareholder in APOC set a precedent for possible government involvement in 
other oil companies in Iraq, in particular in the TPC.996 In 1912, the TPC was formed by 
Royal Dutch Shell, Deutsche Bank and the British owned National Bank of Turkey in the 
Ottoman Empire with the goal of obtaining oil exploration rights in the oil-bearing regions 
of Asiatic Turkey.997 The British government decided to be involved in the TPC through 
APOC. An agreement between Britain and Germany was struck at and led to the 
reconstitution of the company in March 1914.998 TPC’s shareholding was split to become a 
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British company with the Anglo-Persian Group, the largest single shareholder holding 47.5 
per cent of the shares, Royal Dutch Shell 22.5 per cent, Deutsche Bank 25 per cent, and five 
per cent was held by Participations and Investments Limited owned by Ottoman Armenian 
subject Calouste Sarkis Gulbenkian.999 Although the oil firms cooperated in a joint 
exploitation of oil resources in the Middle East, Britain strengthened its control of the 
company itself by the fact that TPC was a British registry, situated within the British 
dominions and the chairman was at all times a British subject. 1000 
 
It is worth noting that upon the recommendation of the Petrol Committee of the Board of 
Trade, the British government also became a shareholder, to the tune of 40 per cent, of 
Royal Dutch Shell in 1914 in return for promises of oil concessions from the Ottoman 
Empire in Iraq.1001 In fact, in June 1914 the Grand Vizier wrote to Britain and Germany 
indicating that the Ottoman Empire ‘agrees to lease’ to the TPC petroleum deposits ‘already 
discovered or to be discovered in the Villayets of Mosul and Baghdad’.1002 However, the 
outbreak of World War I halted these arrangements.  
 
During First World War oil became an important asset for the warring countries. The Sykes-
Picot Agreement of 1916 gave the French, who already controlled it, primary economic 
rights in the potentially oil-rich province of Mosul.1003 However, changes on the ground 
took place before the armistice of 1918 when the British government decided to expand its 
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occupation of Iraq to include Mosul province. This gave Britain authority over Iraq pending 
a final settlement.1004 Retaining control of Iraq was strategically important for Britain, not 
only for oil but also to reinforce its influence in the Persian Gulf and to join Egypt, Palestine, 
India and the Far East courtesy of Britain’s air power.1005 With her troops in Iraq, Britain 
wanted to change the terms of Sykes-Picot and requested Mosul be placed under her 
influence. This was plausible as with the weakening of Turkey and Russia there was no 
longer a justification for turning Mosul into a buffer zone under the French influence, 
particularly as it could supply the British Empire with the one natural resource – oil - that it 
lacked.1006  
 
In December 1918, the French Prime Minister, Georges Clemenceau agreed that Britain 
should have control of Mosul, in return for British diplomatic support in Europe.1007 In fact, 
the Iraqi -Turkish frontier was brought up in 1923 at Lausanne and was fixed by the League 
of Nations in 1926. Here, the Mosul Villayet area was allocated within Iraq, therefore 
placing it officially under Britain’s rule.1008 Accordingly, Britain gained control of oil 
resources in Iraq, but by the terms of the mandate it did not have exclusive rights for 
developing the oilfields.  
 
It was important for Britain to obtain an additional supply of oil to be ‘available for the 
Empire’ particularly during a time of war when supplies from America might not be 
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guaranteed or output from Persian oilfields were unobtainable.1009 61 per cent of Britain’s 
oil imports in 1920 came from the United States, 37 per cent from other foreign countries 
and only 2 per cent from British possessions.1010 The Times reported that new fields should 
be acquired under British control and without scope for foreigners to be awarded licences 
for oil exploration.1011  
 
Negotiations between France and Britain over the boundaries of Palestine were concluded 
in 1920 after which a discussion of French oil rights in Iraq commenced.1012 The 25 percent 
of Deutsche Bank's stake in the TPC were seized by the British and together with the fifty 
per cent participation of APOC, the British Government controlled three-quarters of the 
stock of the TPC.1013 Gallagher explains that defeat in the War ‘locked out’ the German 
claim in the TPC and that their share was ‘reluctantly’ given to France.1014 Accordingly, at 
the French government’s initiative the oil company Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (CFP) 
was set up in 1924 as a quasi-state firm specifically to assume France's portion of TPC.1015 
The reallocation of shares was related to the settlement of oil issues in other places as 
well.1016 It was essential for the French government to be a partner of the TPC as it 
‘possessed no other sources of oil’.1017  
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In April 1920, the Anglo-French Oil Agreement was concluded during the San Remo 
Conference in which Britain secured ‘complete British control’ of the Iraq oilfields. 1018 In 
addition, under this agreement the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon explained that former 
German interests in the TPC were allocated to the French government ‘in return for 
facilities by which Mesopotamia (Iraq) oil will be able to reach the Mediterranean’.1019 The 
French government agreed to put ‘no legal or fiscal obstacles’ in the way of the 
construction of two separate pipelines going through Syria. The outlet port for the pipelines 
on the Mediterranean had to be agreed upon by the two governments.1020 By this 
arrangement the French government was entitled to purchase ‘up to 25 per cent of the oil 
piped from Persia to the Mediterranean’.1021 The agreement in fact widened the benefit for 
the French who became entitled to oil transported from Persia and that expected from 
Iraq. The British and French governments agreed ‘to coordinate their petroleum policies’ in 
the Middle East, but there was no mention of the proposed terminal at Haifa in the Oil 
Agreement.1022 
 
Until 1921 the British government had not yet made a decision on whether the 
development of oil in Iraq would be carried out directly by the British government or ‘by 
arrangement with private companies such as the Turkish Petroleum Company’.1023 
However, Churchill, now the Colonial Secretary, explained in a note to the Cabinet 
Secretary, Maurice Hankey, that there was no possibility that the British government would 
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directly develop oil in Iraq. He further explained that the Anglo-French Oil Agreement was 
concluded with regards to the TPC’s claims in Iraq.1024  
 
It was not until January 1922 when the British mandate over Iraq was enacted via the 
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and the TPC made ‘a formal claim’ to the government of Iraq to have its 
rights promised by the Turkish government ‘recognised and embodied in the definite 
instrument’.1025 This meant that concessions granted before the War by the Ottoman 
Empire were not automatically valid after the War such as that of the Mavrommatis 
concession for an electric power project in Palestine. Colin Davies argues that as the oil 
concession in Iraq was rather dubious, the British government supported the TPC claims 
more on the grounds of expediency than on legal consideration.1026 The following year in 
Lausanne, this promise to the TPC was treated as a contract that ‘should be honoured’. The 
terms of the concession were drawn up under the League of Nations’ supervision and a 
concession convention was signed on 14 March 1925.1027 The reason that the TPC 
concession needed international intervention will be discussed latter in this chapter in 
relation to the introduction of the United States into the TPC. 
 
By the provisions of the oil convention, the Iraq government granted the TPC exclusive 
rights to explore for petroleum in the provinces of Baghdad and Mosul, excluding the 
‘Transferred Territories’ for a period of 75 years. It also stipulated that before 14 November 
1928, the company should select 24 eight-square-mile plots and should construct a pipeline 
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to a port for export shipment ‘as soon as the course should be commercially justifiable’.1028 
This meant that if the Iraq oilfields proved worthy, ‘then the problem of the pipeline will 
have to be settled’.1029  
 
On 12 June 1926, the Mosul agreement was struck between Britain, Iraq and Turkey, at 
which time the Iraq-Turkish frontier was finally drawn. The agreement stipulated, inter alia, 
that ‘Turkey relinquishes’ its claim to the Mosul district of Iraq and its oilfields.1030 The 
agreement also stated that Turkey was to receive ‘10 per cent of all oil and mining royalties’ 
paid to the Iraq Government for 25 years. Moreover, if Turkey had a desire to capitalise on 
its rights Iraq would be entitled to purchase these rights for £500,000.1031 One week later, 
the purchase was affected and ‘the Turkish participation’ reverted to Iraq.1032 Thus the 
peaceful development of the concession was assured. This meant that the oilfields in Mosul 
were placed under Iraq’s jurisdiction, which itself came under the direct influence of Britain 
by the terms of the Iraqi mandate. 
 
The TPC carried out geological surveys during 1925-26 to a ‘degree of precision sufficient to 
enable actual structures to be selected for testing’.1033 By September 1926 ten locations 
were selected to put down test wells. The presence of oil in large quantities was confirmed 
on 14 October 1927 when Baba Gurgur oil well, north of Kirkuk in the province of Mosul, 
was struck at a depth of 1,521 feet with the capability of producing 5,000 tons a day.1034 
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This necessitated the construction of a pipeline from these oilfields to the coast of the 
Mediterranean for export. 
 
The confirmation of the availability of oil in Iraq made it essential for the British 
government to control the transportation of the newly found oil. This was possible by 
having it pass through territories under her influence and for it come out Haifa to serve 
those strategic purposes mentioned earlier.  
 
Britain’s insistence on Haifa as a pipeline terminal 
The British government was aware that the TPC decision for the route of the pipeline, 
based on professional and commercial considerations, would be of the northern line 
through the French controlled Syria, that would terminate in a French controlled coast. 
Although this arrangement was agreed upon in the Oil Agreement, the British government’s 
concern was that in the event of war, and due to limits embedded in war-time regulations, 
it would be difficult for Britain to obtain oil from sources other than her own. Therefore, 
and principally on strategic but also on economic grounds, Britain wanted the company to 
take into consideration her desire to have the pipeline laid in British controlled territories 
and terminated at Haifa. 
 
In February 1926 The Manchester Guardian reported that under the international 
agreement for the Mosul oilfields, a pipeline to the Mediterranean was possible if the 
output reached 100,000 tons a year. ‘There is very little doubt’, the report continued, ‘that 
the pipeline will run to Haifa, and a railway may be constructed parallel to it.’1035 In fact, 
discussions about a railway from Iraq to the Mediterranean were always an essential factor 
in British government debates and negotiations on the route of the pipeline took place in 
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the British government. Moreover, deciding about the route of the pipeline and a railway 
became a primary concern for Britain, France and Iraq, particularly after the confirmation of 
a ‘gush of oil in vast quantities in the neighbourhood of Kirkuk’.1036  
 
In January 1927, the British Consul General in Lebanon informed the Colonial Office that 
improvements had been made at the port of Beirut where the cross-jetty had been 
widened. Plans had been put forward to enable the modernised landing of passengers and 
goods, lines of railways and storage tankers for petrol. Plus, assurances had been provided 
for ‘arrangements [to] be made for tankers to discharge their cargo direct on shore into the 
tanks’.1037 Although these improvements were in line with the Oil Agreement of San Remo, 
they resulted in producing concern within the British government with issues of oil 
transportation. Britain thought that these facilities would reinforce France’s position and 
would constitute strong incentives to encourage the TPC to select the northern route of the 
pipeline. Accordingly, discussions within Whitehall departments about a trans-desert 
pipeline commenced.1038 In order to maximise the benefits from oil, Britain not only wanted 
to have the oilfields placed under her control but also the route and the terminus for 
transporting the produced oil. 
 
At any rate, it was important for Britain to convince the TPC with the southern line that 
should terminate in Haifa. The Colonial Under-Secretary Ormsby-Gore demonstrated that 
the TPC intended to decide about the route of the oil pipeline ‘on the basis of what was the 
best route from a purely commercial point of view’.1039 This meant that certain conditions 
were essential for the consideration of the route. They were related to safety, that the pipe 
to be laid over ground and not under, that no duties were to be imposed, that the 
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construction of the pipeline would be facilitated and should be practicable, and there 
should be an availability of water. The Colonial Office and the Air Ministry were authorized 
by the Cabinet to prepare ‘the practical case for the Haifa route’ that would meet those 
conditions needed to convince the TPC.1040 This route became an urgent matter when the 
British government received confidential information in December 1927 reporting that the 
TPC was contemplating ‘taking steps at a very early date for [a] detailed survey of [the] 
pipeline route from Kirkuk to the Syrian coast’.1041  
 
The company favoured a ‘more northerly route’ to Alexandretta (modern day Iskenderun) 
or Tripoli because a route through Syria would be ‘shorter in length, closer to existing 
railway lines’ and did not involve engineering difficulties such as those found in the Jordan 
Valley.1042 The Board of Trade explained that the estimated distance from Kirkuk to 
Alexandretta was 564 miles, whilst to Tripoli the distance was 555 miles and to Haifa 650 
miles.1043 The British government wanted to persuade the company to select the southern 
route, despite it being the longest and consequently costing more.  
 
In trying to ensure the pipeline went to Haifa, the British government was faced with 
problems which were fundamentally geographic and economic but influenced with 
strategic and political factors complicating the issue.1044 The Colonial Office in coordination 
with the Admiralty, Foreign Office, Air Ministry, War Office and the Board of Trade started 
to collect the necessary information from Iraq and Palestine in order to influence the 
company’s decision.1045 On the insistence of Britain the purpose of the survey was modified 
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to ‘examine the coast line between Haifa and Alexandretta’ and later an alignment for the 
pipeline across the desert.1046  
 
The British government wanted to pursue more investigations about the route of the 
pipeline. Hence, the Board of Trade was authorized to consult Sir John Cadman (Chairman 
of TPC and APOC) and Sir Henri Deterding (Chairman of the Royal Dutch Shell) regarding the 
route of the pipeline. The experts suggested that the British government should consider 
the construction of a trans-desert railway from Haifa to Baghdad. This would ‘definitely 
outweigh the disadvantage of increased length and would be a determining factor’.1047 
Additionally, it could be used for the construction and the maintenance of the pipeline. The 
general manager of Palestine railway, R.B.W. Holmes had also pointed that ‘a Trans-Jordan 
railway could be constructed along which a pipeline could be laid’. He explained that such a 
route should be ‘entirely within British mandated territory’ and it would benefit British 
commerce by ‘utilising only British manufactures and employing British skilled Labour’.1048  
 
However, the sub-committee of CID, in its report of June 1928, was convinced that a 
railway project could not be ‘justified as a commercial proposition’ and would be ‘open to 
serious criticism on financial and political grounds’.1049 In 1929 and in 1930 the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, Philip Snowden, First Viscount Snowden, of the Labour Government, 
declared that it would not ‘spend or guarantee a shilling’ on the railway in order to bring 
the pipeline to Haifa.1050 This was because the Treasury believed that the railway was 
‘unlikely to prove self-supporting for many years and that guarantees of considerable 
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extent will be needed before construction takes place’.1051 The railway suggestion remained 
an issue of discussion in Whitehall and was often used as an essential factor to persuade 
the TPC to send the oil pipeline along the southern proposed route. Therefore, it will be 
discussed in this study so far as it was connected to the discussions about the pipeline and 
its termination at Haifa.  
 
It was essential for Britain to create new facilities to persuade the TPC of the virtues of 
southern option for the pipeline. This was particularly important because by the provisions 
of the Anglo-French Oil Agreement, France was bound to ‘give facilities’, free-duty 
importation and to exempt the oil company from ‘export and transit dues on the oil 
itself’.1052 France was capable of doing so, according to the Agreement, despite article 11 of 
the mandate for Syria and Lebanon which secured equality of treatment for other 
nationals. Hence, France was able to convince TPC with the feasibility of the northern route 
through Syria. In comparison, Britain did not have the same privileges according to the Oil 
Agreement. Furthermore, giving preferential treatment to TPC would be ‘contrary to’ 
article 18 of the Consequently, the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office proposed to apply 
a general rule by which all vessels exporting piped oil from Haifa would be granted special 
reductions in port and harbour dues so as not to be accused of breaching the mandate’s 
provisions.1053 This was to manipulate the regulations though it was not enough to convince 
TPC. 
 
The British government contemplated developing the port of Haifa, inter alia, so it could be 
in a position to present a ‘cogent argument’ to convince the TPC of the adequacy of Haifa 
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harbour as an oil terminal.1054 Actual steps were taken towards constructing the Haifa 
harbour in ‘such a manner as to afford full facilities for [the] berthing of oil tankers and for 
temporary storage of crude oil in a large scale’.1055 The British government made sure that 
no difficulties in Palestine and Trans-Jordan would arise ‘with any other concessionaires 
and that no obstacle would be placed in the way of construction of pipeline’.1056 The Board 
of Trade explained that the conditions at Haifa harbour were desirable to secure the 
discharge and storage of petroleum.1057 In fact, the consulting engineer, Frederick Palmer, 
pointed out, in his 1923 report, the possibilities of ‘port facilities being required for oil’, and 
hence the necessity to provide harbour facilities to accommodate tank steamers having a 
draught of about 30 feet.1058 The High Commissioner of Palestine confirmed that according 
to plans the harbour ‘could be utilized in connection with an oil pipeline and the export of 
oil’.1059 
 
Before intervening in the company’s decision Britain wanted to make sure that the pipeline 
would serve her interests. In order to evaluate the importance of the proposed Baghdad-
Haifa railway and pipeline for Britain, the Cabinet decided in February 1928 to appoint a 
sub-committee to the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) to carry out the task.1060 The 
sub-committee was composed of representatives of the Admiralty with Earl Stanhope in 
the Chair, J. Shuckburgh, from the Colonial Office, G. C. Upcott, from the Treasury, H.J. 
Seymour, from the Foreign Office, Air Commodore C.L.N. Newall, from the Air Ministry, and 
J.J. Wills, from the Board of Trade. Their task was to investigate the question as to whether 
the government should give its support, and in what form, to the construction of the 
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proposed Baghdad-Haifa railway and/or pipeline. The sub-committee had its report ready 
in June 1928. This report was presented to the Cabinet in March 1929 by the Cabinet 
Secretary, Maurice Hankey, who was also the secretary of the CID.1061  
 
The sub-committee discussed the political, strategic, defence and economic aspects for 
securing a Baghdad-Haifa alignment for the proposed railway and pipeline and provided 
recommendations as to the policy to be pursued.1062 The report concluded that by securing 
an oil pipeline terminating in Haifa the British ‘Fleet will possess a source of oil supply upon 
which reliance can be placed in the future’.1063 The report emphasised that the proposed 
scheme was of the greatest strategic importance in connection with the supply of oil fuel to 
the Navy at home, in the Mediterranean and on the route to the Far East.1064 The 
recommendation was that the British government should endeavour to ‘secure the 
Baghdad-Haifa alignment for the pipelines’ and that it was ‘beyond doubt that the pipelines 
will be laid in British-controlled territory’.1065 This meant that once the pipeline was 
constructed, oil would be within easy reach of Britain in peace time and a useful supply 
source for the British Mediterranean Fleet. 1066 
 
It is worth noting that the strategic importance of oil for Britain was confirmed in the July 
1926 report prepared by Naval Staff of the Admiralty on the strategic importance of 
Mediterranean ports for the CID. The report was based on the assumption that the British 
Empire in Europe would be faced with a fleet of equal strength. The bases at Gibraltar and 
Malta would satisfy requirements in the western and central basins of the Mediterranean. 
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The problem was with the eastern basin given its proximity to of Alexandria that Britain had 
ruled out for potential development given the independent status accorded to Egypt. After 
Famagusta in Cyprus, Haifa was a second alternative to the British Navy.1067 Haifa therefore 
was the key to the eastern Mediterranean for the British, particularly after the confirmation 
of the availability of oil in Iraq. Bonne rightly argues that the oil terminus at Haifa, having 
regard to the situation in Egypt, would assure a supply of oil for the British fleet.1068  
 
The report of the sub-committee also discussed the political side of the proposed scheme 
and pointed out that the construction of a railway and pipeline through Iraq and British 
mandated territory would ‘strengthen Great Britain’s position in the Middle East’.1069 
Moreover, it would ‘check the growth of French and Turkish influence at the expense of 
Britain, which a Syrian alignment would encourage’.1070 Hence, the understanding in 
Whitehall departments was that the British government attached importance that the 
route of any pipeline between Iraq and the Mediterranean should be adopted ‘on strategic 
and other grounds’ and should pass ‘exclusively through territory under British influence 
and finding its outlet at the Palestinian port of Haifa’.1071 This position, in fact, was adopted 
earlier by the Admiralty since 1915.1072  
 
In its discussions the sub-committee relied on the fact that article 17 of the Palestine 
mandate, stipulated, inter alia, that ‘the Mandatory shall be entitled at all times to use the 
roads, railways and ports of Palestine for the movement of armed forces and the carriage 
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of fuel and supplies.’1073 H.J. Seymour of the Foreign Office stated that the sub-committee 
believed that the mandatory would be allowed in time of war to use Palestine as a base. 
This meant that Britain would be entitled to use Haifa as if it were one of its ‘own ports for 
the purpose of refuelling’.1074 In the event of war, the Foreign Office explained that Britain 
would act in Palestine as it would in Egypt. The British occupation would then become ‘a 
belligerent occupation and Egypt would be used as a belligerent base’. Any action that 
might be taken against Britain and British forces in Egypt the enemy would ‘regard himself 
as at war with Egypt’.1075 Britain feared that if war ensued it would not be able to obtain the 
oil at the Tripoli terminal. France, in the event of hostilities, could impose ‘a complete 
embargo on the shipment from a Syrian port of oil fuel without giving reasons’.1076 Britain’s 
insistence on a southern line that would end at Haifa harbour was a clear interventionist 
policy adopted by the British government.  
 
In accordance with the sub-committee’s recommendation, the Parliament’s discussion was 
that if oil from Iraq would be shipped through Mediterranean ports ‘to this country, we 
could prevent a further rise in petrol prices, and, after all, petrol to-day under modern 
conditions is almost as necessary as water.’1077 Additionally, the Crown Agents explained 
that since oil from Iraq would require ‘an outlet into European waters’, Haifa harbour 
would ‘save the long sea transport from the Persian Gulf and the charges imposed on 
vessels using the Suez Canal’.1078 In fact, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company’s yearly 
expenditure of dues was about ‘£880,000 for transport of oil by the Suez route’. Hence, to 
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construct a pipeline from the ‘South Persian fields to Baghdad to connect up with the 
Baghdad-Mediterranean line’ would be a commercial interest for the company.1079  
 
However, the sub-committee also recommended that no action was necessary or desirable 
at the moment ‘in view of the uncertainty which at present surrounds the whole 
matter’.1080 This position was, in fact, suggested by John Cadman, Chairman of TPC who said 
that ‘any decision to construct a pipeline must be regarded as premature’.1081 The Cabinet 
agreed to this recommendation and hence no decision was taken in relation to the 
construction of a railway or pipeline.  
 
Although there was no official position with regards to the construction of the pipeline, the 
Colonial Office approved, in July 1928, the enlargement of the proposed harbour to 
accommodate the oil pipeline terminal ‘should it come to Haifa’.1082 In May 1929, the 
Crown Agents instructed the consulting engineers to prepare for a berth for the import of 
oil. This would be arranged so that if the proposed pipeline came to Haifa the ‘berth can be 
given over to oil export’ since in this case the import of oil would cease.1083  
 
In order for Britain to fulfil its economic, strategic and political purposes from the Haifa 
harbour, it was imperative that an early settlement concerning the route of pipeline was 
reached, particularly as the Americans had not yet joined the company. This was because 
the British had fears that the Americans would fall on the side of commercial considerations 
and ally with the French in this respect.  
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Difficulties facing the Haifa terminal option 
The transport of oil and its terminus at Haifa formed the basis of a dispute that had political 
implications. The problem was that the TPC was a ‘concession-hunting vehicle for four 
competing interests’, the shareholders of the company, and was not an independent 
business with a strategy of its own.1084 The main reason for this was that the groups that 
owned shareholding stakes in the TPC were backed or established by their respective 
governments. Some of the oil policies of these governments, and that of the United States, 
were revealed by investigating the issue of the oil pipeline’s route. It became important to 
examine the obstacles Britain faced in bringing the pipeline to Haifa as it completes a 
complex picture that includes the construction of the harbour with its oil facilities and 
Britain’s international relations, particularly with France and the United States. This chapter 
demonstrates how Britain treated Palestine within the overall context of its attitude to the 
Middle East and within the framework of its international relations.  
 
The Times reported that French policy had been ‘directed towards ensuring independence 
from the big oil trusts’.1085 France, the report said, envisaged a pipeline going from Mosul 
and through the French mandated territory of Syria to the port of Alexandretta and 
Marseilles as the two ports were ‘linked by a State subsidized line of tank steamers’.1086 In 
another report The Times explained that French economists, politicians and financial 
officers made the share of the Iraqi oil ‘the basis of their arrangements for the monopoly of 
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the refining and the sale of oil on French territory’.1087 Moreover, the French statesmen, 
soldiers and sailors regarded the delivery of petroleum at a French port on the 
Mediterranean ‘as a most important factor in their plans [for] national defence’.1088 France 
wanted to assert its rights and to prove itself as an equal power to Britain that won the War 
side by side with France. In fact, France had fears that in the event a southern route was 
adopted, it would not be in control of its share of the piped oil from Iraq. Worse still, it 
might not be able to purchase transported oil at all. National commercial and political 
interests were the essential drives behind the French interests.  
 
With the dispute between Britain and France over the route of the pipeline, the distinction 
between private and governmental responsibility in Iraq became ‘blurred’.1089 The Colonial 
Secretary argued that the Oil Agreement was not as the French claimed and that the 
pipeline ‘must necessarily pass through Syrian territory’.1090 At the same time, the French 
government declared that it should be ‘consulted in regard to the selection of a terminal 
port for a trans-desert pipeline or railway’ if the pipeline or railway is to pass through 
French controlled areas.1091 In light of this, it could be acceptable to suggest that from 1927 
onward, the pipeline debate went forward both inside and outside TPC, and ‘the issue 
became a staple of British and French diplomatic exchanges’.1092 In France the major role 
was assumed by ‘the Quai d'Orsay and the colonial administrations in the Levant’. In 
Britain, however, the Admiralty and the Colonial Office were in favour of ‘a forceful and 
confrontationist policy’, whereas the Foreign Office was more concerned with reaching an 
understanding with France.1093 This discrepancy of position in Whitehall, between the 
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Foreign Office and the other departments, was seen throughout the discussions concerning 
Haifa harbour. The Foreign Office was concerned with maintaining a stable foreign policy 
and to preserve good relations with the international community. Despite these 
differences, the British government, with its majority share of the TPC, was concerned with 
reaching an understanding with the French regarding the alignment of the oil pipeline 
before the ‘entry of the Americans’ into the TPC. 1094 The reason, again, was that the British 
were certain that the Americans would support the French in favouring the northern 
alignment for the pipeline on commercial grounds. It is worth asking at this point what the 
case was for the Americans’ introduction into the TPC? 
 
American interest in the Middle East dates back to 1919 and was instigated primarily as a 
result of the United States’ needs and its inability to source its own oil. 1095 The US 
government accepted Britain’s controlling power in the Middle East ‘provided that this 
control would act as an umbrella under which American interests could prosper and be 
protected’.1096 In fact, Britain initially attempted to exclude American oil companies from 
Iraq’s oil and wanted to give advantage to British oil interests.1097 By 1918, the Admiralty 
opposed the hard and fast decision of exclusion and in 1921 the Petroleum Department 
demanded the removal of limitations on imperial oil development.1098 With these 
restrictions, American industry officials recognized the need for government assistance to 
overcome the restrictions employed by their rival Britain.1099 The US government 
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encouraged oil company officials to ‘gain a foothold in the rich oil lands of the Middle East’ 
in return for a promise of vigorous ‘support for the open door’.1100  
 
The Anglo-French Oil Agreement of San Remo aroused the wrath of the Americans. They 
protested against the ‘preferential treatment’ given to the French and demanded that 
Britain apply the principle of equality of treatment, specifically in those areas with potential 
petroleum resources.1101 The Americans saw the agreement as one designed to create a 
Franco- British monopoly to exclude all others.1102 As retaliation for US exclusion from the 
oil arrangement in Iraq, the American Congress enacted in February 1920 the Minerals 
Leasing Law for public lands, forbidding the acquisition of government property by 
nationals of any foreign country that denied reciprocity to Americans.1103 The United States 
struggled for the maintenance of a principle of the open door policy affecting every 
American commercial interest, and not merely the oil industry.1104  
 
Bainbridge Colby, the American Secretary of State, strongly expressed the United States’ 
opposition to the exclusion policy adopted by Britain. Colby stated in a letter addressed to 
Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, on November 26th 1920, that it was of the 
‘utmost importance to the future peace of the world’ that the territories acquired by the 
central powers as a result of the War to be ‘held and administered in such a way as to 
assure equal treatment to the commerce and to the citizens of all nations’.1105 Specifically, 
Britain was expected to depart from its colonial approach expressed in its ‘desire for the 
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exclusive control of the resources and markets of annexed territories’.1106 In effect, Britain 
was expected to adhere to the trusteeship secured by the mandate principles as a new 
concept in international affairs and remove international differences and eliminate the 
sources of economic warfare inherent in colonialism.1107  
 
Colby, in light of an increasing demand for petroleum, requested that Britain apply to the 
petroleum industry ‘the most enlightened principles recognized by nations as appropriate 
for the peaceful ordering of their economic relations.’1108 This meant that American oil 
companies would have equal opportunities in the oil production of the Middle East and in 
accordance with the new regulations prevailing after WWI. The government of the United 
States was clear that it had no desire to interfere in the political relations of any power with 
the territories under its domain of control. It would however protest any confined use of 
the terms ‘for the creation of exclusive economic spheres’.1109 In short, the United States 
wanted Britain to apply one of the mandate’s core principles - economic equal opportunity 
- to the American oil companies. 
 
Additionally, the United States doubted the validity of the concession awarded to the TPC 
by the Ottoman Empire for exploring Iraqi oilfields. Colby argued that the Oil Agreement 
was based on the principle that the concession ‘must be honored’ but prior to the War the 
TPC ‘possessed in Mesopotamia (Iraq) no rights to petroleum concessions or to the 
exploitation of oil’.1110 The TPC was only awarded a concession which hardly set in stone.1111 
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Also, under the mandate Britain was not able to place the Iraqi oilfields under its 
permanent control or to establish ‘any kind of monopoly’.1112  
 
Maintaining good relations with the United States was imperative for Britain. Therefore, 
the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, asserted that Britain would honour the 
mandate’s provisions and that Iraq would enjoy the ‘full benefits of ownership’ over the 
oilfields to be developed.1113 More importantly, Britain extended the open door policy to 
Iraq and stated that it had ‘no desire’ to prevent American participation in the development 
of the Iraqi oilfields.1114 This was crucial in light of a later report in The Times stating that no 
foreigners should be awarded licences for oil exploration in Iraq.1115 Curzon explained that 
the Oil Agreement ‘aimed at no monopoly or exclusive rights’ and that the provisions of 
agreement referred to the concession granted before the war to the TPC were safeguarded 
by the Treaty of Sevres.1116 This is why the concession was treated in Lausanne in 1923 as a 
contract that ‘should be honoured’.1117 
 
In light of these correspondences, The Times wrote that commercial and political interests 
were the source of the dispute between Britain and the United States. With the increasing 
demand for petroleum, the newspaper concluded, there would be solid ground for control 
of the oil industry, but such control would have to be ‘administered internationally, and the 
requirements of each country met by a system of rationing’.1118 In fact, the application of 
the open door to the oil industry required ‘massive combinations of capital and 
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technology’, therefore only a multi-national monopoly would be able to develop the 
oilfields of Iraq.1119  
 
By November 1921, the American oil companies formed the so-called ‘American Group’ 
under the lead of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.1120 They opened negotiations with 
the TPC in order to share in the oil resources of Iraq.1121 The British government welcomed 
this approach because they wanted to silence an American protest as it was better to have 
the Americans as partners in the TPC. The Times reported that one of the foremost British 
oil experts, Mr. Arthur Beeby Thompson, explained in a lecture before the London Chamber 
of Commerce that ‘without American drillers, and to a large extent without American plant, 
oil prospecting even by a British company is almost impossible’.1122 The participation of the 
Americans was therefore essential on a technical level. 
 
Negotiations in the United States and London for a ‘proportionate division’ of both the 
profits and the production of Iraqi oil resources were conducted.1123 After seven years of 
‘discouraging and frustrating’ negotiations, a diplomatic and commercial ‘Group 
Agreement’ was concluded on 31 July 1928. By this point, the Americans had become 
shareholders of the TPC.1124 In fact, this agreement opened enough space to allow the 
Americans to enter and then was promptly shut again, thus disallowing further 
shareholders, including the Italians.1125 Elizabeth Monroe explains that the door ‘ajar always 
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feels more open to those inside than to those outside it’.1126 The United States succeeded in 
securing American participation in the monopoly but not in achieving the open door.1127 
The door was only open to the great powers. The agreement was ‘a binding legal contract’ 
for the consortium which was set up to develop Iraq’s oilfields.1128 The TPC became an 
international consortium made up of four major groups: Anglo-Persian Oil Company was 
British, Royal Dutch Shell was Dutch with a British shareholding, the French Compagnie 
Française des Petroles (CFP) and the Near East Development Corporation which was a 
syndication of five American firms.1129 Each participant owned 23.75 per cent of the 
enterprise and the remaining 5 per cent was left in the hands of Calouste Sarkis 
Gulbenkian.1130 By this settlement, the principal petroleum nations of the world were 
united in TPC and collaborated in the work of developing a jointly held concession.1131 The 
national interests of the governments behind the companies were merged to serve 
international goals. It is worth noting that the Turkish Petroleum Company now changed its 
name to Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) in June 1929.1132  
 
In brief, the difficulties that Britain faced in reaching its goals related to the insistence of 
both the French and the Americans on having their own controlling share in the resources 
and transport of Iraqi oil. It was therefore important to reach an agreement in the TPC as 
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Settlement of stalemate of the pipeline to Haifa 
According to the Convention of March 1925, the TPC was expected to have selected 24 
plotted oil areas by November 1928 because the Iraqi government wanted to throw ‘the 
rest of the field open for outside competition’.1133 This was not however possible to 
complete within the given time, hence, in December 1927 the TPC applied for an extension 
of its deadline and suggested revising the terms of the concessionary rights of 1925.1134 The 
TPC’s geologists believed that the oil-bearing lands were to the east of the Tigris, therefore, 
the company wanted to restrict its rights to the east bank in order to avoid the risk of 
adjoining plots being put up for auction.1135 This was because other drillers ‘could tap into 
the same massive oil pool’ that the TPC discovered which could affect its overall 
production.1136 
 
In February 1928, John Cadman, through the Board of Trade, asked for the help of the 
British government to advise the government of Iraq to approve the required extension. 
Accordingly, in its resolution of August 1928, the Iraqi Council of Ministers agreed to a 
temporary extension of the concession to March 1929 in return, inter alia, ‘to survey a pipe 
and rail route from Baghdad to Haifa’.1137 The Council specified the Haifa alignment for the 
pipeline as ‘one of the essential conditions’ to grant the proposed extension.1138 In fact, this 
is how the pipeline issue became ‘inextricably linked’ with the revision of the 1925 
Convention.1139 The supposedly commercial decision demonstrated clearly how the route of 
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the pipeline became complicated with politics. Britain, in effect used its political privilege as 
mandatory to influence a commercial decision to its own benefit. 
 
Political concerns pushed the Iraqi government to favour a southern route that would 
terminate at Haifa. In fact, King Faisal and the politicians in Iraq were ‘keen on avoiding 
French territory’.1140 This was mainly due to King Faisal’s ‘long-standing grievance against 
the French’ who evicted him from Syria in 1920 and now had ‘a score to settle against the 
French’ over the railway and pipeline.1141 Gallagher also believed that it was Faisal who 
insisted that a branch of the line must go to Haifa’.1142 The feeling in Whitehall was that 
because Faisal’s attitude to the French was so soured that the Iraqi government was going 
to share his view.1143 Moreover, the Iraqi government had fears of ‘French infiltration’ and 
that they would not be content with the oil outlet and would seek to ‘control of the source 
of supply’.1144  
 
Other reasons for favouring the southern line related to the Iraqi government’s wish to 
have the length of the pipeline laid in Iraq and pass through the friendly territories of Trans-
Jordan which was ruled by Faisal’s kin and through Palestine which was under the mandate 
of their British ally.1145 This was because the Iraqi government had concerns that in the 
event of war, if the pipeline were to be situated in territory under French control, the 
colonial administration in Syria might interrupt the flow of oil to the Mediterranean. In fact, 
the Iraqis were warned by the Turks that to consent to the northern line would be ‘to place 
themselves for all time at the mercy of France’.1146 This was important because in principle 
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it was incumbent upon the Iraqi government that to protect the pipeline.1147 Also since 
these oilfields belonged to Iraq they would revert to the Iraq government at the end of the 
concession period.1148 Additionally, the Iraqi government was ‘anxious to develop trade 
with Egypt’ and to make Baghdad ‘the principal trade centre’ in the region, which could be 
achieved by constructing a railway accompanying the pipeline to Haifa.1149  
 
However, the rejection of the French group in the IPC the demands of the Iraqi government 
provoked the French government to intervene. The French government protested against 
what it termed ‘political interference’ by the British government in negotiations and 
demanded that the IPC should be ‘dispensed from the obligation’ to give any definite 
preference to the Haifa alignment.1150 The British government should ‘refrain from all 
further intervention’ and leave the matter to be settled on ‘a commercial basis’ between 
the company and the Iraqi government.1151 The French recommended that such questions 
should be settled by methods of ‘reciprocal concession and co-operation’ and hinted to a 
‘hostile combination of French and American interests’.1152  
 
In light of the French strong opposition, the Cabinet of the new British Labour government 
of Ramsay MacDonald, which came in May 1929, recommended setting up an 
interdepartmental committee. Its task was to consider ‘the whole situation very carefully’ 
of the Baghdad-Haifa railway and pipeline.1153 The committee was comprised of officials 
representing the Colonial Office, the Foreign Office, the War and Air departments and the 
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Treasury. The recommendation of the interdepartmental committee was that ‘a Syrian 
terminal to the Iraq-Mediterranean pipeline and railway be accepted’.1154 
 
This recommendation was, in fact, suggested by Cadman in a report he submitted to the 
committee since it was in the best interest of the company from a commercial point of 
view.1155 Cadman also asked the British government to influence the Iraqi government to 
withdraw their condition of Haifa terminal and accept the Tripoli terminal.1156 The new 
government however, did not do that and instructed the High Commissioner for Iraq, 
Francis Humphrys, not to intervene and to leave the Iraq government to ‘decide the 
question for themselves’.1157 This meant that the new government wanted to rectify the 
relations with France on the issue of the pipeline. 
 
It is worth noting, however, that the Chief Naval Staff who also presented a memorandum 
to the committee had a contradicting opinion. His basic assumption was that the mobility of 
the fleet was dependent on adequate supplies of oil. The Haifa terminus was of strategic 
importance for supplying oil to the Navy and for reducing the naval war reserve of oil.1158 
That was important since Britain’s naval programme, as D. Dilks argues, was chiefly directed 
against France and Russia.1159 It was possible for the British fleet to use Haifa for fuel and 
refuel during war time. Hence, his recommendation was that the British government should 
do all that lied in its power ‘to prevent French control from being established’. The Haifa 
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route was essential and it ‘can only be obtained by stiffening the Iraq government against 
the French Syrian route’ and by subsidising the Haifa railway route.1160 This was important 
because if the pipeline terminated in Haifa as it would render Britain dependence on 
foreign supplies and would reduce the necessary Naval War reserve of oil in the area below 
seven million tons. 
 
Despite the Navy’s firm position, the Cabinet decided, in May 1930, to adopt the 
recommendations of the inter-departmental committee to acquiesce to the French. The 
Cabinet accepted the northern terminal through Syria to the Iraq -Mediterranean pipeline 
and railway.1161 It also decided to open negotiations with the French government with the 
objective of ‘obtaining the requirements desired’ by the British and the Iraqi governments 
should the terminal be on the Syrian coast. The Cabinet concluded that before any 
communication was made to the French government the High Commissioner for Iraq 
should be informed.1162 This policy of surrender to the French was shared by most of the 
British officials but was resented by the Colonial Office.1163 This policy meant that the British 
government agreed to give the French government a strong hold on the oil supplies in Iraq 
and thereby ‘greatly strengthen their political position in the Near East’.1164 The yielding by 
the British government could be understood by her desire to avoid direct confrontation 
with its French and American rivals and to allow for the oil production in Iraq. 
 
However, before the Cabinet decision was communicated to the French, the British 
government was informed by the High Commissioner for Iraq that the government of Iraq 
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was ‘strongly opposed’ to the adoption of the pipeline route going through Syria.1165 Iraq 
was ‘not prepared to co-operate in a comprehensive settlement with France on any such 
basis’ and was not ready to agree to ‘any revision of [the] IPC concession until they are 
satisfied that their own interests in regard to alignment of pipeline and railway are met’.1166  
 
Also, Faisal warned that unless the Iraqi government’s offer was accepted by the IPC ‘he 
would regard himself entirely free’ to grant oil concessions to some other company.1167 
Also, the Iraqi government warned that if a revised concession were not signed before 
January 1931, it would announce an auction for 24 new plots.1168 Britain did not object to 
the Iraqi government’s announcement to the IPC and was ready to prepare an alternative 
policy.1169  
 
In facing Iraq’s strident position, and in its attempt to find a solution to the revision of the 
oil convention, the French government decided in August 1930 to approach the 
representative of the American group in the IPC, Walter Teagle, to find a solution.1170 This 
was because the French Paribas bank was a founding shareholder of the CFP, the French 
shareholder in IPC, and had in 1920 provided ‘financial and political support’ for the 
creation of one of Jersey's new French subsidiaries of which Teagle was its president.1171 In 
a meeting with Cadman in London, Teagle suggested that two pipelines be built since the 
British groups, i.e. APOC and Royal Dutch Shell, would ‘never accept a single pipeline 
running to Tripoli’. 1172 Teagle explained that the double pipeline would separate into two 
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single lines to the Mediterranean coast of which one would go to Tripoli and the other to 
Haifa. The cost estimated for such a proposal would be around £11 million, a figure that 
must be deemed acceptable by the company as two separate lines like this would provide 
the company with greater security against potential interruptions in the flow of oil.1173 The 
French recommended that a split line should be ‘built and operated in common’ by all 
groups in the IPC.1174  
 
On 10 October 1930, in its board meeting, the IPC’s partners agreed to accept the two 
pipelines suggestion be presented in a revised concessionary agreement to the Iraqi 
government.1175 The struggle centred on Iraqi oil and the control of its transport routes was 
over in Britain’s satisfaction.1176 Accordingly, the IPC was obliged to construct a pipeline 
system from the oilfield to the Mediterranean.1177 The agreement also stipulated that the 
construction of the pipelines would happen simultaneously in three locations: Mosul, 
Tripoli and Haifa. The point of the pipeline split was, however, not yet determined.1178 The 
Times reported that speculation pointed to the line splitting ‘at the point where the 
frontiers of Syria, Palestine and Iraq meet, with a terminal at each port’.1179 The French 
suggested Haditha as a compromise location for the bifurcation point as a midway between 
the French preference of Abu Kemal near the Syrian frontier and the British preference at 
Rutba closer to Transjordan frontier.1180 The compromise reached between Britain and 
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France could be viewed as easing their Imperialist rivalry.1181 The pipeline was also utilized 
by APOC, according to an agreement with IPC in 1932.1182 
 
The British government considered that the interests of Iraq would ‘best be served’ by 
accepting the Haditha proposal. This was because Britain was bound to support the 
candidature of Iraq for admission to the League of Nations in 1932, although independence 
did not mean that Iraq would be permitted to operate outside the sphere of British 
influence.1183 It was necessary to reach an agreement with the French whose acceptance of 
Iraq as a member of the League was essential.1184 With this connection in mind, Monroe 
explains that doing away with the mandate was regarded by the Americans as a ‘device to 
plunder’ Iraq and to hinder the Americans’ chances of enjoying the open door clause.1185  
 
The Iraqi government consented to this arrangement. The Colonial Office believed that this 
solution would safeguard the political and economic interests of Iraq, would satisfy Britain’s 
Imperial ambitions in both Iraq and Palestine, and would also be acceptable to the French 
government.1186 After years of wrangling over the route of the pipeline a revised 
convention was signed on the 24 March 1931. This agreement gave the IPC the exclusive 
concession it wanted (also termed ‘blanket concession’) on the east bank of the Tigris. 
 
The pipeline system coming from Mosul was expected to be completed by the end of 1935. 
It was to follow a route from Haditha to a terminal in Haifa and another to Tripoli in 
Lebanon. The capacity of the whole pipeline system, that would produce at least 4 million 
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tons per annum, was to be carried in equal quantity to both terminals.1187 The signing of the 
agreement initiated economic prospects and allowed for Haifa to be ‘the outlet for the vast 
hinterland stretching to Persia’.1188 The IPC’s partners were not able to bring the Iraq petrol 
into the ‘world market’ until the oil transportation problem was solved.1189 The Times 
reported that the difficulty of the terminal port was solved to ‘the satisfaction of all the 
Governments concerned’.1190 By this agreement, the Anglo-French pipeline conflict was 
over.1191 The goals concerning the route of the pipeline and its terminus at Haifa were 
achieved following Britain’s diplomatic efforts with the French and Iraqi governments and 
not because it was ‘hard to resist’ the Palestine government’s offer of not imposing levies 
on the transit or export of oil, as Herbert and Sosnovsky claim. 1192 France was able to offer 
more incentives to the IPC, thanks to the Oil Agreement, in order for the later to choose the 
northern route. It could be said that the dispute about the pipeline route demonstrates 
that Anglo-French relations were characterised as a ‘close cooperation tempered by 
constant friction’ and that nothing changed ‘the selfish national interests in either 
country’.1193  
 
A subsidiary company of the IPC began the work on the pipeline from Iraq to the 
Mediterranean.1194 Nationals of the shareholders of the IPC benefited from the 
construction of the pipeline.  John Cadman declared that the aggregate cost of undertaking 
the Iraq pipeline construction was approximately £9.25 million. Cadman stated that the 
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placed orders in the United Kingdom for the material and transport required in the 
construction would reach over £2 million.1195 Unlike the discrete policy adopted with 
regards to the announcement of the use of British equipment and material, the British 
government had now declared publicly that contracts for the pipelines were placed with 
British manufactures.1196 Oil News published that the IPC had placed contracts with British 
and foreign manufacturers, including French, German and American makers of pipelines, to 
be laid across 1,300 miles from Iraq to the two ports on the Mediterranean.1197 The work of 
laying the pipeline went on simultaneously from the three points: Tripoli, Haifa and 
Kirkuk.1198 It took about seven years from October 1927, when further substantial 
quantities of oil were discovered in Iraq, until August 1934 that tankers were loaded at 
Tripoli.1199  
 
On 5 January 1931 a convention regulating the transit of mineral oils of the IPC through the 
territory of Palestine was struck between the High Commissioner for Palestine and IPC. 
Courtesy of the convention, the government of Palestine was bound to grant to the 
company the right to construct, maintain, and operate one or more pipelines and the entire 
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works ancillary thereto, and to do all things necessary for the undertaking.1200 The British 
government was now able to make decisions about oil facilities to be constructed at Haifa 
harbour. In fact, the consulting engineers, who confirmed the possibility of arranging for 
the required oil accommodation, were instructed earlier by the British government to 
prepare to this effect.1201 The construction of an oil dock was finally sanctioned by the 
British government in August 1933.1202 The IPC arranged with the consulting engineers as to 
the proposed site of the oil pipeline terminal and to the oil dock for the export of oil.1203 
Accordingly, the original plans of Haifa harbour were modified ‘to enable an area to be 
included within the breakwaters which would provide a site for the construction of an oil 
dock’.1204 It was arranged that the pipeline would run down near the lee breakwater and a 
new oil dock would be constructed within the sheltered area of the harbour, immediately 
to the west of the lee breakwater, and that a special oil area be built for bulk storage of 
oil.1205 (See appendix V, Map showing the route of the oil pipeline.) 
 
The settlement of the stalemate of the route and terminus of the pipeline was to the 
convenience of the shareholders and allowed Britain to proceed with the oil facilities in 
Haifa harbour.  Now the French improvements of the harbours in Syria would not hinder 
the Haifa harbour development in oil related facilities or other commercial services. 
Additionally, the British government had preserved its good relationship with France and 
the United States which was essential for Britain’s peaceful advance and development in 
the area. 
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The strategic, political and economic importance of the Haifa harbour for Britain was 
reinforced by bringing the oil pipeline terminal to Haifa. Britain’s abandonment of its 
previous laissez faire approach in the interwar period can be seen clearly in its involvement 
in the pipeline. This involvement reflected Britain’s oil policy in the region pertaining to oil 
policies in the Middle East after WWI. The main reasons for Britain’s insistence on a Haifa 
terminal from the strategic point of view were to ensure its control of the whole of the 
pipeline and to decrease the dependence of the navy and the British Empire on oil supplies 
from foreign countries particularly the United States.1206 
 
The issue of the route of the pipeline became further complicated by the TPC’s difficult 
position. as a private shareholding company. It was not able to be neutral and act solely on 
the merits of commercial imperatives. It had to take into account political factors as the TPC 
was comprised of companies controlled by different governments with often different and 
sometimes conflicting goals and motives. With this it had to find compromises that allowed 
for a blending of commercial and political interests. Diplomatic and business considerations 
featured in the question of the route of the pipeline.  
 
Britain did not want to be at the mercy of its rival France by allowing the French ultimate 
control of the route and the terminus of the pipeline on the Mediterranean. The British 
government was able to manage the limitations and difficulties imposed on it by previous 
agreements and by the provisions of the mandate system. Britain was handicapped by 
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these commitments as it made it impossible to take actions or give promises that would 
convince the multinational ownership IPC to adopt an all-British route that would end at 
Haifa. Davies rightly argues that British oil policy was operating on almost a day-to-day 
basis, ‘without much of the deviousness or overall ‘grand design’ so often attributed to 
it’.1207 The subsequent government adopted different policies on how best to deal with the 
route of the oil pipeline that wavered between being firm on the Haifa terminal and 
accepting the northern line. Despite this, Britain was able to achieve its goals with regards 
to the alignment of the pipeline. The demands of the Iraqi government, stimulated and 
backed by the British government, undermined the solely commercial basis of the IPC’s 
decisions. In short, indirect interventionist policy was operated in order to influence the 
company’s decision to favour British interests. 
 
This chapter has demonstrated how the connection between the construction of Haifa 
harbour was established with the oilfields in Iraq which was at the core of Britain’s oil 
policies in the Middle East. It also showed the extent to which Britain’s political influence 
affected commercial decisions. The IPC’s adoption of the split pipeline solution with one 
line going through Syria to Tripoli and the second through Jordan and Palestine to Haifa, 
was for the satisfaction of the governments behind the shareholders of IPC and the 
government of Iraq.  
 
Moreover, examining the oil pipeline route and terminus at Haifa makes it possible to 
enhance our historical understanding of Britain’s relationship with the international 
community after First World War with particular regard to France and the United States. By 
overcoming the dispute over the open door policy in the Middle East, Britain’s political, 
strategic and economic policies with regards to the construction of Haifa harbour were 
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affirmed by establishing a terminus and oil dock in the harbour of Haifa. At the same time, 
the compromise made by the British to the benefit of international understanding testifies 
to that Britain was able to depart from its ‘romantic imperialism’ in pursuit of its national 
interest.1208 The British government was able to achieve a considerable balance among 
local, national and international interests in a manner convenient for all involved and 
without breaching international obligations.  
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After years of wrangling over the construction of Haifa harbour, when the British 
government settled on the most suitable method to be employed in the mandated 
territory, the building of the harbour commenced in October 1929. Through the 
government of Palestine’s established Haifa Harbour Works Department, the British 
government was able to enact its Imperial methods under disguise. By employing the 
British consulting engineers and British staff to operate the Harbour Department, Britain 
was able to do what it wanted without violating international regulations. The British 
government was able to fulfil its imperial aims by benefiting the British economy, albeit 
indirectly through the Harbour Department. This was possible by following the Foreign 
Office’s recommendation to execute purchases in Britain in a low profile manner. However, 
this did not mean that Britain’s rivals, the Americans and the Italians in particular, were 
unaware of British activities in this area. 
 
Vigilant rivals demanded Britain to afford them equal economic opportunities in the 
harbour works. This compelled Britain to allow non-British firms to perform specific tasks in 
the harbour construction. This could be viewed as a step away from the very rigid position 
adopted by the Colonial Office of completely reject foreign businesses to have a stake in 
the harbour construction. Moreover, since the construction of the harbour was now the 
responsibility of the government department, it was essential to activate the fair labour 
conditions, inserted in the Palestine Loan Act, meaning that fair wages and reasonable 
working time standards had to apply for local labourers. These practices by the British 
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government did not undermine Britain’s supremacy in the region. The opening ceremony of 
the harbour emphasised this theme by employing similar procedures when opening 
harbours in the colonies. 
 
Indeed, it is possible to see in the creation of the harbour how British statesmen managed 
to ‘foster both British interests and a stable and balanced world order.’1209 Thus, this 
chapter is intended to examine the balance achieved by the British government. This has 
been possible through the investigation of how purchases made via the departmental 
method were executed in Britain and how oil facilities for the Iraqi oil pipeline were 
included in the harbour’s construction. This chapter also examines how Britain’s, although 
limited, adherence to the economic equality clause imposed by the League of Nations 
paved the way for foreign firms to compete for works contracts. Additionally, it examines 
how Britain, as the mandatory power, paid special attention to the enactment of fair labour 
conditions for the workers employed locally. 
 
The theme of this chapter is that the British government managed to balance her interests 
against that of the international community and the local government. Adherence to the 
mandate system enabled Britain to achieve its goals and satisfy the international interests 
as well as that of the local inhabitants. 
 
The question that this chapter deals with focuses upon what the British did to achieve this 
balance of interests? What were the methods used for obtaining British manufactured 
goods? What measures were utilized to offer foreign firms economic opportunities? To 
what extent did the British government abide by fair labour conditions in the harbour 
works? And, what implications could be drawn from the harbour’s inauguration ceremony? 
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This chapter argues that by the time the construction of the harbour began Britain was able 
to adjust its methods in order to meet the international requirements. The British 
government used subtle method to purchase equipment and material from Britain and 
accepted, although on cost grounds, to allow the miner required dredging to be performed 
by a foreign firm. The chapter also argues that Britain’s strategic aim was fulfilled by the 
building of oil facilities in the harbour. Moreover, it was essential for Britain to show a form 
of supremacy by employing colonial ceremonial practices in the opening of the harbour.   
 
This chapter is structured in four main topics. The first concerns the economic and strategic 
goals achieved by building the breakwaters and the oil dock in the vicinity of the harbour. 
The second examines Britain’s consideration of the international community and its 
interests as demonstrated by British invitations to foreign firms to compete for dredging 
contracts. The third is concerned with the fulfilment of fair labour conditions for the 
employment of local workers. The final topic addresses the significance of Harbour’s 
inauguration ceremony as Britain asserted her power on the mandated territory.  
 
Butler’s contention that during the inter-war years Britain went through a period of 
‘economic readjustment’ is vivid in the discussion of the building of the harbour.1210 This 
manifested itself in the attempt ‘to integrate the imperial economic system’, that was 
evident particularly after the onset of the Depression in 1929 when attempts were made to 
‘use imperial economic policy to assist the metropolitan economy’. Indeed, obtaining 
equipment in Britain and employing an Anglo-Egyptian company for the main dredging 
complies with this general theme. This was significant since, as N. Dimsdale discusses, that 
lack of competitiveness, caused by the little change in Britain’s export prices relative to 
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those of competing economies between 1925 and 1931, was a major factor contributing to 
Britain's loss of market share’.1211 
 
In The Empire Project, Darwin argues that the key to British power lay in the combination of 
its strong overseas assets with that of the imperial centre and the management of them 
through various linkages of ‘imperial politics’.1212 Although Darwin is referring to the 
dominions, his argument still holds in regards to Britain’s policy in Palestine. Britain’s 
economic and strategic policies were indeed evident in her managing the harbour 
construction project from London, sometimes directly through the Colonial Office and often 
via the engagement of the Crown Agents for the Colonies.  
 
Metzer argues that the building of the Haifa harbour was part of Britain’s commitment to 
the construction of Palestine’s ‘economic infrastructure’.1213 The British government 
undertook substantial overhead investments with consideration to the ‘poor economic 
state of the country’.1214 Employing local labour in the harbour works conformed to the 
British government’s policy to alleviate the hardship in mandated Palestine and participate 
in developing its natural resources.  
 
 
Economic and strategic purposes: equipment and oil dock  
The adoption of the departmental method by the British government and the 
establishment of the Haifa Harbour Works Department (HHWD), was done precisely to 
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benefit the British Empire. Ferris is correct in arguing that British aims were ‘defined and 
pursued in a hard-headed fashion’.1215 Equipment and material were required in order to 
execute the layout of the harbour which included main and lee breakwaters, wharf wall, 
transit sheds, roads and rails, and an oil dock. It was decided to construct the main 
breakwater to withstand a five-metre wave from trough to crest.1216 Since the result of 
boring showed certain projections of rock, the consulting engineers were compelled to 
extend the main breakwater beyond the line originally proposed.1217 The base of the main 
breakwater on the west started from the promontory Ras-el-Krum at the foot of the Carmel 
to the east, roughly parallel with the town front.1218 The lee breakwater and the oil dock 
were situated in the eastern side of the port. 
 
Construction of the harbour commenced on 1 October 1929, and although the consulting 
engineers expected the works to ‘be completed within 36 months’, they in fact took four 
years and were completed in October 1933, a year overdue.1219 The actual works started 
with the opening of a quarry to the south of Haifa to provide the required rocks to build the 
breakwaters. 
 
It was vital for the British government to acquire British manufacturing because it fell 
within its industrial policy. This was also made possible by the British turn toward an 
interventionist economic approach. Allan Booth argues that officials justified their 
increasing involvement in the staple industries ‘by claiming that short-term intervention 
was needed to put industry on the right course.’1220 By the time the harbour works 
commenced the second Ramsay MacDonald Labour government was in power. With it 
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came a Treasury policy to promote cheap money and investment.1221 Passfield, 
MacDonald’s Colonial Secretary, instructed that ‘materials should, where available, be 
purchased locally or that they may be indented for on the Crown Agents for the Colonies, 
[…] plant and equipment which cannot be manufactured locally should be included.’1222 
Bearing in mind that the Crown Agents were under standing orders to purchase in Britain, it 
becomes clear how the arrangements for the HHWD worked in favour of the British 
producer.1223 The Colonial Secretary’s instruction could well be understood in light of A.N. 
Porter and A.J. Stockwell’s contention that Britain exploited colonial resources ‘for 
metropolitan benefit’ under the pretence of advancing the colonies.1224 
 
The Resident Engineer, George Thompson as head of HHWD ordered stores through the 
Crown Agents who were entitled to obtain material, machinery, and engineering stores for 
Mandatory Palestine.1225 He also started with preliminary works including acquisition of 
lands necessary for the works, organization of staff, installation of offices, and laying 
railway lines and roads.1226  
 
In a meeting in April 1929, the Resident Engineer George Thompson, as head of HHWD, 
outlined the equipment needed for the construction of Haifa harbour. However, since the 
Government of Palestine possessed no equipment and unsuccessful efforts were made to 
effect the purchase of equipment locally and in Egypt, it was necessary to obtain all the 
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equipment elsewhere.1227 Because the consulting engineers were held responsible for the 
satisfactory execution of the scheme, they were charged with preparing all contracts and 
specifications. The arrangements also entailed that tenders would be invited by the Crown 
Agents, and the tenders received would be submitted to the consulting engineers for their 
recommendation. It was decided that all contracts would be placed in Britain by the Crown 
Agents.1228 In fact, tendering and contracting was planned and executed by the Crown 
Agents in London, some distance from the government of Palestine. Past practice in the 
colonies, when large public works were carried out departmentally was different. The 
Crown Agents explained it had been for the Resident Engineer to pass the necessary 
purchase orders ‘through the Colonial government’.1229 As for the project of building the 
harbour the role of the government of Palestine was confined to that of a mediator 
between the Resident Engineer and the Crown Agents and did not have the authority to 
perform the purchases of equipment and material for the harbour works. In this case, it 
could be said that the arrangement effectively diminished the role of the mandate 
government below that of the colonial government.  
 
It was a major concern of the British government that this practice of purchasing British-
only goods would not provoke criticism among foreign countries. According to The 
Manchester Guardian, ‘While it may be taken that British machinery will mostly be used, 
foreign Governments will not be able to protest that a mandate territory is being used to 
favour British interests.’1230 The reason for any lack of protest would be because, according 
to government documents, there was not yet any announcement by the Crown Agents 
concerning public purchasing of the needed equipment. There was only limited advertising 
about placing, with British firms, orders pursued by the Crown Agents. For example, 
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Modern Transport published that ‘in connection with the harbour development scheme at 
Haifa, Palestine, Sir Wm. Arrol and Co., Limited, of Glasgow, have been awarded, by the 
Crown Agents for the colonies, the contract for 100 all-steel skips, each of a capacity of 
about 10 tons,’ for the use of stone quarries.1231 Another advertisement said that ‘The 
Hunslet Engine Co., Limited, Leeds have received from the Crown Agents for the Colonies 
an order for eight tank engines required in connection with the extension of Haifa 
harbour.’1232 Under ‘Notes of the week’, it was written in Modern Transport that ‘at the 
Haifa harbour works, good progress has been made during the past few weeks. Since 15 
September [1929], between 700 and 800 tons of heavy plant and machinery have arrived at 
the railway jetty at Haifa harbour.’1233 And in a report that also appeared in Modern 
Transport about ‘Harbour development in Palestine’ it was mentioned that ‘The steel work 
is being supplied by Horseley Bridge and Thomas Piggott Limited of Tipton (Staffs.)’.1234 The 
documents of the British government including The Board of Trade Journal, the Crown 
Agents, including The Crown Agents Bulletin, and the various newspapers did not provide 
any further announcements about placing contracts with British firms. Occasional 
references to the works at Haifa in general were found in The Economist, The Times, and 
Modern Transport. This shows evidence that the British government, in fact, followed the 
advice of the Foreign Office about not advertising widely any of the contracts and to 
purchase the equipment in piecemeal and by petty contracts. Therefore, it was not possible 
to identify the firms and manufacturers who provided all of the equipment and material for 
the harbour construction. The reports of the consulting engineers and the government 
documents however ascertained that these purchases were executed in Britain.  
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The Crown Agents took good care that all contracts should be placed in Britain through 
inviting competition directly from British manufacturers with track records of capability, 
resources, and trustworthiness.1235 The Crown Agents assured the Colonial Office that in 
principle there was no ‘difficulty in proceeding with the acquisition of the plant required’. 
However, some of the required items should be ‘purchased direct from makers.’1236 
Therefore, in order to boost the British economy, particularly given that ‘exports declined 
13.4 per cent’ and ‘world trade increased 27 per cent’ between 1913 and 1929, a limited 
number of British firms were invited to tender.1237 However, the documents do not provide 
an exact number or the names of the firms.  
 
The consulting engineers’ reports and the correspondence of the Crown Agents show that 
locomotives, cranes, machinery and other equipment had been purchased in Britain and 
sent out to Haifa.1238 The equipment obtained in Britain included seven 15-ton Scotch 
derrick-cranes of 65-foot radius, twelve tank-locomotives, fourteen 15-ton steam travelling 
cranes, and four hundred skips of various sizes.1239 Additionally, a 15-ton pillar crane was 
designed by the engineers for a special task. It had been tested in Britain and was delivered 
to Haifa and started work in December 1930.1240 Booth and Glynn’s contention that 
industries increased their specialization in ‘catering for the demands of the export 
industries’ is evident in the manufacturing of a crane to perform a specific task in the 
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harbour.1241 Five units of this equipment, including the derrick crane and travelling cranes 
were used in the quarries.1242  
 
The abundance of stone in Palestine was one of the most important factors affecting the 
ultimate cost of the work.1243 This was due to stone being the main physical component for 
building the breakwaters and constituted the bulk financial cost of the harbour. It was 
possible to obtain the required stone from the sandstone ridge of the Athlit quarries eleven 
miles south of Haifa.1244 Arrangements were made between HHWD and the Palestine 
Railway Department to place 200 stone train wagons at the disposal of the Harbour 
Department. At the same time the Railway Department took care of sidings and haulage of 
the stone trains to reach the base of the breakwater.1245  
 
With the use of the equipment shipped to Haifa, five thousand tons of stone was removed 
daily from Athlit quarry with the total amount of stones quarried 1,202,833 cubic meters 
solid that were used in building the breakwaters.1246 (See appendix VI: One of the faces in 
the north quarry at Athlit)The crest level of the breakwaters was four metres and 2,210 in 
length metres.1247 Large natural blocks of stones of irregular shape and form were 
transported by the British made skips and were placed in position by the specially-designed 
pillar crane, capable of handling a load of 15-tons at a radius of 65 feet. 1248 (See appendix 
VII: Equipment, pillar crane for construction of main breakwater) However, it was concrete 
and not stone that was used for the parapet and was provided with bollards at intervals for 
end-on moorings for cargo steamers.1249 The lee breakwater was of a much lighter design 
than the main breakwater, as the structure had only to withstand the moderate waves 
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from the north. The lee breakwater, which was formed by prolonging the existing railway 
jetty, and was about 765 metres long, contained 230,000 cubic yards of stones with a crest-
level of 2 metres above mean sea level.1250 It was also built with the use of the machinery 
brought from England.  
 
In addition to the main and lee breakwaters, the wharf and the oil dock became an 
essential part of the harbour for both economic and strategic reasons. For ultimate 
utilization of the pipeline terminus coming from the oil fields of Mosul, the British 
government in consultation with the consulting engineers and the Iraq Petroleum 
Company, decided to construct an oil dock within the harbour and not outside of it in order 
that tankers and oil cargoes would be protected by the breakwaters similar to other types 
of shipping. The need for an oil dock in the harbour, The Times explained, was so that 
tankers can come to take oil brought through the Iraqi pipeline.1251 The oil dock at Haifa 
served as a facility to export the Iraqi oil to Europe of whom Britain was the largest 
consumer taking more than 75 per cent of the total amount going to Europe.1252 (See 
appendix VIII: Design of the harbour including the oil dock). 
 
When the works for the development of the Haifa harbour were approaching completion, 
Oil News wrote that the lay-out of the harbour was such as to ‘provide a site for an oil dock 
within it.’1253 The consulting engineers assured the Crown Agents that ‘the plans of the lee 
breakwater were modified’ and ‘stern-on moorings must be confined to the main 
breakwater’ in order to allow for the accommodation of oil dock.1254 The plan of the 
harbour could be utilized in connection with an oil pipeline and the export of oil ‘without 
interfering in any way with its use for ordinary commercial purposes.’1255 The Crown agents 
were enthusiastic that they suggested the building of a ‘safe oil dock’ would be carried out 
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‘concurrently with the main harbour works.’1256 This did not happen as the construction of 
the oil dock was only sanctioned in August 1933 when the harbour works were almost 
complete. Why did it take that long for the British government to decide about the oil 
facilities at Haifa harbour? This was primarily due to the delay in settling the issue of the 
alignment of the oil pipelines from Mosul to the Mediterranean. Additionally, it was due to 
the British government thinking it advisable to allow for the possibility for the IPC to 
request the building of the oil dock in order to finance its expenses. 1257  This was essential, 
since the loan provision for the harbour did not include the cost of an oil dock in the 
original estimate of £100,000.1258 
 
Nevertheless, the British government was encouraged to approve the building of the oil 
dock since Palmer of the consulting engineers was confident that the cost of the additional 
building in the harbour for oil facilities could be covered by harbour charges payable by 
IPC.1259 Gilbert Herbert states that serious negotiations with the Iraq Petroleum Company 
began in the latter part of 1932, with the consulting engineers ‘stressing the urgency of a 
firm decision in view of the anticipated completion of the pipeline in 1934.’1260 In order to 
make the funds available without burdening the British government, the Colonial Office 
suggested to the Treasury that provisions for the oil dock could be afforded by using the 
funds allocated for another project in the Palestine Loan schedule. The drainage scheme, 
amounting to £107,000, was duly identified.1261 The Treasury agreed to that on the 
understanding that the IPC were willing to enter into an agreement for a period of twenty 
years on the basis of flat rate payment on all oil loaded and to be subject to a guaranteed 
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minimum of £25,000 per annum.1262 By this arrangement the funds needed for building the 
oil dock became available. It is worth noting that the procedure entailed the government of 
Palestine gaining Treasury approval for most of its expenditure proposals.1263 The Crown 
Agents, on behalf of the government of Palestine concluded an agreement with IPC for the 
use of Haifa oil dock on 15 June 1933.1264 In doing so the company had agreed to ‘a non-
exclusive right to use the dock’.1265 This meant that the IPC would pay for the construction 
of the oil dock while permitting other companies and shipping agencies to use it as well. 
However, building an oil dock within Haifa harbour did not pass without criticism. 
 
The Association of Steamship Agents at the Haifa port, and the Italian Consulich Line, 
protested against the construction of the oil dock within the Harbour on grounds of safety. 
The risk of fire in particular was identified due to the proximity of the oil and because of the 
foul odour causing discomfort to passengers aboard nearby vessels.1266 There were 
therefore concerns that tourist trade would be affected by the building of the oil dock. 
Moreover, having the oil dock located to the west of the lee breakwater would hamper the 
berthing of larger vessels thus would ‘lessen the attraction of Haifa as a desirable safe port 
of call for large cruising ships’.1267  
 
The consulting engineers refuted these allegations, and assured the Colonial Office that 
those fears were baseless and that every precautionary measure was taken to make the oil 
dock ‘the cleanest and tidiest section of the harbour’. Additionally, a clause was included in 
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the agreement with the IPC that demanded the company to ‘take all necessary measures 
for keeping the oil dock clean and free from scum.’1268 Moreover, Buckton of PRT presented 
to the Colonial Office a comparison between the plans of the oil dock at Haifa with plans for 
oil docks situated in various other harbours. He showed that the position of Haifa oil dock 
appeared to be ‘at least as safe, and in some cases safer than others, e.g. Colombo and 
Hamburg’.1269 Consequently, the Secretary of State was satisfied that there would be no 
justification for insurance companies increasing their rates in Haifa. This was because the 
precautions which had been provided against fire risks the oil dock were ‘as great as or 
greater than those taken in other ports.’1270 In fact, a fire-screen of reinforced concrete was 
extended along the entire length of the oil dock.1271 Thus the Italians, in particular, were not 
able to pursue their complaints.  
 
Modern Transport reported in September 1934 that the construction of the concrete jetties 
to form an oil dock had commenced and that these works were expected to be completed 
towards the middle of the following year.1272 Some equipment was transferred from the 
HHWD and used in carrying out the new works of the oil dock.1273 With an enclosed area of 
25 acres formed between the lee breakwater and the oil dock, it was possible for the 
harbour to take two tankers and a future extension would allow for a further two.1274 The 
oil dock in fact made it possible for the transportation of oil from the pipeline terminus in 
Haifa. However, in order for the British fleet to make use of the oil it had to be refined, so a 
refining facility was constructed later. Therefore, the oil dock served as a facility that the 
navy could use in connection with further arrangements. 
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The total cost of the equipment, machinery and material purchased by the government of 
Palestine from the Palestine loan for the building of the harbour amounted to £220,000.1275 
This amount did not include the additional equipment purchased for the oil dock or the 
stores and material provided by the Crown Agents to works related to the building of the 
harbour. The bulk of this amount (£180,000) was spent in Britain with only some items and 
material purchased from the local market. The Colonial Office wrote that small contracts 
should be sourced locally for the supply of material, or for the execution of sections of the 
work, as circumstances permitted.1276 No further details, however, were provided as to the 
material or contracts that were executed in Palestine. The only mention in the consulting 
engineers’ report refers to the expenditure of £40,000 that was spent locally.1277 
Nevertheless, we also learn that some second hand equipment such as a compressor and 
some cement were purchased locally. The lack of information about the local expenditure 
may be attributed to the fact that upon completion of the works at the harbour, all papers 
were disposed of as required by the government and as the instructions given to the 
Resident Engineer regarding the ‘disposal of correspondence files’.1278  
 
Although it is not the intention in this study to delve into various aspects of economic 
conditions in Britain during the interwar period, it is necessary to relate those conditions to 
the behaviour of the government in regards to the building of Haifa harbour. It is possible 
to say that the policy of ‘protection’ established as an ‘emergency measure’ by the British 
government in 1931 was in fact enforced earlier in 1929 by the Colonial Office and 
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continued to be so until the completion of the works.1279 Such behaviour could be explained 
by Cain and Hopkin’s claim that ‘the growth of foreign competition certainly increased 
business demand for protection and for greater state involvement.’1280 The state’s 
involvement in connection with the construction of the harbour at Haifa is seen in the 
extent to which the government managed to use British products. Using the method 
followed by the Crown Agents of directly obtaining quotations for equipment and 
machinery from selected manufacturers, known for their capability, resources, and 
trustworthiness, it was manageable to give the issue of purchasing in Britain a low 
profile.1281  The usual practice of the Crown Agents was that upon receipt of orders for 
stores, depending on the quality and nature of the items requested, they would contact 
one of their suppliers or solicit bids from an approved list of manufacturing firms. The 
beneficiary of this policy was British business.1282 For Britain, as the mandatory power, such 
action was justified because it felt that in return for administrating the territory of Palestine 
it had the right to benefit from its economy. Besides this, Britain wanted to keep its rivals 
away and thus competition for tendering was limited to known British firms. 
 
The state involvement was not only related to the staple products in Britain but also in 
gearing the mandatory territory towards spending its money inside Britain. The government 
of Palestine was not even given the opportunity to consider obtaining equipment from 
other foreign countries. The entire issue of the harbour construction was in the hands of 
the government in London acting through the Crown Agents and the consulting engineers. 
Although the amount spent in Britain was not huge, in comparison to that spent for the 
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extension of the oil pipeline from Mosul to the Mediterranean, it contributed to reviving 
British industrial production, even by a small amount.  
 
The end result was that the British government was able to obtain the required equipment 
and material for the building of the harbour from British manufacturers. This goal was 
possible since the work was performed by an ad hoc department of the Palestine 
government. This allowed for the manipulation of the mandate provisions that demanded 
economic equality. In this matter it is feasible to say that Britain in effect treated Palestine 
as if it were one of its colonies.  
  
 
Initial change: accepting foreign competition  
It was not possible for the British government to pursue the dredging of the harbour in the 
same manner it dealt with obtaining machinery and equipment (i.e. through British 
providers and with a low profile). The purpose of dredging was to deepen the basin of the 
harbour in order to meet the Colonial Secretary’s instructions for the harbour to be of a 
depth suitable to ‘enable vessels drawing thirty three feet to enter in all weathers’.1283 The 
Colonial Office made enquiries with P&O and the Royal Mail in order to decide the depth of 
dredging suitable for Mediterranean-bound steamers.1284 Dredging of the whole enclosed 
area by the breakwaters was decided in order to provide nearly 10,000 feet of vessel 
quayage along the eastern, western and southern sides of the harbour.1285  
 
The consulting engineers suggested that dredging needed to be carried out stage by stage 
so as to suit the general progress of the works. The first operation required was the 
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dredging of a trench for the foundations of the wharf wall. The second was general 
dredging of the whole enclosed area. However, dredging by HHWD was not advised by the 
consulting engineers. If dredging were to be carried out by HHWD, they explained, the cost 
would be 25 per cent greater than the amount allocated for dredging since dredgers were 
expensive vessels both to build and to maintain.1286 The recommendation of the consulting 
engineers was to open up the work to competitive tender, with sourcing a reputable firm of 
constructors being the most economical method of carrying out the work.1287 The Crown 
Agents supported this view, although, in their opinion, purchasing expensive equipment for 
dredging would ‘benefit British trade’.1288  
 
It was decided, in October 1930 that dredging works should be put out to tender and open 
to foreign firms.1289 Though the decision was based on cost concerns, the new approach of 
allowing foreign firms to tender could be understood along the lines of Butler’s claims that 
‘for Britain, the interwar years saw the beginnings of an important phase of economic 
readjustment.’1290 The Crown Agents were concerned that if the public invitation for 
tenders were issued Dutch and Italian firms experienced in dredging would make ‘great 
efforts to secure the work’.1291 Thus, the Colonial Office found it necessary to consult with 
the Foreign Office regarding the method used for inviting tenders.1292 That was essential for 
the Colonial Office in order to avoid any appearance of discrimination or of infringement of 
the mandate.1293 
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For its part, the Foreign Office took a firm stand and insisted that foreign firms should be 
permitted to tender in light of Italian and American protests against the attempt to limit the 
call to tender to British firms.1294 With the consent of the Colonial Office, the Foreign Office 
wrote to the ambassadors of Italy and the United States in order to inform them that 
modifications were introduced to the departmental method chosen to construct the 
harbour. They were told that the government of Palestine decided to carry out part of the 
constructional dredging in connection with the harbour works by contract.1295 However, in 
order to make clear that there was no intention to open the competition to all firms, the 
Foreign Secretary pointed out to them that tenders would be advertised to the colonies by 
the Crown Agents. This meant that the Crown Agents would not employ a fully open door 
policy by public tendering but rather would be limited to include British and some non-
British firms. The Foreign Secretary explained that as the contract was small, referring to 
the dredging for the foundations of the wharf wall would ‘likely to command itself only to 
such firms as have the necessary dredging plant in the vicinity.’1296 
 
The Crown Agents did not prefer the method of public tendering as they sought to avoid 
receiving tenders from ‘unknown or unsatisfactory firms’.1297 They wanted to maintain their 
standard practice and confine invitations to known firms. They, in fact, authorized the 
consulting engineers Rendel, Palmer and Tritton to invite known and reputed firms to 
include ‘those foreign firms who have already applied, and from one or two others who are 
known to them to do good work’.1298 The new approach of inviting non-British firms was a 
breakthrough in the traditional colonial policy related to construction works. It was now 
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feasible for the British government to consider the interests of other members of the 
League of Nations in accordance with the rules of the mandate system.  
 
Five firms, including British and foreign firms but with, the latter having representatives in 
Britain, were invited to tender in January 1931 for the dredging work required for the 
foundation trench for the wharf wall. Only three tenders were received. The lowest tender, 
amounting to £9,252, was submitted by James M. Dawar & Sons, in London, acting on 
behalf of their principals the Dutch firm, Baggerwerken de Vries & Van Bosch who had 
dredging machinery and equipment at Latakia on the Syrian coast.1299 A foreign firm having 
works close to Haifa was accepted, meaning that finally an equal access was given to non-
British firm to perform works in the Haifa harbour. The fears of the Colonial Office 
therefore, that the government behind the firm would attempt to gain a controlling stake in 
the mandated territory, appeared to be baseless and as this did not transpire in this 
example. The dredging to thirty-one feet below mean sea level for a length of about 1400 
feet took two months and ended in July 1931.1300 Although this part of the dredging was in 
a small amount, it drew the attention of the Americans. 
 
With instructions from the government of the United States, the American Consul-General 
in Jerusalem addressed the government of Palestine with regards to tendering for dredging. 
He demanded to be furnished with copies of the dredging concession since the Crown 
Agents called for tenders from suitable British and foreign firms. He also inquired about the 
conditions of the tender for the projected work of dredging.1301 In reply, the Colonial Office, 
through the government of Palestine, furnished the American Consulate with copies of the 
contract placed with the Dutch firm as well as with documents related to the projected 
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main dredging at Haifa harbour.1302 Moreover, Standard Dredging Company of New York 
was also provided with the necessary documents to enable them to submit tender.1303 
 
Similar tendering invitations were adopted for the main dredging. Invitations to tender for 
the main dredging and reclamation work were sent in August 1931 to nine suitable firms 
but were not advertised publicly and openly beyond these. Only six tenders were received 
and came from British, Dutch, Belgian and Italian contractors. The Americans did not bid for 
the contract, although they were invited to do so.1304 Although the manner of invitation to 
tender was not opposed by the Americans, it seemed that the conditions of the tender 
were not agreeable or that they did not have available equipment close enough to the area. 
Heavier work was expected for this part of the project. The contract was for dredging the 
whole of the harbour area between the main wharf and Lee breakwater. This required 
dredging to a depth of 9.4 metres and depth of 11.3 metres for the harbour entrance and 
to provide large mooring and a turning area for tourist vessels. The contract covered the 
removal of all necessary material to provide the required depth. It was designed so that the 
whole of the dredged material was to be used in the building of a reclaimed area at the 
foreshore.1305 On the recommendation of the consulting engineers, the Crown Agents 
accepted the lowest tender which had been submitted by the Anglo-Egyptian firm Tilbury 
Contracting and Dredging Co., (Egypt) Ltd, and amounted to approximately £80,000. The 
main dredging works covering 175 acres started in November 1931 and was finished in 
September 1933.1306 This meant that giving the work for an Anglo-Egyptian company was 
not in violation of the provisions of the mandate since the British government opened the 
work fairly to British and foreign firms alike. (See Appendix IX: Reclamation pump dredger) 
                                                          
1302
 Ibid., CA to CO, 26.6.1931; TNA/CO733/198/5B, S.S. CO to H.Cr. Palestine, 2.7.1931. 
1303
 Ibid., CA to CO, 30.6.1931. 
1304
 Ibid., CA to CO, 30.6.1931; TNA/CO733/198/4A, Partner’s report, July 1931. 
1305
 TNA/CO733/233/1, Opening ceremony, General Description, 31.10.1933. 
1306
 TNA/CO733/198/5B, CA to CO, 12.8.1931;TNA/CO733/198 /4B, RPT report, Sep., 1931; 




Modern Transport reported that ‘altogether over 2 million cubic yards of material, mainly 
sand, have been removed in connection with deepening the harbour and reclaiming the 
area along the shore.’1307 Technically, dredging added around 100 acres of reclaimed land in 
front of the town. The High Commissioner explained that this area was ‘available for the 
erection of buildings’ and was used for the new harbour station and for the standard gauge 
railway.1308 As a result it was possible to accommodate 30,000-ton liners, or ‘the largest 
ships which call at Haifa’.1309 The harbour became more suitable for commercial and naval 
ships meaning economic and strategic goals would be satisfied. (See appendix X: General 
view, harbour works, July 1931.) 
 
This work ended up by providing about 300 acres of sheltered water enclosed by the main 
breakwater. This ran from the foot of Mount Carmel and lee breakwaters built from the 
east.1310 These two arms protected about 700 yards of quay space which allowed for six 
ships weighing in between 8,000 to 10,000 tons as well as lighters and coasting vessels to 
be simultaneously moored alongside them.1311 Even before dredging was completed seven 
ships moored along the lee breakwater.1312 This meant that the original goal to provide 
Haifa with a major harbour given that big vessels could now moor on its wharves. 
 
Although works were given after foreign firms were invited to tender, awarding the works 
to the Anglo-Egyptian company did not pass quietly. The Italians protested in September 
1931 in a communication to the Foreign Office. They stated that article 11 of the Palestine 
mandate gave them rights of equal opportunity to participate in public works, services and 
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utilities and in the development of the national resources of the country so far as these 
matters were not directly undertaken by the administration. They postulated that 
according to the principles which governed the grant of the mandates ‘all works of a certain 
importance had to be thrown open to competitive offers by public tender.’ They added that 
the direct assumption by the Palestine administration of the more important public works 
‘is a policy contrary to the spirit of international agreements on the subject’.1313 Their 
complaint was not only directed towards the recent dredging contract but also referred to 
the departmental method used for the construction of the harbour. In fact, the use of this 
method limited the field in which Italians, as well as nationals of other states, would be able 
to compete for contracts.1314 The departmental method had been in operation for about 
two years, however giving the dredging to Tilbury Company had soured the Italians’ 
approach towards the whole harbour project. Due to military weakness and to the new 
ideological currents that swept Europe, Italy was handicapped and was unable to ‘win even 
a secondary position in Palestine.’1315 
 
Since the British government adhered to the provision of the mandate and invited foreign 
firms to tender, the Colonial Office agreed with the Foreign Office to reply to the Italian’s 
indictment. Their answer stated that although the British government admitted that the 
principle of granting works of the mandate had to be put out to public tender, they argued 
that the government reserved the right ‘to decide in the light of the best interests of the 
Mandated Territory’ about the appropriate method.1316 This approach was in line with the 
British government’s policy since the start of its investment in the Haifa harbour project. 
When the decision was taken to carry out the works of the harbour by a government 
department, the pretence offered was that this was done in the best interest of the 
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mandated territory. Indeed, Darwin rightly argues that there was a distinction between the 
theoretical acceptance of trusteeship and the practiced day-to-day approach of colonial 
administrators.1317 Although he refers to self-government, the British government had to go 
through hardship in order finally to decide which method that was the most suitable (or the 
least disadvantageous) for Britain in its major decisions concerning the construction of 
Haifa harbour. With the dredging experience, Britain had to move away from its pure 
colonial method of administrating and to adjust its method to fit prevailing conditions.  
 
The position of the British government clearly was to assert its superiority in matters 
related to the territory under its control. Gallagher and Robinson explain in their discussion 
about the relationship of economic and political arms in the Empire, that the political 
actions aided commercial supremacy and this supremacy in turn strengthened political 
influence.1318 Although their discussion is relevant to the period before First World War, it is 
possible to suggest that the political position of Britain as a mandatory power aided her 
commercial supremacy in the region. 
 
The Colonial Office believed that the government’s reply would be acceptable to the 
League of Nations. Such conviction emanated from the principle that the mandatory power 
had the right to make its own arrangements with regards to public works, purchases of 
stores, etc., but this was to be conditioned by the interests of the mandated territory. This 
principle had been under the consideration of the Permanent Mandates Commission since 
its sixteenth session in 1929. A decision by the Commission was deferred until ‘further 
information could be collected from the Mandatory powers’.1319 The Commission’s view 
was similar to its view on the purchasing of British material using monies from the Palestine 
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loan. No decision however had yet been reached. This could be understood in light of how 
Zara Steiner describes the League of Nations. She said that the ‘Geneva system was not a 
substitute for great-power politics but rather an adjunct to it.’1320 
 
It can be claimed that the dredging episode demonstrates a slight transition in the British 
government’s colonial policy towards investment in Palestine. Perhaps the consideration of 
the method to be used for the harbour construction could be considered as a step toward 
changing the colonial approach. The dredging episode was however a more obvious 
attempt. This could be understood in light of the previous, and firm, position of the Colonial 
Office which refused any participation or engagement of foreign firms or governments in 
the harbour works. The dredging issue could also be seen as an acid test of Britain’s 
commitment to international agreements and understandings. The British government was 
compelled not only to explain itself to the international community, but to adhere to the 
provisions of the mandate resulting mainly from the pressure exerted by the Americans and 
the Italians. The coordination between the Colonial and the Foreign Offices could be 
characterised as more harmonious in regards to dredging. This sits in clear comparison with 
their disagreements over decisions concerning the method of constructing the harbour. The 
Colonial Office accepted the position of the Foreign Office and the recommendation of the 
consulting engineer to go for contracting. In return however, commercial benefits to Britain 
would potentially be lost, as argued by the Crown Agents. It was through coordination 
between government departments that Britain could adapt to the international regulations 
and accept competition for projects in British controlled territories from other nations in 
British controlled territories. 
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This is demonstrated by Britain’s awarding of minor dredging to a Dutch firm whilst 
retaining the main contract for a firm of British origin (although right under the noses of the 
Italians and the Americans). This was not always planned, particularly as the main work was 
awarded to an Anglo-Egyptian company only as a result of a tendering that was not limited 
to British firms. It can, however, be suggested that there was still a hidden Imperial 
motivation in the referencing for British contractors. Although the dredging issue involved 
various departments to consider changes to past colonial practice, it was vital for the British 
government to reassert itself as an Imperial power. This also could be viewed in light of 
Susan Pederson’s claim that ‘the League was the training ground’ where statesmen learned 
skills and built alliances to regulate the world.1321 In light of this, it is possible to suggest 
that British statesmen also learned how to avoid provoking the international community. 




Consideration of labour conditions  
The British government’s trusteeship over Palestine, and commitment to aid development 
in the territory as dictated by the mandate system, was given important expression in 
British attempts to develop Haifa harbour and to raise the standard of living in Palestine. 
This was demonstrated by Britain’s desire to make sure that the government of Palestine 
would meet Section 1 (4) of the Palestine Loan Act concerning ‘fair labour conditions’ in the 
harbour works. The Resident Engineer, HHWD head George Thompson was compelled to 
adhere to that provision. Wage rates and working hours were the important labour 
conditions concerns. The Manchester Guardian published an article in December 1927 
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titled ‘Unskilled Labour in Palestine: Jewish–Arab Competition’ that claimed there was a 
considerable disparity between the wages paid for unskilled Jewish workers and Arab 
labourers. For the cost of any piece of work, the government employed ‘the Arab standard’ 
which was lower than the Jewish one.1322 In fact, H. Nevinson pointed out that the 
government of Palestine favoured the Arabs because the Arab would work for about ‘a 
third of the Jew's wages.’1323 In light of the government’s wage policy in Palestine, and the 
requirements stated in the Loan Act, the question posed concerned those labour conditions 
adopted by the HHWD and to what extent these conditions influenced the works of the 
harbour. 
 
It was part Britain’s colonial policy aims, as D. Meredith contests, ‘to raise the living 
standards of the people for whom the British government thought itself a trustee.’1324 The 
decision to carry out the works by the HHWD did not therefore relieve the Colonial 
Secretary of the responsibility to satisfy fair labour conditions.1325 The issue of fair 
conditions was related more to unskilled labour as skilled labourers were paid fair wages. 
The daily rate for skilled and semi-skilled labour varied in accordance to the type of work. 
For example, a carpenter was paid between 180 and 350 mils in 1929 and increased 
gradually to reach somewhere in between 200 and 475 mils by 1933.1326 That average was 
also paid for fitters, blacksmiths, electricians, locomotive and crane drivers.1327 Professions 
and technicians enjoyed fair pay since, as we learned earlier, it was difficult to obtain these 
professionals given they were usually employed by contractors. Their comparatively better 
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pay compared to unskilled labour was further enhanced given premiums received for 
improved performance. 
 
With regards to unskilled labour, Palmer argued that since there was no ‘serious 
unemployment’ in Palestine, it was not possible to obtain local labour below the current 
market rates of 120 mils per day.1328 The estimated cost of work at the harbour was based 
on this figure. Nevertheless, the Resident Engineer was instructed to cooperate with other 
departments on the labour question.1329 Guided by the rates given by the Railway 
Department, the initial wage adopted at the commencement of the harbour works for 
unskilled labour started at 120 mils per diem.1330 Accepting a low-wage, Issa Khalaf explains, 
was due to rural migrant workers accepting wages lower than those paid to Arab urban 
workers. This was because employers and the government determined wage scales without 
reference to the labourers’ general needs. Rural migrants were seen as requiring less to live 
on and as willing to accept a lower standard of living in the countryside.1331 On the other 
hand, the public works secured Jewish unskilled labour at 150 mils. J. Metzer explains that 
there was a ‘widening standard-of-living gap’ between the two communities, i.e. Arabs and 
Jews. He added that Jewish per capita income was ‘already 2.6 times higher than that of the 
Arabs in 1929, and the differential remained fairly constant thereafter.’1332 Although De 
Vries is generally correct in his argument that for the civil services the government of 
Palestine preferred ‘employing low-wage Arab workers over Jewish ones’, a different 
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approach was considered in pursuing the construction of the harbour.1333 The Colonial 
Office advised the government of Palestine to adopt a uniform wage rate for unskilled 
labour which would yet be high enough to attract some unskilled Jewish labour.1334  
 
Was the uniform wage rate of 120 mils sufficient for unskilled Jewish labour? Why was it 
important to attract unskilled Jewish labour? The reason for giving special treatment to the 
wage rates offered to Jewish labour involves the Zionist Organisation and its lobbying of the 
Colonial Office about the needs of unskilled Jewish labours and their wages. The normal 
market rate of 120-140 mil per day for unskilled labour was, in the Organization’s opinion 
‘insufficient to maintain the average Jewish working-man’s family.’ Therefore, the 
Organization requested that a Jewish unskilled labourer should be paid 200 mils a day. In 
order to avoid the difficulty that would accompany fixing different wage scales, the 
Organization suggested that a Jewish worker should be offered a wage above the base rate 
for ‘suitable piecework arrangements’.1335 Such a suggestion was expected to solve the 
problem of wage disparity between Arab and Jewish labourers, but in fact it exacerbated it.  
 
In order to meet the requirements of the Jewish Organization, the Colonial Office amended 
the wage rate to a minimum of 150 mils per day for a maximum working week of 54 hours. 
Additionally, a ‘piece-work’ rate of about 50 mils for unskilled Jewish workmen and a 
weekly day of rest were included.1336 The increase to 150 mils as instructed was justifiable 
by the Resident Engineer as men were trained and became more efficient.1337 Although the 
Organization demanded a percentage of jobs to be given to Jews, Chaim Weizmann, 
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Chairman of the Zionist Executive and the Jewish Agency and President of the World Zionist 
Organisation during 1919-31, admitted that at Haifa harbour ‘large numbers of Jews were 
employed’.1338 In fact, the maximum total labour employed at the construction of Haifa 
harbour, including the quarries, was 1615 of which 1243, about 77 percent, were Arabs and 
372 Jews and, from the latter, 50 workers were paid on a piece-work basis.1339 This means 
that some of the Jewish unskilled labour were in effect paid above the wage rate given for 
everybody else as requested by the Jewish Organization. Additionally, around 500 workers 
of whom 94 per cent were Arabs were employed for the construction of the oil facilities in 
the harbour.1340 The variation in the number of Arab and Jewish workers is possible to 
understand in light of the fact that ‘within the Jewish economy the Jewish labour 
movement advocated the hiring of Jewish, and not Arab, workers.’1341  The reason for 
adopting this policy regarding Jewish labour for the Jewish economy lay in Churchill’s White 
Paper of 1922. The paper set out the concept of ‘economic absorptive capacity’ as the 
criterion for the granting Jews immigration certificates.1342 That is labour was connected 
with politics in the sense that Jewish immigration was decided on the basis of economic 
criteria to allow Jewish labour to enter the country on the pretext that they were needed 
for the local economy.1343 In this case these labourers would not be counted as foreign 
labour imported for works in Palestine but rather fell in the category of Jewish immigrants. 
Hence, Arabs were mostly employed by the government for the harbour works. 
 
                                                          
1338
 Segev, One Palestine, pp. 358-9; Chaim Weizmann, ‘Palestine To-Day’, International Affairs 
(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939), 15/5, (September - October 1936), pp. 671-683, 
p. 682; El-Eini, Mandate Landscape, endnote, p. 41.  
1339
 TNA/CO733/198/4B, RPT progress report, 30.9.1931; TNA/CO733/184/6, Partner’s report, 
30.6.1930: maximum labour employed at the quarries was 1043 made up of Arabs 835 (80 per cent) 
and Jews 208 (20 per cent) of whom 50 Jews were on piecework basis. 
1340
 TNA/CAOG10/70, RPT Progress Report, 31.3.1934. 
1341
 N. Caplan, ‘Arab-Jewish Contacts in Palestine after the First World War’, Journal of Contemporary 
History, 12/4, (October 1977), pp. 635-668, p. 647. 
1342
 N. Halevi, ‘The Political Economy of Absorptive Capacity: Growth and Cycles in Jewish Palestine 
under the British Mandate’, Middle Eastern Studies, 19/4, (October 1983), pp. 456-469, p. 456. 
1343
 Miller (ed.), Britain, Palestine, p. 4. 
301 
 
In general, HHWD received ‘applications in great numbers for employment’ from all over 
Palestine.1344 Eligibility of candidates was examined ‘in pursuance of the policy’ adopted by 
the High Commissioner so ‘that the maximum number of suitable Palestinians shall be 
employed upon the Haifa Harbour works.’1345 The policy was taken in light of the described 
labour conditions and in accordance with the mandate system with regards to the living 
standard of the population of the mandated territory. 
 
With regards to staff, it was upon the approval of the Colonial Secretary Amery that the 
Crown Agents, acting on behalf of the government of Palestine signed agreements in March 
1929 with staff selected mainly by the consulting engineers from Britain. This staff included 
engineers, accountants, foremen and gangers, derrick drivers, storekeepers and clerks.1346 
The Resident Engineer assured the government of Palestine that ‘no engagement has been 
made in London that could have been satisfactorily filled locally’.1347 The low level of 
personal qualifications in Palestine provided a rationale for the employment of staff and 
professionals from Britain. However, for filling further vacancies for the harbour works the 
policy of the government of Palestine was that they should refer to the Colonial Office 
‘before proceeding with any proposal for the engagement of additional staff.’1348 In this 
respect, the Colonial Office decided that it was not advisable to advertise in Palestine for 
any particular appointments in order to avoid ‘difficulties with foreign governments’.1349 
That is that foreign governments would claim their right under the equal economic 
opportunity to be employed in connection to the harbour works.  
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The fears of the British government were justified since the Italians complained to the 
Foreign Office about the policy incorporated with regards to the harbour works. The Italian 
position was that the British government’s policy was ‘contrary to the letter and the spirit 
of the mandate’ and that public works in Palestine were given to British firms whose 
engineers were ‘incorporated in the Palestine administration’.1350 In reply to the Italians’ 
protest, the Colonial Office explained to the Foreign Office the policy actually adopted with 
regards to the harbour works. They demonstrated that the staff engaged in London were 
officials of the government of Palestine and were paid from Palestinian funds. In fact they 
were officials of the HHWD that formed part of the government of Palestine. Furthermore, 
those officers lent from the staff of the consulting engineers were engaged on temporary 
agreement with the government of Palestine. To justify this procedure the Colonial Office 
asserted that these engagements were ‘made in the interests of efficient execution of the 
work’, meaning that this was in the interest of the mandated territory.1351 Therefore, in 
approving this arrangement the British government did not admit to ‘contravening either 
the letter or the spirit’ of the mandate or the assurances given by the Foreign Secretary to 
the Italians in 1926 regarding concerns of economic equality.1352  
 
Despite the conservative approach to employment followed by the HHWD, the fact that 
Britain paid full heed and attention to fair labour conditions shows how much the British 
were adapting to the international environment. Adjusting the wage rates and weekly 
working hours were also in conformity with the provisions of the League of Nations’ 
covenant concerning labour standards. Consequently, by adhering to the instructions of the 
Colonial Office, the government of Palestine contributed to elevating the standard of labour 
in the mandated territory. 
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The inauguration of the new Haifa harbour in 1933, and the building of the oil pipeline in 
1935, formed a platform for the British government to assert its power over mandated 
Palestine and consequently the region. The opening ceremonies were impressive and 
brought with them a sense of great achievement vis-a-vis the British government’s role in 
and contribution to Palestine. The Haifa harbour became ‘the finest harbour in the Levant’, 
serving both Britain’s commercial and strategic purposes.1353  
 
When the works at Haifa harbour were approaching completion, the consulting engineers 
suggested the end of October for its official opening.1354 The 31 October 1933 was the date 
assigned by the Colonial Office for the official opening of the harbour. The Colonial Office 
suggested inviting special guests to the ceremony such as the governors of the 
neighbouring countries and Iran. However, the Foreign Office limited those Invitations 
under various political pretences to bordering and adjacent countries.1355 Hence the 
invitations were extended only to the governor of Egypt, the High Commissioner for Syria, 
and the governments of Jordan and Iraq.  
 
One day before the opening of the harbour however, the High Commissioner, now Arthur 
Wauchope (November 1931 - March 1938), decided to ‘curtail the ceremony of formal 
opening’.1356 He thought it would not be ‘fitting to hold a ceremony’ as arranged while lives 
were lost and families were being mourned as a result of the riots that occurred a few days 
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before the opening.1357 In response a special train trip was cancelled. The train was 
originally put on to bring members of the Executive Council, Corps Consulaire whilst other 
special invitations for guests from Jerusalem and Lydda.1358 Special invitees like Sir Percy 
Loraine, the British High Commissioner for Egypt, did not attend and the planned luncheon 
was also cancelled.1359  
 
Nevertheless, an impressive audience attended the ceremony. The appearance of the High 
Commissioner was in the presence of mainly British officials.1360 They included Colonel 
Woods, representing the Foreign Office and the Department of Overseas Trade, and 
Colonel Fleming, Engineer-in-Chief of the Crown Agents for the Colonies. Captain Sanfor, of 
H.M.S. Hastings, and Directors of other liners that called at Haifa harbour also attended the 
ceremony.1361 Other attendants included the chairman and members of the Harbour Board 
which was comprised of the Director of Customs, Excise and Trade, Director of Public 
Works, General Manager of Palestine Railways, in addition to E. Keith-Roach and R. E. H. 
Crosbie as Northern and Southern District Commissioners, G.H. Adams deputy Treasurer 
and the port Officer of Haifa. Attendants also came from HHWD, the Resident Engineer G.C. 
Thompson and Chief Assistant Engineer from RPT.  Other attendees included dredging 
Contractors Tilbury Contracting and Dredging Co. (Egypt) Ltd and Baggerwerken De Vries 
and Van Den Bosch from Holland. Officers from the departments that were associated with 
the completion of this enterprise of Haifa harbour also attended.1362  That is the ceremony 
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was a very British affair and was performed with a modified programme ‘without any 
guests being present.’1363 
 
The opening ceremony was very much similar to the inauguration of colonial ports such as 
Takoradi, on the Gold Coast. The Colonial Office wanted the official opening of Haifa 
harbour to be a spectacular event. The arrangements agreed with the government of 
Palestine for the formal opening of the harbour therefore ensured this was achieved. 
 
The High Commissioner Wauchope arrived to Haifa by aeroplane. He went aboard the 
‘Lancastrian Prince’, a British line steamer that regularly called at the port of Haifa was 
especially decorated for the occasion. The steamer entered the harbour ‘amid the 
discharge of maroons and salute of guns from H.M.S. Hastings’.1364 On the sound of ‘the 
band of the second Battalion of the seaforth [sic] highlanders’, the High Commissioner 
proceeded towards the main wharf wall where he inspected the guard of honour and then 
declared the opening of the Haifa harbour.1365 He declared that ‘the harbour is to be of 
benefit not only to Palestine and Trans-Jordan but also to many other countries both in the 
East and in the West’. With these words the High Commissioner proceeded with his 
inauguration speech. He went on to emphasize the importance of Haifa as ‘the new 
gateway of the East’. He also spoke in confidence about prosperity and of extending of 
trade the harbour would bring to Palestine.1366 (See appendix XI: Haifa from Carmel 
showing completed harbour.) 
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The High Commissioner’s speech concentrated on the benefits brought by the harbour to 
Palestine and to the international community. More specifically, the construction of Haifa 
harbour transformed an unprotected roadstead into a modern harbour for Palestine and 
the reclaimed dredged area also added about one hundred acres of land to the town. With 
the development of Haifa harbour communications with the rest of the world would, 
particularly with the existence of railways that provided direct communication with Egypt. 
Plus, through the Hejaz railway new access to Tran-Jordan and Syria was established to go 
with a network of roads that linked up with Syria and all parts of Palestine. Additionally, 
within a decade the population of the town of Haifa had doubled and a number of new 
industries were established. Moreover, the amount of shipping to the harbour had 
increased and the figures for export a steadily rose. Most importantly, that a special oil area 
had been established for bulk storage of oil and arrangements were made to the transport 
with fuel oil since the town was chosen as one of sites for an Iraqi pipeline terminal.  
 
The economic and strategic importance of the harbour to Britain was not in fact raised in 
the speech. The Colonial Office decided that it was ‘undesirable to lay stress upon British 
enterprise in building the harbour’ in the speeches for the opening ceremony of Haifa 
harbour. They thought that the method of constructing the harbour was still ‘a matter of 
suspicion at Geneva’. They were afraid that if the speeches mentioned the purchases 
performed in Britain, and the number of British staff employed in the harbour, the Italians 
would think the British government abused its position as the mandatory power.1367 
Caution was required, in the view of the Colonial Secretary, to not incite foreign nations 
who were waiting for the British government to admit to the exclusive benefits it accrued 
from the harbour project. By confining the inauguration speech to technical and factual 
elements, and overlooking important factors that concerned the mandatory power, the 
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British government sought to mask the fact that they enjoyed tremendous gains from the 
construction of Haifa harbour. Therefore, the speeches were meant to concentrate on the 
benefits brought to Palestine itself.1368  
 
Additionally, Palmer’s speech was revised several times by the Colonial Office. When 
Northern District Commissioner Major Keith-Roach, read Palmer’s speech on his behalf, as 
he was taken ill at that time, the concentrated on the technical description of the 
construction.1369 Palmer’s message also stipulated that ‘the imminent opening of the 
pipeline from Northern Iraq could leave no doubt that the success of the harbour was 
already assured’.1370 
 
Moreover, a description of the works and data about the harbour were the subject of a 
pamphlet specially prepared for the occasion.1371 With this, a fact sheet, based on an article 
published earlier in Modern Transport by the Resident Engineer, Thompson, was prepared 
for the press.1372 Both publications provided facts and figures about the construction of the 
harbour dating back to 1922 when the Crown Agents authorized the consulting engineers 
to examine the Palestine coast for a suitable harbour. An account on the progress of the 
works, up to its completion and including a description of the shape of the completed 
harbour, was included. They also spoke about the expected use of the harbour for oil 
export as well as about future developments. These publications provided material for the 
opening ceremony’s coverage in the British media. Articles in The Times and in The Dock 
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and Harbour Journal reported the construction of the harbour and the development it 
would bring to Palestine and Trans-Jordan.1373  In accordance with the Colonial Office 
directives, the press coverage did not mention the economic and strategic benefits 
rendered for Britain as a result of the harbour construction. Similar to the speeches 
delivered in the opening ceremony, most of the reports in newspapers and magazines 
highlighted the benefit that the harbour brought to Palestine by turning it into a gate to the 
East. 
 
At the end of the ceremony, the High Commissioner exchanged wireless telephone 
messages with the Colonial Secretary who extended his congratulations to the government 
of Palestine for the opening of the harbour; he also praised the consulting engineers for 
their work. The Colonial Secretary was quoted in The Times saying ‘for four years from 
1,000 to 2,000 workmen, both Arabs and Jews, had laboured on the construction of the 
harbour, and some 70 per cent of the cost had been spent in Palestine itself. These facts 
witnessed to the benefit to Palestine from the work of construction alone.’1374 He also 
pointed out the progress made by the IPC in laying the pipeline that would link the Mosul 
oil fields to the terminal at Haifa. In regards to the latter, preparations for the construction 
of the required oil dock were at an advanced stage.1375 
 
The High Commissioner, in a telephone message, said that within two years after work 
began ‘vessels of large tonnage were able to moor in the new harbour, […] a mooring space 
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only a little less than that of the great port of Marseille.’1376 In fact, ships continued to use 
the harbour during construction subject to permission. In the autumn of 1931, commercial 
shipping was first allowed to moor in the shelter of the main breakwater. In 1932, several 
ships entered the harbour including H.M.S. Sandhurst, seven destroyers and the S.S. 
‘Bormaira’ carrying pipes for the IPC, moored at the main breakwater, and another 
merchant ship moored at the lee breakwater.1377 Beyond that, a hundred and thirty-seven 
vessels had entered the port by May 1933.1378 It was also said that Haifa would provide an 
incomparable base for the British fleet.1379 The charging of port dues was effective in 
August 1933 when berthing facilities, quays, transit sheds and rail and road access became 
available.1380  
 
Fourteen months after the official opening of the harbour at Haifa, the oil pipeline was 
formally opened. On 14 January 1935 King Ghazi of Iraq officially opened the ‘1,150 mile 
pipeline which the Iraq Petroleum Company has constructed between its oilfields at Kirkuk 
and the two terminals of Tripoli, in Syria, and Haifa, in Palestine’ on the Mediterranean.1381 
The official inauguration of the oil pipeline in Iraq was ‘in the presence of a brilliant 
gathering’ mainly composed of officials representing the different nationalities of company 
shareholders.1382 However, in comparison with the opening ceremony of the Haifa harbour, 
the opening ceremony of the pipeline in the oil fields of Kirkuk was simple, with no guard of 
honour or British army band playing music. The King of Iraq, now Ghazi the son of the late 
King Faisal, inspected the buildings and quarters. He then entered the pump house and 
turned a handle which started the engines and sending oil on its journey across the desert 
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to the Mediterranean.1383 The Petroleum Times reported on the official opening and said 
that ‘further opening ceremonies will take place during the next few days in the various 
countries through which the pipeline passes.’1384  
 
On 22 January 1935, the High Commissioner Wauchope formally opened the Haifa oil 
terminal. In the ‘presence of a large gathering’, he started the mechanical operation which 
allowed oil to flow through the sea-line into the hold of a tanker which lay off shore. In his 
speech he hinted that the oil facilities would be extended in the near future by the 
‘establishment of a refinery at Haifa’. At the luncheon afterwards Sir John Cadman, the 
chairman of the IPC, referred to Haifa as ‘providing facilities for loading oil unique in the 
Eastern Mediterranean.’1385 (See appendix XII: Haifa harbour development works, showing 
the oil dock, 1935.) 
 
On the occasion of the opening of the pipeline, John Cadman said in his address to the 
Institute of Fuel, said that ‘From a political point of view, as well as from an international 
one, the understanding was equally important, because it had brought together in harmony 
and sharing the same interest of many different nations, not only European ones but also 
our cousins overseas.’1386 For Britain, by opening the oil terminal at Haifa had achieved the 
economic and strategic aims of building the harbour. Building Haifa harbour with an oil 
dock could be seen to confirm Darwin’s argument that Britain operated to assert its 
‘Imperial claim’ in the Middle East.1387 Moreover, the harbour brought benefits to Europe at 
large as Middle Eastern oil was made available on the east coast of the Mediterranean. 
Gallagher and Robinson’s claimed that Britain, before First World War, pursued its Imperial 
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interest ‘by maintaining supremacy over the whole region’ in regard to Africa and the South 
Pacific. This argument is also applicable to the Middle East in relation to routes to the east 
after WWI and is demonstrated by the events that surrounded the construction of Haifa 
harbour.1388  
 
The opening ceremony of Haifa harbour reflected the Britain’s access in achieving its 
economic and strategic goals in Palestine as a key to its policy in Middle East and beyond. It 
also shows the extent to which the British knew that they had not applied the spirit of the 
mandate regulations, even if they applied the letter, and thus they purposefully avoided 
drawing attention to their intent and achievement over the Haifa harbour. Confining the 
speeches in the ceremony to the benefits the new harbour conferred on Palestine. As well 
as the international community, demonstrates a clear change in Britain’s approach to 
Imperialism. Britain remained careful to show adherence to the regulations of the League 




In discussing the construction of Haifa harbour, it becomes clear that the British 
government was adroit in balancing its own interests with those of the international 
community as well as those of the people of Palestine. In order not to provoke foreign firms 
and governments, the Crown Agents purchased equipment and machinery from the British 
market in piecemeal form as recommended by the Foreign Office. All equipment and 
material were obtained as the stage of work required and were sent out to Haifa. This 
approach contributed to the revival of the British economy, albeit on a very limited scale. 
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The Foreign Office was careful to avoid pursuing a policy that would mar Britain’s image in 
front of the League of Nations. Indeed, and on the one hand, the Foreign Office wanted to 
pursue a policy concerning the mandate that would not antagonize the League. On the 
other hand, it endeavoured successfully to utilize British products and interests to serve 
Britain’s Imperial aspirations. The Foreign Office recommendation was that the contracting 
be made on piece-meal parts of the harbour project to avoid having a detrimental effect 
upon British interests. Thus, the Colonial Office interpreted these recommendations and 
the principle of economic equality by not issuing public tenders that would favour British 
firms. The Crown Agents opted to target many British firms for the each of the different 
items needed for the harbour instead of contracting one big firm.  
 
Nevertheless, the Italians and the Americans in particular made representations against the 
British government’s decision to construct the harbour through an ad hoc department 
formed under the cover of a department of the Palestine government. Alerted by this, and 
to avoid further difficulties, the British government allowed the Crown Agents to invite a 
limited number of British and foreign firms, with the consent of some foreign governments, 
to tender contracts to carry out specific tasks, (i.e. dredging). This implied a slight change 
from Britain’s firm position to ignore other nationals’ interests in the mandated territory. 
Britain could therefore be viewed as abiding by the provisions of the mandate by honouring 
equal economic opportunities for foreign firms, yet still retaining for itself the maximum 
benefit from the development project. Equipment and material were purchased in Britain 
and contracts with essential staff were struck in London.  
 
Cost saving in the harbour construction project, and saving the Palestinian tax-payer 
additional burden, was possible by the use of natural stone already available in Palestine. 
Additionally, the employment of local labour on higher than usual wages, in effect 
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contributed to the rise of native peoples’ standard of living in the mandated territory. 
Additionally, the building of the oil dock in conjunction with the harbour works made it 
possible to reduce costs and prepare the site to receive the oil pipeline coming from the 
Mosul oilfields. The oil facilities built in the harbour also allowed for export trade to Europe 
to develop, of which Britain was the not beneficiary. Finally, despite the scaling back of the 
opening ceremony due to unforeseen circumstances, it still played to the advantage of the 
government. The ceremony was attended mostly by British officials whether from Britain 
itself or from the government of Palestine which gave it the appearance of a traditionally 
British ceremony. With this, it was possible to deliver such speeches that highlighted the 
benefits the new Haifa harbour brought to Palestine and the international community, 
without any opposition by foreign governments who might be disadvantaged through their 








In this thesis I have explored Britain’s economic policy in the mandate of Palestine through 
the construction of Haifa harbour. This has been undertaken with a focus on how Britain 
balanced three key factors: the domestic (British), the international, and the local. This was 
done by examining the influence that the mandate system had upon Britain’s behaviour, as 
mandatory power. The first factor related to British interests in Palestine. This thesis 
investigated how Britain prioritised its economic, strategic and political interests in its 
decision-making throughout the period of the harbour construction. The crucial aspect of 
this first factor was how the British government employed the appropriate constructing 
method of construction that would benefit the British economy through the purchase of 
British manufactured items, and also how it achieved its strategic goals relating to having 
an oil terminus in Haifa. The second factor relates to the interests of the international 
community. This study examined how negotiations in Whitehall, particularly between the 
Colonial Office and the Foreign Office, produced serious disagreement about how to deal 
with the international community. Of particular concerns was the reference for equal 
economic opportunities, as demanded by the League of Nations. As we have seen, 
ultimately, the Foreign Office view prevailed. The third factor was connected to the extent 
to which the British government developed the local area in Palestine. The harbour itself, as 
this thesis demonstrates, was a major asset which added to the already important strategic 
location of Palestine. The importance of Haifa was enhanced by the building of a new 
terminal which brought the oil pipeline from the oil fields of Mosul to the city.  
 
The intention of this thesis was to establish that Britain’s economic policies in Palestine 
followed an imperial pattern in that its primary aim was to use the natural resources of the 
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territory so as to bring benefit to the British economy. The acquisition of territories as a 
result of First World War did not trigger fundamental changes to Britain’s imperial 
approach where, in Palestine, the colonial style of administration was maintained.1389 
Hence, the claims of Cain and Hopkins and those of Wright with regards of Britain’s change 
of its imperialist approach after the War was challenged in this study.1390 Comprehensive 
economic and political control over the Palestine mandate made it possible to expect high 
return on investment, a concept which was expressed by Fieldhouse in regards to imperial 
expansion after 1870.1391 However, the British did have to modify implementation of their 
imperial policies due to their commitment to the provisions of the mandate system as set 
by the League of Nations, in particular these were those obligations pertaining for equal 
economic opportunities to the members of the League. The imperial goal remained: 
exploiting the natural resources of the acquired territory. But the manner to achieve it was 
different in order to comply with the emerging world system after First World War. 
 
According to Herbert and Sosnovsky, the development of Haifa harbour was an imperial 
project contemplated by the British government in order to fulfil Britain’s economic and 
strategic purposes in Palestine.1392 Nevertheless, the method to be used in constructing the 
harbour was different from that used in the colonies. Debates in Whitehall about that 
method were influenced by two major aspects, which confirm Darwin’s description of 
British imperialism. The first aspect is related to what Darwin termed as the chronic 
disagreement with the British government over how the British system should work, the 
second was reflected in Britain’s international connections as influenced by the exogenous 
forces of the global environment.1393 These two aspects were interwoven in the case of the 
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Haifa harbour construction. There was constant conflict between the Colonial Office and 
the Foreign Office over the method of construction, which was influenced by the world 
environment. The concern of the Foreign Office to conform with the League of Nations’ 
regulations, also demonstrated the extent to which the global environment affected 
Britain’s decision about the construction of the harbour at Haifa. This approach is also seen 
in this thesis when discussions in the British government took place over the Palestine loan 
and the oil terminus at Haifa. 
 
The investigation in this study mainly depended on the documents of the British 
government as well as on early publications by official institutions, such as the Bank of 
England, and non-official institutions such as the Institute of Civil Engineers. These and 
other sources provided material to answer the following research questions: What were 
Britain’s economic and investment policies in Palestine during the period in question, 1919-
1935, and how were they formed? It was possible to answer this fundamental question by 
investigating the construction of the harbour at Haifa. In examining the extent to which 
Britain’s approach towards the harbour construction was influenced by its economic and 
strategic concerns, we learned that British economic and strategic interests were the 
driving force behind the construction of the harbour. Also, by looking at how Britain’s 
international commitments affected its decisions about the construction of the port, it 
becomes clear that these external pressures of the League of Nations and the international 
community at large influenced what was usually characterised as an internal concern of 
Britain. Moreover, by discussing the impact that Britain’s foreign policy had on its insistence 
on the Haifa terminus for the Iraqi oil pipeline, the fact that Britain employed its 
interventionist policy to achieve its economic and strategic goals in Haifa was revealed. 
Finally, the inquiry of how Britain’s imperial approach towards acquired territories was 
adapted to fit the mandate system was seen in Britain’s readjustment of its usual approach 
317 
 
to colonies. This was demonstrated by the manner which Britain attained its interests 
without violating the mandate; consequently, Britain did not receive criticism from the 
League of Nations. 
 
This thesis argued that the construction of Haifa harbour was an imperialist enterprise and 
one that reflected the British economic concerns. However, it was not possible to follow 
straightforward methods like those used in the colonies to give the works to British firms. 
This was due in part to the League of Nations’ mandate system that demanded economic 
equality, ensuring that other members of the League could participate in development 
projects in the mandated territory. Britain had to achieve its goals through subtle means 
which the British government arrived at only after extensive deliberations in Whitehall. This 
thesis argued that these deliberations show that, in fact, Britain lacked the proper 
mechanisms to deal with the mandated territory. Hence, the harbour construction started 
debates in Whitehall as how to pursue Imperial goals whilst adhering to the requirements 
of the League. The thesis argued that the British government had to adjust its traditional 
colonial methods and develop a new approach that incorporated pre-existing colonial 
practice. The purpose of this evolution was so that Britain’s policy would fit with the 
changed global environment. The thesis further argued that by manipulating the mandate 
system Britain was able to balance its own interests, that of the local population and that of 
the international community. 
 
The contribution of this thesis is to enhance the historiography of Britain’s economic policy 
in Palestine. This is important in light of John Darwin’s suggestion that studies of 
imperialism did not recognize the Middle East as a sphere of great ‘imperial 
significance’.1394 However, he explains that in the view of some British officials, British 
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interests in the Middle East were of major political and strategic value.1395 Hence, the 
purpose of this thesis was to shed light on the British government’s imperial approach in 
Palestine by examining its economic policy as implemented in the construction of Haifa 
harbour. It was not possible to consider this issue in isolation, not least because decisions 
about the port had to take the international community into account and the interests of 
France in particular as the power controlling Syria and Lebanon. Britain was bound by its 
commitment to the mandate system of the League of Nations, yet was able to pursue a 
course that largely conformed to her interests. Developments over the period of study saw 
this underlying imperial approach challenged, as evidenced when Britain had to open 
competition for dredging in the harbour to foreign firms. Nevertheless, the British approach 
endured. Underpinning all of this has been a methodical examination of Britain’s 
commitment to imperialism and the shift that occurred in the way it applied its traditional 
colonial practices. In principle, Britain did not depart significantly from its colonial approach 
towards Palestine although its methods were, in most cases, different. 
 
A major conclusion of this thesis highlights the importance of the interrelatedness between 
the economic, strategic and political aspects of Britain’s approach to the mandated 
territory of Palestine. This thesis argued that Britain’s guardianship over underdeveloped 
countries, in the form of a mandate, followed a colonial example, particularly with regards 
to exploitation of natural resources and securing economic benefit to Britain. This thesis 
was built upon the assumption that the construction of Haifa harbour was done mainly to 
satisfy Britain’s economic objectives. This assumption has been proven by many examples 
of British policy and action. Since the beginning of British rule in Palestine, the military 
commanders made it clear that the development of Haifa, including its port, would 
contribute economically to the British Exchequer and help deal with the nation’s financial 
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difficulties resulting from WWI. Indeed, this hope was expressed by the Colonial Secretary, 
Amery, in his defence of the British loan guarantee to Palestine. 
 
Nevertheless, this thesis has revealed how a gradual movement took place from a rigid 
imperial approach to an acceptance that other nations must be afforded the right to access 
opportunities in the mandate territory. This shift from the purely imperial approach, to one 
more accepting of the emerging global political environment, was slow but not 
insignificant.  
 
A central finding of this study has been that the British government’s concern for the 
regulations of the League of Nations and the provisions of the mandate was a constant. This 
was because the League’s Covenant did not provide directions on how to manage the 
mandated territories, as Pedersen explained, and hence the mandatory powers were not 
equipped with proper tools to govern the territories.1396 Although the British government 
sought the success of the mandate system as an alternative to colonization and annexation, 
in practice it was not able to produce in Palestine an approach that greatly differed from 
existing colonial methods. In order to achieve the optimum economic and strategic 
benefits, Britain had to employ unconventional methods. By relying on previous 
experiences in the territories under its control, the British government succeeded in coming 
out with modified ways to meet its interests without infringing the provisions of the 
mandate that originally gave it the right to control Palestine. This could be attributed to the 
fact that other influential powers in the League such as France, also wanted to seek 
benefits from mandated territories without being criticised by the international community. 
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Moreover, the fact that the United States was absent from the League meant that its anti-
imperialism could not be institutionalised within it.1397  
 
This thesis has also revealed the importance of the mandate provisions in framing  British 
acts. These provisions fell short of fulfilling the basic needs of the mandatory power. It 
seems that the authors of the Palestine mandate neglected and overlooked the need to 
secure benefits for Britain, as their primary concern was to preserve world peace through 
securing equal economic opportunities for all members of the League of Nations. The claim 
by British officials that the United Kingdom had the right to accrue benefits, in return for 
administering the country would have carried more weight had the mandate included such 
provisions. This might have been possible, given the French secured privileges for public 
works in the mandate of Syria. Additionally, changes could have been introduced to the text 
of the Palestine mandate before it was confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations. 
This was done before when, for example, the ‘juridical and political’ rights of the non-
Jewish population stated in the preamble of the mandate for Palestine were substituted 
with ‘civil and religious’ rights. This change was not opposed by the League. It is worth 
noting that amendments, upon the request of the mandatory power, to the provisions of its 
mandate after being ratified requested the consent of the League’s Council. 1398  
 
In examining the method used to construct the harbour, this thesis explored the goal and 
purpose of the British government’s decisions. Barbara Smith is right in arguing that ‘the 
building of Haifa Harbor is the most glaring example of the underlying policy at work. 
Nobody doubted that the size and location of the port were determined by British colonial 
interests’.1399 It is worth noting here, however, that Smith’s argument that the first High 
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Commissioner ‘privately communicated’ to the Foreign Office requesting for a loan for 
Palestine is not entirely accurate.1400 This was because, in fact, Samuel’s request was 
discussed in Whitehall and at the League of Nations and resulted with adding article 28 to 
the provisions of the Palestine mandate regarding securing the rights of the bondholders of 
a raised loan.The investigation of the method adopted for the building of the harbour 
showed that there was considerable hesitation over which path to follow. The British 
government consistently changed its mind about the best method to use, mainly because 
of obstacles arising from the mandate system, which did not permit the mandatory to act 
as it pleased. The investigation showed that the British government oscillated between the 
departmental method and the contracting method. Although, the central guiding principle 
was the desire to bring maximum benefit to the British economy, their deliberations were 
affected by Britain’s foreign policy goals. Britain was not able to take truly independent 
decisions about Palestine as it had to honour the mandate system, as well as the specific 
Palestine mandate, in regards to how public works and the rights of foreign nationals were 
organised in Palestine. Hence, it was the Foreign Office that insisted that the Colonial Office 
take measures to accommodate the rights of the other nationals. It was this pressure, 
which led to the works being undertaken by the departmental method. This was done by 
the establishment of the Haifa Harbour Works Department as an ad hoc department within 
the government of Palestine. Thus the British government could make sure that orders for 
purchases were executed only through the Crown Agents who in turn instructed that 
purchases be made from Britain or the British Empire. 
 
In this connection, the thesis has explored the role played by the Crown Agents for the 
Colonies in the mandated territory. This is significant as the available literature about the 
Agents, such as that of Sunderland and Penson, falls short in discussing their role during the 
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period between the two World Wars and in particular in mandated territories.1401 This 
thesis demonstrated that in principle the Crown Agents performed the same role that they 
did in the colonies, according to the functions set out for them by the Colonial Office in 
1917.1402 These functions included: a) contracting with firms, such as Rendle, Palmer and 
Tritton consulting engineers; b) entering into engagements with staff to work in mandated 
territory such as that which took place with the staff employed for the Haifa Harbour Works 
Department; and c) the purchase in Britain, or the British Empire, of equipment, material 
and stores needed for the harbour construction and for the government in general. 
However, they did not employ in Palestine their financial role, as were forbidden to do this, 
because Palestine was not subject to Britain’s colonial regulations in this respect. 
 
It was also the Foreign Office which recommended that purchases for the harbour in Britain 
should be carried out by breaking down its buying of equipment and material into smaller, 
single items from different providers. This tactic was coupled with a ploy to ensure that no 
tenders or orders from providers or manufacturers outside of the British Empire were 
entertained, as Smith also demonstrated.1403 Therefore, only three or four announcements 
on placing orders for the harbour works in Palestine appeared in British newspapers and 
periodicals. Nevertheless, such attempts to conceal the fact that purchases were carried 
out in Britain was not entirely successful. The Americans and the Italians in particular 
monitored Britain’s actions and were prepared to protest officially. They were unable to do 
so, because of the fact that the management of mandated territory was not defined by the 
League of Nations’ Covenant and, therefore, the League’s Permanent Mandate Commission 
could not violation of the provisions of the mandate. Clearly, Britain did not fully abide by 
the spirit of the League of Nations’ regulations, as Rappard pointed out; but at the same 
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time it managed to avoid breaching them entirely.1404 The dissatisfaction of other countries 
remained though, and rose again when the British government decided to carry out the 
dredging works by contract.  
 
During the harbour construction process, the British government was faced with a situation 
where it found itself obliged to use a contracting method for the performance of a certain 
task. Using contractors to dredge the enclosed area of the harbour by contracting was the 
more appropriate method due to the tight budget that was allocated for the harbour. The 
British government’s fear about awarding the harbour works to a contracting firm was still 
valid with the dredging task but the government had to do it on financial grounds. The 
concerns of the government were that in the event that work was awarded to foreign firms, 
British firms and Parliament would be angry; the guarantee of the Palestine loan was only 
approved on the verbal condition that British contractors, providers and manufacturers 
would benefit from its proceeds. Moreover, ministers and officials were particularly anxious 
that no other nation should acquire any kind of foothold in Palestine and that Britain should 
retain exclusive control. 
 
Britain’s apprehension about rivals for power in the Middle East and its aim to affirm its 
position in the region was also apparent in the deliberations over the route that the 
pipeline would take to Haifa’s new terminal from the Mosul oilfields. Creating the terminal 
served one strategic goal because it ensured that the pipeline traversed territories under its 
control and terminated at Haifa. The aim was to guard British interests in the region from 
competitors, particularly France, as Barr maintained.1405 The terminal at Haifa was thus one 
essential part of Britain’s oil policies in the Middle East. In the episode regarding the oil 
pipeline two major issues were discussed. These were Britain’s interventionist policy where 
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politics influenced an economic decision. The second was the fulfilment of strategic 
purposes by making fuel available for the British fleet in the event of war. Therefore, Britain 
wanted to retreat from its Oil Agreement with Franc; to impose on the IPC, commercial 
company its own desires with regards to the route of a pipeline ending at Haifa; and still to 
maintain good relations with its rivals, especially France. It was because the French wanted 
oil production to start that a compromise was reached. The solution of two lines bifurcated 
at Haditha, one to Tripoli under French control and the second to Haifa under the British 
control, was to the satisfaction of all concerned parties.  
 
A further conclusion of this thesis is that the construction of the harbour at Haifa signified 
evolving British attitudes towards decolonisation. Debates in Whitehall over the harbour 
construction could be seen in light of the notion that the mandate did not denote 
colony.1406 The argument that the mandate of Palestine was a compromise between 
‘progress towards a decolonization process and the manifestation of Imperial rule over 
peoples not yet able to govern themselves’ was evident towards the end of this thesis 
where Britain’s imperial policy did not entirely change.1407 This meant that the change in 
rhetoric did not equate to a substantive adjustment in policy. The dredging issue 
demonstrated the more genuine intent of the British government to consider the interests 
of the international community by not limiting invitations to tender to British firms but to 
include foreign firms too (through the process remained secret). Awarding these small 
contracts reflected a slight change in British government thinking and could be understood 
in light of Ferris’s view that during the 1920s ‘Britain helped significantly (and more than 
any other power) to increase the stability and the longevity of the post-war-world 
order’.1408 Such a change did not, however, indicate a loosening of Britain’s grip on 
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Palestine, or a departure from its imperialist policies. Indeed, the dredging issue, and the 
wider construction of the harbour, affirms Darwin’s view that ‘British interests in the 
Middle East were regarded as of greater political and strategic value, and more deserving of 
protection than those in almost any other part of the imperial system.’1409 This feeling was 
evident in the opening ceremony of the Haifa harbour where a colonial-like ceremony was 
performed. 
 
Through these various Whitehall and international developments related to Haifa, it has 
become clear that the United Kingdom developed new policies and approaches towards the 
mandated territory. This was reflected in Britain shifting away from established colonial 
practices and adopting new methods that fit the changing global environment. This 
occurred courtesy of pressure exerted by rival powers, which squeezed Britain to find 
alternative methods for dealing with mandated Palestine. It was also seen through 
continuous European and American attempts to enforce their rights, according to the 
provisions of the mandate system, so as to exploit a share of the natural resources of 
Palestine. Their insistence on equal economic rights in Palestine prompted Britain to find 
ways to protect its interests and at the same time not infringe the international regulations 
set by the League of Nations. This was important because Britain, as a founder member of 
the League, found itself committed to these regulations, which also legitimated its 
authority over Palestine. With Britain’s fulfilment of its commitments to the League, it 
therefore asserted its right to exercise control over the territory, thus securing its presence 
in the region. This supremacy would only be strengthened by the construction of Haifa 
harbour, offering Britain strategic benefits on water and on land. In naval terms, the British 
fleet would have a safe harbour for filling fuel and Haifa also served as a key location 
connecting Britain to the remaining territories of its Empire in the east.  
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Appendix I: Ker, Haifa Plan, 1920. 
 
 
TNA/MFQ1/25, Maps. Plan showing results of investigations made during May and June 1920. 





Appendix II: Rendle, Palmer & Tritton, Plan of Haifa, 1923. 
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Appendix III: Palestine and East Africa Loan Act, 1926. 
 
Palestine and East Africa Loans Act, 1926. Chapter 62. 
 An Act to authorise the Treasury to guarantee certain loans to be raised respectively by the 
government of Palestine and by the governments of certain territories in East Africa [15th 
December 1926].  
Be it enacted by the King’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of 
the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and 
by the authority of the same, as follows:-  
1.-(1) The Treasury may, subject to the provisions of this Act, guarantee in such manner and 
on such conditions as they think fit the payment of the principal of and the interest on any 
loan raised by the government of Palestine for the purposes set out in the First Schedule to 
this Act and any loan raised by the Governments of Kenya, Uganda, Northern Rhodesia, 
Nyasaland, or Tanganyika for the purposes set out in the Second Schedule to this Act: 
 Provided that the amount of the principal of the loans to be guaranteed under this Act 
shall not in the aggregate exceed, as respects loans raised by the government of Palestine 
an amount sufficient to raise the four million fine hundred thousand pounds, and as 
respects loans raised by the other Governments aforesaid an amount sufficient to raise ten 
million pounds.  
(2) A guarantee shall not be given under this Act until the Government by which the loan is 
to be raised has provided to the satisfaction of the Treasury and the Secretary of State—(a) 
For raising, appropriating, and duly applying the loan in the case of a loan to be raised by 
the Government of Palestine, for the purposes and in the manner set out in the First 
Schedule to this Act, and in the  … either case to any arrangements which may be made 
with the assent of the Treasury and the S/S for the application of savings on one head of 
expenditure under the Said First Schedule or the said Second Schedule, as the case may be, 
to another head of expenditure thereunder: (2)  For the establishment and regulation of 
one or more sinking funds for the purpose of the repayment of the principal of the loan or 
any instalment thereof within a period not exceeding forty years from the date on which 
the loan or instalment is actually raised and for the management of the sinking funds by 
trustees to be nominated by the Treasury. (c) For charging on the general revenues and 
assets of the territory or colony concerned or on any other revenues or assets which may 
be made available for the purpose, with priority over any charges not existing at the date of 
the passing of this Act the  principal and interest of the loan and the payments to be made 
to the sinking funds to be established as aforesaid: (d) For charging on the general revenues 
and assets of the territory or colony concerned immediately after the last mentioned 
charge the repayment  to the Treasury of any sum issued in pursuance of this Act out of the 
Consolidated Fund on account of the guarantee under this Act with interest on the said sum 
at such rate as the Treasury may fix. (e) For raising or securing the raising of, sufficient 
money to meet the above charges, nor, in the case of loan to be raised by any Government 
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other than the Government of Palestine, until after consultation with the advisory 
committee appointed by the Secretary of State subject to the approval of the Treasury. 
(3) Any sums required by the Treasury for fulfilling any guarantee given under this Act shall 
be charged on and issued out of the Consolidated Fund or growing produce thereof, and 
any sums so issued shall be paid into the Exchequer. 
(4) The Secretary of State shall satisfy himself that fair conditions of labour are observed in 
the execution of all works carried out under any loan raised in pursuance of this Act. 
2. This Act may be cited as the Palestine and East Africa Act, 1926.’ First Schedule, Purpose 
of Palestine Loan: 1. Railways: £1,640,000; Purchase of railway and other capital assets 
from HMG: £1,000,000; 3. Harbour Construction and port improvement: 1,115,000; 4. 
Public buildings, telegraphs and telephones, surveys, minor works of development, and 
purposes incidental to or connected with any of the purposes mentioned in this Schedule, 
Including the raising of the loan: £745,000; Total: £4,500,000.   
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Appendix V: Map showing the route of the oil pipeline 
 
 
John Cadman, ‘The History and Construction of the Iraq Pipeline’, Journal of the Institute of 




Appendix VI: One of the faces in the north quarry at Athlit 
 
 





Appendix VII: Equipment, pillar crane for construction of main breakwater 
 
 





Appendix VIII: Design of the harbour including the oil dock 
 
 





Appendix IX: Reclamation pump dredger 
 
 




Appendix X: General view, harbour works, July 1931 
 




Appendix XI: Haifa from Carmel showing completed harbour 
 




Appendix XII: Haifa harbour development works, showing the oil dock, 1935 
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